Petre Andrei, Fascismul (Petre Andrei, Fascism)

Petre Andrei, Fascismul
(Petre Andrei, Fascism[1])  

Silvia BOCANCEA

Abstract: Republicarea lucrării Fascismul pe care Petre Andrei a publicat-o în anii ascensiunii acestei mișcări în Europa este un gest cultural necesar. Spre deosebire de celelalte ediții ale studiului, prezenta ediție vine cu elemente ce fac posibilă o mai bună percepere a concepției lui Petre Andrei și a criticii pe care acesta i-a făcut-o fascismului. În afară de aceste elemente ce țin strict de facilitarea relației lectorului cu cartea, această republicare este importantă din cel puțin următoarele două motive: definiția pe care i-o dă Petre Andrei fascismului este valabilă și astăzi și avertismentul pe care sociologul l-a formulat atunci este valabil pentru orice societate ce se poate afla la un moment dat în criză.
Keywords: Petre Andrei, fascism, ideology, bolshevism.

Prima întrebare ce poate apărea la republicarea studiului Fascismul al lui Petre Andrei ar putea fi: la ce bun? Fascismul e istorie, iar ceea ce interesează acum este criza globală și, la nivel național, judecarea torționarilor din regimul comunist. Dar, un cititor atent al scrierilor lui Petre Andrei înțelege faptul că în situația unei crize economice riscurile ce pândesc democrația sunt enorme, fiindcă lipsa de orizont și de soluții economice lasă loc fantasmelor colective: sunt propuse și se susțin persoane mesianice și programe politice miraculoase. Procedurile democratice și dezbaterile parlamentare, mari consumatoare de timp, ajung să fie considerate piedici în calea unei bune evoluții a societății, uneori chiar piedici în calea bunăstării unei națiuni. În astfel de momente, constatăm că democratizarea unei societăți nu este un proces ireversibil, pentru că un șoc economic poate distruge o construcție realizată în timp.
Studiul Fascismul a fost elaborat de Petre Andrei în 1926 și publicat în 1927 (în revistele Minerva și Viața românească), într-o perioadă a ascensiunii fascismului în Europa și a primelor gesturi ale fascismului românesc. Din păcate, în anii în care efervescența generației noilor naționaliști era în creștere, acest studiu nu s-a bucurat de o percepție care să genereze o dezbatere importantă sau o un curent de opinie care să se opună „poruncii vremii”. După război, studiul a fost trecut la index, pentru că autorul său fusese ministru în guvernul format de către regele Carol al II-lea, astfel încât era trecut în categoria „dușmanilor poporului”. Abia după căderea comunismului, studiul a fost republicat în anul 1992[2], apoi în ediția bilingvă a operelor lui Petre Andrei, în anul 2010[3]. Dar, și această ediție nu a avut o răspândire care să permită receptarea mesajului acestui studiu la un nivel apreciabil. Fascismul lui Petre Andrei a fost analizat abia recent, în studii publicate în revista Transilvania nr. 11/2011 și în volumul colectiv Dimensiuni social politice ale operei lui Petre Andrei, apărut în 2012[4].
Ediția apărută de curând la Editura Institutul European, îngrijită de Doru Tompea, este cea mai completă din câte au fost editate până în prezent și cu cele mai multe șanse de a se bucura de o percepere seminficativă. În primul rând, ea este o ediție în limba engleză, a cărei traducere a fost revăzută și revizuită, fapt ce îi oferă șansa de a fi percepută nu doar în România. În al doilea rând, este pentru prima dată când acest studiu este publicat la o editură de prestigiu cum este Institutul European. În fine, lucrarea este însoțită de texte ce facilitează perceperea operei lui Petre Andrei și a studiului său despre fascism: o prefață realizată de Daniel Șandru („Petre Andrei. On a Different Manner of Understanding Politics in the Interwar Period”); o prezentare biografică a lui Petre Andrei, realizată de Doru Tompea („Petre Andrei – Biographical Sketch”); republicarea unui text scris de Petru P. Andrei, fiul lui Petre Andrei care s-a ocupat de recupetarea operei savantului („Petre Andrei – The Man and his Personality”[5]); un studiu introductiv realizat de Sorin Bocancea („Fascism: A Scientific Warning for a deaf Society”). Volumul se încheie cu o trecere în revistă a studiilor care s-au scris despre Petre Andrei („Petre Andrei – Bibliografical Contribution”), realizat de Doru Tompea.
În lucrarea Fascismul, Petre Andrei analizează un fenomen ce începuse să capete proporții și în România, dar de care puțini intelectuali s-au preocupat. Din păcate, în România anilor ’20, intelectualitatea românească a fost atrasă în această mișcare fără a avea o privire critică  asupra ei. Din aceast punct de vedere, Petre Andrei a fost o voce singulară, care s-a exprimat împotriva curentului cultural și politic ce începuse să capate proporții de masă. În demonstația sa, el a utilizat o bibliografie actuală la acea vreme, printre autorii invocați numărându-se: Luigi Sturzo (unul dintre fondatorii Partidului Popular Italian și dintre părinții creștin-democrației), Robert Michels, Johann Caspar Bluntschli, Oda Olberg ș.a.
Sociologul a fost interesat în primul rând de cauzele ce au dus la apariția fascismului în Europa, în centrul preocupării sale fiind fascismul italian. În opinia sa, ca și bolșevismul, fascismul a izvorât „din motive economice, din antagonismul capitalist al marilor puteri”[6]. De fapt, pe parcursul întregului studiu, Petre Andrei va asocia cele două ideologii politice (fascismul și comunismul) care, chiar dacă au fost adversare, aveau cauze comune și aceleași efecte devastatoare pentru societățile în care s-au impus. Iată cum le prezintă Petre Andrei: „dacă bolșevismul este comunist și internaționalist, fascismul este e reacționar-burghez și naționalist. Bolșevismul e o concepție teoretică reprezentată și aplicată de un partid politic, pe când fascismul a fost mai întâi un partid politic fără doctrină precisă și abia mai târziu s-a alcătuit o concepție fascistă pe baza naționalismului”[7]. Elementul comun al celor două ideologii pe care sociologul l-a ideintificat este dictatura, pe care el o considera nocivă pentru orice stat: „dictatura fascistă nu se deosebeşte în esenţa sa de dictatura bolşevică, căci atât în Italia, cât şi în Rusia ea este apăsătoare şi abuzivă. Bolşevicii şi fasciştii au creat monopolul puterii în favoarea partidului şi al clasei lor, ei s-au impus cu forţa, trecând peste lege, ceea ce constituie un fapt de o gravitate excepţională, căci au proclamat primatul forţei asupra dreptului legal. Oricând se pot găsi însă – într-o astfel de stare – forţe mai mari, care pot răsturna pe conducător şi atunci legea, siguranţa, autoritatea, statul sunt desfiinţate”[8].
Analizând evoluția fascismului italian, Petre Andrei constată că nu este vorba de o ideologie sau de o teorie propriu-zisă, ci de „o însăilare de elemente variate, care aparțin altor concepții diferite și uneori opuse între ele, cum ar fi naționalismul, sindicalismul și bolșevismul”[9]. El ar fi, în realitate, o mișcare politică ce a reușit să  antreneze aceste elemente. Cu toate acestea, P. Andrei a reușit să  ofere o definiție a fascismului, poate una dintre primele definiții date acestui fenomen în literatura de specialitate: „o concepție activistă, aristocratică, bazată pe ideea de elită, care trebuie să conducă societatea. În al doilea rând, fascismul este mistic-clerical, deoarece proclamă biserica catolică drept o valoare superioară, alături de națiune, în scara ierarhiei mussoliniene. Mai departe, fascismul este un naționalism integral, care ajunge chiar la mesianism și imperialism. El identifică statul cu națiunea. Și, deoarece a conduce un stat înseamnă a crea necontenit, a realiza, nu a discuta, fascismul este antiparlamentarist. Dar, conducerea nu o pot avea decât cei aleși, care trebuie să urmeze propriile lor forțe sufletești fără a asculta de glasul masei și fără a face apel la colaborarea ei, de aceea fascismul este și antidemocratic. După metodele sale, fascismul este o reînoire a machiavellismului”[10].
Această definiție este formulată după ce Petre Andrei a criticat fiecare dintre elementele specifice fascismului: elitismul, misticismul, mesianismul, naționalismul integral, imperialismul și antiparlamentarismul. Definiția încheie, practic, o primă parte a studiului, a doua parte fiind o pledoarie pentru democrație.
Încă un element este de reținut din analiza fascismului: unele soluții pe care o ideologie sau o mișcare le poate oferi la un moment dat într-o societate le pot asigura succesul și le pot legitima. Și fascismul italian și nazismul din Germania au reușit în primă instanță să vină cu rezolvări ale unor probleme sociale acute, șomajul fiind prima dintre acestea. Dar, aceste succese de moment nu trebuie să le legitimeze. „Fascismul în genere apare ca o mișcare și o concepție retrogradă care, chiar dacă a adus Italiei unele realizări practice utile, rămâne totuși periculoasă prin nota ei absolutistă dictatorială. Viața statului nu poate fi pusă în dependență de un om, fie el cât de mare, pentru că atunci se întronează arbitrarul și aproape întotdeauna abuzul”[11]. Cred că acest avertisment este valabil pentru orice epocă și pentru orice perioadă de criză, fiindcă o mișcare antidemocratică poate fi legitimată oricând de un succes social de moment.
Ceea ce a scris Petre Andrei în Fascismul, mai ales în cea de-a doua parte a studiului, poate fi considerat și crezul său politic. În întreaga sa activitate politică, pe care o începe (poate că nu întâmplător) după publicarea acestui studiu, el a fost un democrat convins. Petre Andrei a luat atitudine împotriva fascismului românesc atât în calitate de profesor la Universitatea Al. I. Cuza, cât și în calitate de parlamentar. Între intelectualul și omul politic Petre Andrei nu poate fi identificată o fractură, ceea ce a gândit și a scris în studii profesorul fiind susținut și de pe băncile Parlamentului de către politicianul Petre Andrei.
Reducerea în atenție a studiului Fascismul este utilă atât din motivul pe care l-am enunțat mai sus (slaba percepere a lui până în prezent), cât și din cel puțin din următoarele două: definiția pe care o dă Petre Andrei fascismului este valabilă și astăzi, lucru de care orice lector se poate convinge consultând lucrările recente din acest domeniu; avertismentul pe care îl formulează intelectualul și omul politic Petre Andrei este valabil pentru orice societate ce se poate afla la un moment dat în criză. Indiferent de problemele economice și de urgența unor măsuri, soluția cea mai bună vine tot dinspre democrație.

Note
[1] Petre Andrei, Fascism, Editura Institutul European, Iași, 2013, ISBN: 978-606-24-0022-4.
[2] Petre Andrei, Fascismul, Editura Neuron, Focșani, 1995.
[3] Petre Andrei, „Fascismul”, în Opera omnia, Tomul VIII, Volumul I, Editura Tipo Moldova, Iași, 2010.
[4] Doru Tompea, Daniel Șandru, Dimensiuni social-politice ale operei lui Petre Andrei, Editura Academiei Române, București, 2012.
[5] Acest eseu a apăru pentru prima dată în volumul Petru P. Andrei, Valeriu Florin Dobrinescu, Doru Tompea (ed.), Petre Andrei – jurnal, memorialistică, corespondență, Editura Grafix, Iași, 1993.
[6] Petre Andrei, Fascism, ed. cit., p. 89.
[7] Ibidem, p. 90.
[8] Ibidem, pp. 131-132.
[9] Ibidem, p. 113.
[10] Ibidem, pp. 112-113.
[11] Ibidem, p. 131.

Alana Lentin & Gavan Titley, Criza multiculturalismului: rasismul în era neoliberală (Alana Lentin & Gavan Titley, The Crisis of Multiculturalism: Racism in a Neoliberal Era)

Alana Lentin & Gavan Titley, Criza multiculturalismului: rasismul în era neoliberală
(Alana Lentin & Gavan Titley, The Crisis of Multiculturalism: Racism in a Neoliberal Era[1])

Maria CERNAT

Abstract: In their recent book, Alana Lentin and Gavan Titley are analyzing the complex relation between those criticizing multiculturalism and those criticizing minorities. Among the most famous “recited truths” of the moment is the claim stating that multiculturalism is a failed experiment and must be abandoned. In favor of what exactly – one may ask. The first problem with multiculturalism is that it makes it impossible to even talk about racism since in Western societies this type of problem has been, theoretically, already solved. The second one is that it offers the perfect opportunity for the development of all sorts of racist discourses trying to replace multiculturalism.
Keywords: crisis, multiculturalism, racism, neoliberalism.

The Enemies of Multiculturalism and the Enemies of Minorities
For the last 50 years multiculturalism has been largely accepted as a way of making sense of a space where people with entirely different cultural backgrounds could live together peacefully. Minorities could find it very easy to live in countries where no political party is founded on race and where they found themselves respected as representatives of equally important cultures. This is the general framework of discussion about race and minorities. The current state of multiculturalism becomes very important in the present political and social context. Globalization as a pure economic phenomenon is a very naïve perspective on the current cultural and social developments in Western societies. The migration of the labor force in the free-market capitalist economy is revealing very important problems in the social and cultural spheres of the everyday life.  It must be stated right from the beginning that there is an actual lived multiculturalism (that we are all experiencing in our daily life) but also a theoretical multiculturalism (based on the “fundamental” assumptions of cultural relativism). This type of perspective although theoretically inconsistent (the only absolute truth is that there is no such truth) has been adopted for the last decades as the starting point of dialogue among representatives of different kinds of cultures. The book published by Alana Lentin[2] and Gavan Titley[3] reveals two important aspects about multiculturalism. The first one is that multiculturalism served as a way of covering racism in western societies. The racial problem is thought to be solved and already dealt with so there is really no need to further investigate this issue. The authors are fighting this type of hypocrisy insisting on the fact that multiculturalism is a way of making racist discourses legitimate and acceptable: “Our particular extension of this approach is to examine the conjunctural importance of multiculturalism in providing a site in which the politics of race can be legitimized and laundered” [4] The second aspect is that all the recent attacks on multiculturalism as a naïve way of resolving inter-ethnic communication problems also pave the way for very dangerous populist and nationalist discourses. In other words, because the multiculturalism is such a failed experiment the “logical” conclusion would be that we must go back to a time of more secure certainties of the national state. As Alana Lentin and Gavan Titley are showing, multiculturalism was doomed right from the beginning since it managed to gather a very wide range of enemies. Nowadays, when the attacks such as those of 9/11 released all sorts of fears in Western societies multiculturalism itself is under attack from countless theoretical positions: “Competing to deliver multiculturalism’s the coup de grâce are liberals convinced of the weakness of  cultural relativism, nationalists threaten by the inassimilable, progressive intellectuals for whom “liberal multiculturalism” has weakened and divided leftist critique, and so-called race related professionals refashioning “diversity and “integration” as the new paradigms of their daily graft”[5] As we can see if you want to harm multiculturalism these days you have to stay in line and wait for your turn. Still, the wide variety of “sins” currently attributed to multiculturalism is obscuring the most significant one. This is why Lentin and Titley’s theoretical contributions are so important. They are insisting in revealing a crucial aspect about multiculturalism: it is criticized for all kind of reasons but not for the fact that it fosters racism. In other words multiculturalism, dead or alive, gives the perfect opportunity for all sorts of racist discourses, the dominant one being that of political liberals: “First, liberalism – and the ‘liberal cultural agenda’ – has become a popular modality of nationalisms that are primarily grounded through attacks on the illiberalism of minority and Muslim populations, and on the ‘relativist’ licence multiculturalism has accorded them”[6]

Did Muslims actually killed multiculturalism?
A rely confusing aspect in the dominant political discourse of Western societies about multiculturalism is that while taking for granted the cultural relativist assumptions it talks about the great need of investing in the “integration of the minorities”. One may ask why are huge amounts of money  granted for the integration of those belonging to equally important cultures. This is a very controversial aspect that is indeed threatening the weaken construction of multiculturalism. We are representatives of equally important cultures but, since we live in the same space, we must find ways of sharing this common space. This cannot be done without a common set of shared values. But since there are no absolute values but only relative ones (the basic assumption of cultural relativism) who can assume the role of choosing the “right” set of shared values in a multicultural community? Alana Lentin and Gavan Titley are insisting on the fact that abandoning this inconsistent multicultural theoretical construction leads us to an equally controversial situation where we have good diversity and bad diversity. “Rejecting multiculturalism has become the proxy for the rejection of lived multiculture, the alibi of experimental failure justifies the ordering of good and bad diversity.”[7]The authors are insisting on the fact that the last decade terrorist attacks pushed Western societies to find a safety net in racial homogeneity. The neoliberal political regimes offered no guarantee for minorities since it favors a very strong type of individualism: “[…] complex social problems and political-economic disjuncture can be blamed on ‘migrants’, and the solution, in a neoliberal era, located in an increased individual responsibility to become compatible and integrate.” Just think on how many occasions we hear the phrase “he doesn’t want to integrate”! In 2004 the British columnist Rod Liddle declared that “it is Muslims who ‘killed multiculturalism’”. The 2005 reaction of the Muslims on the publication of the famous caricatures of the Mohamed prophet made Brian Mikkelsen, Danish minister for cultural affairs, declare ‘war against the multicultural ideology’ because ‘a medieval Muslim culture can never be as valid as Danish culture here at home […][8]. So, did Muslims killed multiculturalism? Surely one cannot bring such hilarious accusations to the Muslim minority. It can only be said that they functioned as the revealing element of multiculturalist hypocrisy. In analyzing some of the recent declarations of Angela Merkel the authors are insisting on the good diversity and bad diversity. She was very pleased to see the (good) diversity in the German football team, but very disappointed in the ‘dis-integrated’ subjects. The Muslim minority is indeed a very important one since it poses such dramatic questions about all the dominant neoliberal political discourse. It is indeed very hard to explain to a Muslim women the good values of Western society while accepting the egalitarian multiculturalist assumption that she is belonging to an equally important culture: „Is interesting to note that the multivalent rejection of multiculturalism traduced by Merkel involved not only conservative culturalist formations, but also civil society movements concerned that multicultural ideas were an impediment to ‘teaching the “migrants” German “core values” of sexual freedom and gay friendliness’”[9]. It is indeed very hard to imagine how such good values could be shared by a Muslim, for example, since the very idea of teaching such values must abandon the relativist perspective.
The cultural intolerance and racism is nevertheless present in Western political action and discourse and the authors are revealing this fact by providing very important examples:In 2009 in Switzerland a national referendum bans the building of minarets in a country that has only four; in 2010 70 per cent of voters in the state of Oklahoma support the banning of sharia law even though Muslims comprise less than 0.1 per cent of the population; in the Netherlands parliament seriously considered banning the burka – a garment believed to be worn by fewer than fifty women in the entire country.”[10] Those disproportionate reactions are by no means the vivid expression of the fact that racism cannot be covered neither by multiculturalism nor its enemies.

Note
[1]
Alana Lentin, Gavan Titley, The Crises of Multiculturalism: Racism in a Neoliberal Age, Publisher: Zed Books, 2011.
[2] Alana Lentin  is a Senior Lecturer in Cultural and Social Analysis at the University of Western Sydney, Australia. She worked for six years in the Department of Sociology at the University of Sussex, UK.
[3] Gavan Titley is lecturer in media studies at the National University of Ireland, Maynooth.
[4] Alana Lentin, Gavan Titley, op. cit., p. 24.
[5] Alana Lentin, Gavan Titley, op.cit., p. 18.
[6] Alana Lentin, Gavan Titley, op.cit., p. 30.
[7] Alana Lentin, Gavan Titley, op.cit., pp. 17-18.
[8] Alana Lentin, Gavan Titley, pp. 22-23.
[9] Alana Lentin, Gavan Titley, op.cit., p.10.
[10] Alana Lentin, Gavan Titley, op.cit, p.72.

O analiză a migrației Est-Vest după extinderile UE din 2004 și 2007: efecta asupra dezbaterii politicii de migrație (An Analysis of East-West Migration Following the 2004 and 2007 EU Enlargements: Effects on the Migration Policy Debate)

O analiză a migrației Est-Vest după extinderile UE din 2004 și 2007: efecta asupra dezbaterii politicii de migrație

(An Analysis of East-West Migration Following the 2004 and 2007 EU Enlargements: Effects on the Migration Policy Debate)

 

 

Rada Cristina IRIMIE

radairimie@yahoo.com

 

 

Abstract: Of special interest to EU migration policy are the effects of the EU enlargements of May 2004 and January 2007, with the addition of the EU-8 (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia, Lithuania, and Latvia) and EU-2 (Bulgaria and Romania) respectively. After the fall of Eastern communist regimes, massive East-West migrations were predicted and were expected to have a significant negative impact on the original EU-15. However, neither mass migration nor significant negative effects for receiving countries materialized, though many policies were implemented relating to these concerns. This paper seeks to analyze the effects of the expansions and accompanying policy changes on the long-standing trend of East-West migration. Policies implemented prior to and during the enlargements are examined, followed by an analysis of the likely impact of migration trends on both current and future EU migration policy, using comparative case studies of both sending and receiving countries. A review of the literature on trends and policies surrounding the enlargements suggests that economic concerns continue to play a role and have increasingly become the primary determinant driving migration patterns, though contributing factors such as asylum migration, ethnic return, and undocumented migration, as well as important topics in labor migration, such as the effects of the recent economic downturn and remittance flows will also be examined. Results from the analysis indicate that though EU migration policy continues to be more and more centralized, further integration is required, and should include standardized data gathering and reporting to facilitate informed policy decisions.

 

Keywords: migration, policy, enlargement, European Union.

 

 

 

Introduction

 

In 1998, negotiations for European Union membership began between the EU and the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia, followed by negotiations with Slovakia, Lithuania, Latvia, Bulgaria, and Romania (EU-10). This led to the first Eastern enlargement of the EU in January 2004 (EU-8), and included all of the aforementioned countries except Bulgaria and Romania which joined the EU in January 2007 (EU-2). It was widely expected that mass migrations would take place from the new member states to the existing members, due in part to high wage differentials[1]. This expectation fueled intense policy debates leading up to the accessions, and immensely influenced the policy of the older EU states (EU-15). While mass migrations never materialized for most receiving countries, there was a definite change in European migration patterns, as patterns shifted from being predominantly permanent East to West flows, to circular and temporary East-West movements[2].

The next section covers a brief history of migration policy within the EU, followed by a review of the various general types and causes of migration important to the region. An examination of several cases of sending and receiving countries reveals the variety of both the drivers and manifestations of migration patterns in the EU, as well as certain themes that are common to many EU member states following the accessions. Analysis and concluding thoughts focus on the theme that throughout the migration scholarship it is repeatedly revealed that insufficient or inadequate information hinders good scholarship and the ability of policy makers to institute data-driven policies.

 

History of EU Migration Policy

The history of migration prior to the enlargements was a large part of what determined the policy shifts leading up to and during the enlargements. From the outset, the EU has sought to define and implement common policies on migration issues, including free movement within the EU member states, and common immigration, border control, and asylum policies. Since the Treaty of Rome in 1957, which set the stage for a trend towards a unified European migration policy, the EU has continued to integrate, driven by the movement towards a single market on the one hand and the relative inefficiency of national migration policies on the other. Starting in 1985, the Shengen Agreement sought to relax internal borders among EU countries and shift the focus to strengthening external borders. Then, in 1998 with the ratification of the Amsterdam Treaty, the Shengen Agreement became part of the acquis communautaire, the total body of EU legislative practices and standards. In 2007, all of the EU-10 countries except Cyprus joined the Shengen Agreement.

     Another important milestone was the Dublin Convention, which was designed in 1990 and ratified in 1997 with the intention of making it impossible for asylum seekers to apply for asylum in more than one EU member state. Further, it established that the country responsible for processing applications is the country of first handling, rather than the country of first arrival, and states that applicants can be sent back if there is no risk of persecution in the home or transit country. This essentially set up all Eastern European countries as transit countries (or “safe” countries), and caused these countries to form a buffer zone to the rest of the EU member states[3]. In response, Eastern countries like the Czech Republic and Slovenia implemented asylum policies that were monitored by international organizations such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Organization for Migration[4].

     Up until the fall of the USSR, Eastern European countries were concerned with regulating the flow of people out of their regions, and protecting their borders. The flow of people between Eastern European countries was relatively free among Warsaw Pact members (which included the Soviet Union, Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Romania), but emigration outside the region, especially to Western countries, was quite limited. After the dissolution of the USSR and subsequent political changes, most Eastern European nations removed exit restrictions and instead focused on border protections. In the decades preceding the 2004 enlargement, there was a great deal of worry that mass East-West migrations would destabilize not only the receiving countries of the EU-15, but also the struggling economies of many of the accession states, leading to political turmoil as well. These fears lead to a great deal of interest in the study of European migration patterns, and the creation of policies to deal with such an influx[5]. These worries stand in contrast to most current scholarship in which there seems to be a consensus that the overall effects of enlargement are positive[6].

     Another factor influencing migration flows in the region had to do with agreements made during the accession process of the EU-10 countries. Though new entrants to the EU were eventually to be subject to the same migration policies as the old EU-15 states, labor movements were initially subject to restrictions limiting flow from the EU-10 to the EU-15[7]. Sweden, Ireland, and the UK were the exceptions, allowing immigration from new member states to proceed without significant additional restrictions. It seems likely that migration patterns were at least somewhat disrupted as migrants shifted towards the UK and Ireland due to the lack of transitional arrangements in those countries[8]. However, there is some evidence to suggest that these restrictions had little impact on migration flows as a whole[9].

     Further complicating matters was the reluctance of Eastern states to give up all of the visa-free agreements which had been in place between Warsaw-Pact states. As EU members, they were required to adopt the acquis, but doing this meant that previously easy movement between Warsaw states became a time consuming and costly prospect, as citizens of non-EU countries now needed a visa for entry into the newly added EU states[10]. Another source of migration shift came after the ratification of the Geneva Convention and European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms between 1989 and 1998 by countries that would accede to the EU in 2004 and 2007, which increased the desirability of these states as destinations for asylum seekers[11]. These developments in policy set the stage for a shift in migration patterns across the region, and set many of the parameters under which new and old member states operate in response to population inflows and outflows.

     Having now discussed some of the history and policy decisions that took place Europe prior to the enlargements, the following section examines some of the types and causes of migration in the EU, as groundwork for an analysis of several case studies of sending and receiving countries from the EU-10 and EU-15.

 

Types of Migration and Influencing Factors

 

Since the political transformations of the late 1980’s, four main types of migration have come to the fore. The first category is labor migrants, who are typically unskilled to moderately skilled workers moving from Eastern Europe to more economically advanced Western European nations, with a small percentage of managers and experts moving from West to East[12]. Economic factors continue to be the main driver of migration, especially from low to high-income counties, and to fuel demand for cheap labor in Western Europe[13]. More recently demand for Western highly skilled labor in Eastern countries has been a small but significant driver for migration[14]. The second type of migration, also related to labor factors, is small-scale traders establishing markets in border regions and big cities, typically selling goods that were purchased cheaply in their home, neighboring countries. These are especially prevalent along the Polish border.

      The third category consists of refugees, asylum seekers, and ethnic return migrants—refugees and asylum seekers played an especially large role in migration flows to the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Poland due to newly established asylum procedures in these states, though it slowed in later years as migration restrictions tightened[15]. This marked a change as Eastern EU states had previously been net asylum senders rather than receivers. This is also relevant to labor issues, because asylum seekers typically wish to find work in the host country in which they reside, but often can only find employment in undesirable low-wage positions[16]. An example of ethnic return migration took place following the division of the Czech and the Slovak Republics in 1993, which caused a large population exchange as migrants moved from each state into the other depending on which country individuals perceived to be their homeland, causing disruptions to the labor force of both regions[17].

     And fourth are transit migrants, or those trying to get to Western Europe or North America by passing through Eastern European countries, which tends to be driven primarily by those seeking increased economic opportunities[18]. As part of the EU, Eastern countries have become more attractive destination in their own right, in addition to serving as gateways for refugees from such places as Georgia, Russia and Asia, Other factors that influence migration patterns and policy are undocumented migration, remittance flows, and in recent years, the global economic downturn.

     Undocumented migration poses special problems for policy makers, because it is so difficult to obtain accurate data on undocumented immigrants, such as the number and origin of such individuals[19]. For example, in Poland the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs estimates that between 100,000 and 150,000 foreigners work in the country illegally each year. A telling fact is that in 2007, the number of applicants for temporary work visas was 22,000, but after policy changes to make them easier to obtain the number increased to 180,000 in 2010, though migrants still make up a negligible percentage of the Polish labor market overall. Governments may not be able to completely control undocumented immigration, but by taking steps to regularize the immigrants coming into the country better data can be gathered to inform further policy choices[20].

     Hand in hand with the issue of undocumented migrants are the problems of human trafficking and the smuggling of undocumented migrants. This in particular in an area in which good data is severely lacking, in part because of the difficult nature of obtaining data on illicit activities in general, and in part because it has so far failed to be a significant priority at the state level in the EU[21]. The upshot is that the EU community as a whole recognizes the importance of addressing the problem of irregular migration, and with the current policies in place, it can be hoped that continued progress towards state compliance will be achieved[22].

     Migration to developed countries somewhat slowed down during and immediately after the recent global economic crises, but has overall remained steady in spite of the economic downturn[23]. More recently, it appears that migration rates are beginning to rise again, though it is still too early to know whether it is the start of a definite upward trend[24]. The current economic condition influences not only the decision of individuals and groups on whether to migrate, but also affects remittance flows back to the sending countries. Remittance flows in the European region have historically been from West to East as migrants from poorer countries send wages to support relatives in their home countries. This flow of funds is thought to be one key to bringing stability to areas that would otherwise lose important segments of the workforce through emigration, and to help alleviate poverty in poorer countries[25].

     Though prior to the fall of the USSR labor migration from East to West was relatively rare, it has become increasingly important as migration restrictions have been lifted and harmonized[26]. Economic factors are generally agreed to be the primary drivers of migration, and some researchers continue to rank them as the most important factors driving migration decisions[27]. However, a simple economic cost-benefit model cannot adequately account for migration patterns. If the decision to migrate were simply based on whether all future monetary benefits from moving to the new host country would exceed the cost of moving, then factors like host-country demand, and non-economic factors like social networks would not have an impact[28]. Freeman and Kessler[29] argue with Boswell and Meuser[30] that migration studies would be best served by integrating economics and other disciplinary approaches. So while economic factors continue to be a major factor, other drivers of migration must also be taken into account.

     There is, however, a questions about the degree to which states are able to control migration flows through policy action. For example, on some views, states play a passive role, merely responding to migration choices by individuals and groups, but work done by Joppke[31] suggest that states in fact play an active role in determining migration flows. This stands in contrast to other theoretical frameworks, for instance, emphasizing structural factors that are largely outside state control[32]. On this model, the main thing states can regulate is who obtains legal immigration status. In short, there are many factors that go into informed policy decisions, and much disagreement about basic questions such as how or to what extent specific policies are able to effect migration outcomes. The keys to these questions are good data and research, but at present good country-level data can be difficult to find in spite of continued efforts to integrate migration policy among EU states.

 

Case Studies: Sending Countries

Poland

 

Poland has a long history as a sending country for migrants, though outflows tended to vary depending on the particular economic and political situation of the period. For instance, after the fall of the USSR, a large exodus of Poles of German decent took place, in spite of the fact that Polish migration policy has in general discouraged migration flows in or out of the country[33]. Network factors play a large role in the directionality of Polish migration patterns. For example, the close—if disruptive—ties with Germany provide networks for many Polish immigrants moving to Germany. In Poland itself, the number of foreigners is quite low and a negligible amount of those immigrants participate in the Polish labor market.

     After the 2004 accession, the international mobility of Poles ended up being one of the most spectacular examples of population movements in modern European history. The dynamics, scale, and structural characteristics of migration from Poland all underwent changes, most of which can be attributed to the selective opening of EU-15 labor markets and the corresponding transitory arrangements[34]. Large-scale outflows such as these are supposed to have a significant negative effect on the sending country, but analysis by Kaczmarczyk, Mioduszewska and Żylicz[35] suggests that the effects have so far been only moderate, and in the long-term, mass-migration may lead to the outflow of economically redundant segments of the population which would actually foster modernization of the Polish economy.

     Though Poland is overwhelmingly a sending country, in recent years it has also been the most important receiving country of the EU-10, hosting 77 percent of all asylum seekers in the region. With the increase in stability of the Polish economy and political situation, it has become a more attractive destination for asylum seekers. Additionally, its close proximity to less stable regions in the East, and the network relations with the Caucasus region and Georgia, which are a source of many asylum seekers, account for the relatively high percentage of asylum seekers. In recent years the number of asylum applications in Poland has even overtaken that of a number of EU-15 countries. This contrasts with other EU-10 countries like Bulgaria and Hungary that receive very low percentages of EU asylum seekers, and in general the trend for asylum seekers is still to move west into the more developed EU-15 countries[36].

     Poland, along with many other Central Eastern European countries, struggled with high unemployment in the period leading up to the accession, with rates as high as 20 percent in 2002. While from 2000 to 2004 the labor market gradually improved as the Polish economy grew, unemployment began to fall after accession in 2004[37]. Like many sending counties from the EU-10, the outcomes for Poles in their new host countries are often less than optimal, and characterized by low-wage jobs and underemployment, which may lead to a slowdown in migration as conditions at home stabilize[38].

 

Bulgaria

 

Bulgaria also has a long history as a sending country due in part to poor economic performance and regional instability. In 2010, around 430,000 Bulgarians lived in EU-15 countries, primarily in Spain, Germany, and Greece, and according to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, by percentage of population Bulgaria was the second largest sending country in the world to OECD members, losing around 1 percent of its population to emigration[39]. Migrants from Bulgaria tend to be medium-skilled, but though around 70 percent are employed in their host country, positions tend to be slightly below their qualifications. Economic factors tend to be the primary motivators, and the goal is often to send remittances or improve living and working conditions[40]. Bulgaria is highly dependent on remittances, which constitute a considerable percentage of the GDP[41]. Consequently, the state of the Bulgarian economy remains closely tied to the economic health of countries that host its migrants, and the effects of the global economic downturn will likely impact Bulgaria more in the long-term.

     Overall migration rates have remained quite high, at around 3.4 percent of the Bulgarian population between the years 2004 and 2009, and saw an increase with the accession in 2007[42]. This is in spite of the fact that many potential host counties have been slow to open their labor markets to EU-2 countries, and imposed heavy transitional restrictions—even countries like the UK that placed very few restrictions on EU-8 members[43]. Though there is some concern about brain drain from Bulgaria, enrollment rates in tertiary education have increased in recent years to a level higher than found in most EU countries, and in 2008 the Bulgarian government instituted a program designed to bring high-skilled Bulgarian citizens and foreigners back to Bulgaria to settle, but it remains to be seen whether this program will be effective, and poor national data collection systems will make it difficult to assess the results. However, in general working age Bulgarian migrants tend to have lower overall educational attainments than their EU-8 or EU-15 counterparts[44]. In addition to trying to attract highly qualified Bulgarians living abroad, the government has also adopted a new National Migration, Asylum and Integration Strategy for 2011 to 2020 that seeks to prevent illegal migration and improve how labor migration is handled. With the focus on migrant integration and the recognition that migration can provide interesting opportunities for economic development, Bulgaria is continuing to push towards migration strategies in line with EU principles and policy[45].

 

Case Studies: Receiving Countries

 

Germany

Germany is largely a receiving country, though as noted above it has also been a sending country for a small number of highly skilled professionals, but it was historically a country of emigration, sending farmers to Russia, and others to Eastern Europe, south, and to the US[46]. However, under the 1949 German constitution, the return migration of ethnic Germans from East Central Europe and the former USSR to Germany and the attainment of citizenship is guaranteed. Because of this, ethnic Germans who experienced discrimination, forced resettlement, and expulsion from other countries had a homeland to move to. As a result of Germany’s encouragement of other countries to remove barriers to emigration, a tremendous flow of migrants to place based largely on ethnic grounds. After the breakup of the USSR a huge amount of ethnic return migration took place as ethnic Germans migrated to Germany from East-Central European and post-Soviet countries. Though the provision allowing easy return migration for ethnic Germans was abolished in 2005, it continues to play a role in the East-West migration dynamic of the EU—albeit a drastically reduced role compared to 2005 and earlier.

     Leading up to the 2004 enlargements, Germany was expected to be the most affected country by the increased mobility. This was thought to be the case because of the large existing EU-8 population already residing in Germany, and due to its close proximity to EU-8 countries[47]. Of the new EU-10 states, the biggest sender of migrants to Germany is its neighbor to the east, Poland. While political factors like national security push towards closure, globalization and world economics push towards openness (the so-called “liberal paradox”). In response to this, in 2000 Germany opened up tech visas designed to recruit up to 20,000 highly skilled workers, which marked a change in Germany’s long standing anti-immigration policies though public sentiment in Germany remains mixed[48]. But in keeping with the prior trend towards closure, Germany maintained restrictions on labor access for EU-10 countries for the maximum 7 years, and at least in part because of this experienced only moderate increases in migration after the enlargements[49]. Further, there is evidence that transitional arrangements may have driven high-skill workers away, leaving a greater proportion of migrants with lower qualifications[50].

     Another facet of East-West migration unique to Germany was the flow of workers from the former German Democratic Republic into the Western portion of the country. These movements tended to mirror the new migration patterns across the EU, in that they were generally circular and transitory[51]. Rather than a massive wave of migration after the accession that some researchers predicted[52], Fertig and others more accurately predicted a moderate increase in migration to Germany, especially from the first round of candidates, based on an analysis of the drivers of historical migration patterns[53].

 

Ireland

Though a modest wave of immigration was expected in Ireland, as one of only three countries to largely allow open access to new member states from the start, it was also one of the only countries where the number of incoming migrants far exceeded predictions[54]. Since 2004 a disproportionately large number of EU-8 (especially Polish) citizens migrated to Ireland, and between 2007 and 2009, the number of EU-8 citizens living in Ireland rose from 30,000 to 39,000. In the decades leading up to 2004, Ireland had a net outflow of migrants, but in 2004 this changed to a net increase which peaked in 2007 with the arrival of an estimated 32,000 migrants. One difference that saw a smaller percentage of migrants from EU-2 countries following the 2007 enlargement is that the UK placed severe restrictions on access to labor markets for EU-2 citizens[55]. Also, though EU-10 migrants are among the least educated groups in Ireland, they are still relatively well-educated. On the other hand, they tend to be employed below their skill level, in lower paying jobs in the Irish labor force with a wage disadvantage from around 32 to 45 percent relative to natives. In spite of this they do have high employment rates—as high as 80 percent within the Irish labor force[56].

     Since 2000, around 122,000 long-term migrants have arrived in Ireland, but this likely does not capture the full scope of the population movements since it does not include short-term or temporary migrants[57]. While over the next 20 years long-term immigration to Ireland is expected to fall to insignificant numbers, data gathering systems need to be implemented in order to properly track and plan for any future population movements, especially as more countries seek to join the EU in the coming decades. In the meantime, the impact of larger than expected migrations has lead to increased strain on public services, such as medical care and public housing, and as the migration restrictions ended in 2011, that is only expected to increase. Additionally, the economic downturn may cause Ireland to return to outward and return migration[58]. However, these factors have been offset by the positive economic benefits that have resulted from the enlargements, such as an additional 40,000 jobs added to the economy[59].

 

Analysis

 

It should be clear from the proceeding discussion of sending and receiving countries that the experience of EU accession varies considerably from country to country, based on a host of factors such as prior regulations, economic condition, geographic location, and networks. Typically, employment opportunities in receiving countries are low-skilled positions, and many migrant workers from EU-10 countries end up employed below their skill level. While there often seems to be some negative economic impact on sending countries, this is somewhat mitigated by remittance flows and the removal of surplus workers from the labor force. Additionally, though the general migration trend is still from East to West, since accession the trend in EU-10 countries and across the EU has been towards circular, transitory migration, rather than permanent waves of migrants coming from the East[60].

     Since 2004, about 1.8 percent of the EU-8 population has moved to the EU-15, raising the host country population by an average of 0.3 percent, approximately 75 percent of which can be attributed to the enlargements. In spite of their smaller size, the addition of the EU-2 countries sent about 4.1 percent of their total population, which resulted in an additional 0.3 percent increase in host-country population size, of which about 50 percent can be attributed to the enlargement[61]. This is expected to have a negative permanent effect on the economies of the sending countries of about 3 to 10 percent of potential per capita GDP, though this effect is expected to be offset in the short-term by the flow of remittances back to the sending countries[62]. While these figures are in some regards helpful to policy makers and forecasters, aggregate numbers fail to illustrate the diversity of experiences among sending and receiving states after the 2004 and 2007 enlargements, and in order to ascertain specific useful information for policy decisions, better data gathering systems are needed.

     As the cases of Germany and Ireland indicate, the individual policy choices regarding transitional arrangements had very specific outcomes, though since Ireland was one of very few countries that did not impose significant transitional barriers the effects are largely lost in the aggregate numbers. Similarly with sending countries, the local structural factors, networks, and other mitigating factors all had a profound influence on how the enlargements affected the social and economic outcomes of their citizens at home and abroad. Though Germany in particular has relatively high-quality migration data available, that is far from the norm, and all of the other case study countries had serious shortfalls in the quality and availability of information. The new member states of the EU-10, and the EU-2 in particular, have especially underdeveloped data systems, but are in some ways better poised for new regulation since so many structural factors are still in flux and could be built up in a way that unifies policy among EU states, making the data comparisons among states significantly less problematic. However, even EU-15 states are not free from data shortfalls. For instance, in Ireland, published data does not allow the number of EU-10 immigrants to be determined before 2006, and Barrett[63] notes a huge discrepancy between census data and administrative data (issuance of social security numbers known as PPS numbers) that continues to be a problem. Numbers from the census indicate an estimated inflow of 100,000 migrants from 2004 to 2010 versus 300,000 based on PPS numbers issued—the reasons for this discrepancy can only be guessed at, which may mean that important factors that could have significant impacts on the market and immigration models have been missed[64].

     Additionally, because of the issues with how individual states define classes of migration and gather different types of data, analysis between countries is also a challenge, and coming to reasonable policy decisions that affect the entire EU body are difficult to say the least. As a precursor to further wide-ranging migration policy changes, uniform data systems across states are essential.

 

Conclusion

 

Though there are many areas of unified migration policy, overall there is still a high degree of fragmentation and dispersion on the specifics of migration policy[65]. Fertig[66] and others have pointed out that the most difficult part of forming an analysis is the lack of good data for many regions of the world, and at present there is no unified system or methodology for population data collection among EU member states, and so the amount and quality of data available varies widely from country to country[67]. Policy makers would like to know the size, makeup, and attributes related to the timing, duration and length of stay for future waves of migration[68], but current approaches to migration theory, research, and data-collection are not comprehensive or developed enough to form accurate models and predictions about migration patterns and the effects of migration policy[69]. The European Commission recognizes the need for further integration of migration policy, and in order for this to take place, new unified data collection systems must be enacted[70].

 

 

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[21] Idem., Smuggling of Migrants … ; Clandestino Project. Undocumented Migration … .

[22] Clandestino Project. Undocumented Migration… .

[23] Gervais Appave, Frank Laczko , ed., International Organization for Migration. „International Migration Annual Review 2010/2011.” World Migration Report 2011 Communicating Effectively About Migration, International Organization for Migration, Geneva, 2011, pp. 49-89.

[24] OECD, International Migration Outlook 2012, OECD Publishing, 2012.

[25] World Bank, Global Economic Prospects: Economic Implications of Remittances and Migration. The World Bank, Washington DC, 2006; World Bank, Migration and Remittances: Factbook 2011. 2nd., The World Bank, Washington DC, 2011.

[26] Heinz Fassmann, Rainer Munz. „European East-West Migration, 1945-1992.” International Migration Review 28, no. 3, 1994, pp. 520-538.

[27] Christina Boswell, Peter R. Mueser. „Introduction: Economics and Interdisciplinary Approaches in Migration Research.” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 34, no. 4, 2008, pp. 519-529;  John R Dobson, op.cit.,.

[28] Thomas Faist, The Volume and Dynamics of International Migration and Transnational Social Spaces. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2000.

[29] Gary P Freeman, Alan E. Kessler. „Political Economy and Migration Policy.” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 34, no. 4, 2008, pp. 655-678.

[30] Christina Boswell, Peter R. Mueser, op.cit.,.

[31] Christian Joppke, ed., Challenge to the Nation-State: Immegration in Western Europe and the United States, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998.

[32] Wayne Cornelius, Marc Rosenblum, „Immigration and Politics.” Annual Review of Political Science 8, no. 1, 2005, pp. 99-119; James Hollifield, „The Emerging Migration State.” International Migration Review 38, no. 3, 2004, pp. 885-912.

[33] Krystyna Iglicka, „Migration Movements from and into Poland in the Light of East-West European Migration.”, International Migration 39, no. 1, 2001, pp. 3-32.

[34] Michal P Garapich, „The migration industry and civil society: Polish immigrants in the United Kingdom before and after EU enlargement.” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 34, no. 5, 2008, pp. 735-752.

[35] Kaczmarczyk, Paweł, Marta Mioduszewska, Anna Żylicz, „Impact of the Post-Accession Migration on the Polish Labor Market.” In EU Labor Markets After Post-Enlargement Migration, edited by Martin Kahanec and Klaus F. Zimmermann, Ed. Springer, Heidelberg, Dordrecht, London, New York, 2010.

[36] Eurostat. Eurostat regional yearbook 2011. Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 2011.

[37] Kaczmarczyk, Paweł, Marta Mioduszewska, Anna Żylicz, op.cit.,.

[38] Stephen Drinkwater, John Eade, Michal Garapich, „Poles Apart? EU Enlargement and the Labour Market Outcomes of Immigrants in the United Kingdom.” International Migration 47, no. 1, 2009, pp. 161-190.

[39] OECD, International Migration Outlook 2012. OECD Publishing, 2012.

[40] Dawn Holland, Tatiana Fic, Ana Rincon-Aznar, Lucy Stokes Pawel, op.cit.,.; Martin Kahanec, Anzelika Zaiceva, Klaus F. Zimmermann. „Lessons from Migration after EU Enlargement.” In EU Labor Markets After Post-Enlargement Migration, edited by Martin Kahanec and Klaus F. Zimmermann, Ed. Springer Heidelberg, Dordrecht, London, New York, 2010.

[41] Martin Kahanec, Anzelika Zaiceva, Klaus F. Zimmermann, op.cit.,.

[42] Dawn Holland, Tatiana Fic, Ana Rincon-Aznar, Lucy Stokes Pawel, op.cit.,.

[43] Martin Kahanec, Anzelika Zaiceva, Klaus F. Zimmermann, op.cit.,.

[44] Idem.

[45] OECD, International Migration Outlook 2012. OECD Publishing, 2012.

[46] James Hollifield,”The Emerging Migration State.” International Migration Review 38, no. 3, 2004, pp. 885-912.

[47] Dawn Holland, Tatiana Fic, Ana Rincon-Aznar, Lucy Stokes Pawel, op.cit.,.

[48] James Hollifield, op.cit.,.

[49] Dawn Holland, Tatiana Fic, Ana Rincon-Aznar, Lucy Stokes Pawel, op.cit.,.

[50] Martin Kahanec, Anzelika Zaiceva, Klaus F. Zimmermann, op.cit.,.

[51] Nicola Fuchs-Schündeln, Matthias Schündeln. „Who stays, who goes, who returns?: East–West migration within Germany since reunification.”, Economics of Transition 17, no. 4, 2009, pp. 703-738.

[52] Thomas Straubhaar, op.cit.,.

[53] Michael Fertig, „The economic impact of EU-enlargement: assessing the migration potential.” Empirical Economics 26, no. 4, 2001, pp. 707-720.

[54] Dawn Holland, Tatiana Fic, Ana Rincon-Aznar, Lucy Stokes Pawel, op.cit.,.; Raymond Russell, Migration in Northern Ireland: an update. Research Paper, Northern Ireland Assembly, Research and Information Service, Belfast, 2012; Alan Barrett, „EU Enlargement and Ireland’s Labor Market.” In EU Labor Markets After

Post-Enlargement Migration, edited by Martin Kahanec and Klaus F. Zimmermann, Ed. Springer Heidelberg, Dordrecht, London, New York, 2010.

[55] Raymond Russell, op.cit.,.

[56] Alan Barrett , op.cit.,.

[57] Raymond Russell, op.cit.,.; Alan Barrett , op.cit.,.

[58] Alan Barrett , op.cit.,.

[59] Raymond Russell, op.cit.,.

[60] Béla Galgóczi, Janine Leschke, and Andrew Watt, op.cit.,. ; Roos Pijpers, „Problematising the ‘orderly’ aesthetic assumptions of forecasts of East – West migration in the European Union.” Environment and Planning A 40, no. 1, 2008, pp.174-188.

[61] Dawn Holland, Tatiana Fic, Ana Rincon-Aznar, Lucy Stokes Pawel, op.cit.,.;

[62] Idem.

[63] Alan Barrett , op.cit.,.

[64] Idem.

[65] Sergio Carrera, Anaïs Faure Atger, Elspeth Guild, Dora Kostakopoulou. Labour Immigration Policy in the EU: A Renewed Agenda for Europe 2020, CEPS Policy Briefs, CEPS, 2011.

[66] Michael Fertig, op.cit.,.

[67] OECD, International Migration Outlook 2012. OECD Publishing, 2012.

[68] Martin Kahanec, Anzelika Zaiceva, Klaus F. Zimmermann, op.cit.,.

[69] Gary P Freeman, Alan E. Kessler, op.cit.,;  Dusan Drbohlav, „Migration Policy Objectives for European East-West International Migration”, International Migration 35, no. 1, 1997, pp. 85-108; Stephen Castles,”Understanding Global Migration: A Social Transformation Perspective.” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 36, no. 10, 2010, pp. 1565-1586.

[70] European Commission. The Global Approach to Migration and Mobility, Communication from the commission to the European Parliament, The Council, The European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Brussels, 2011.

Neo-colonialismul și actorii săi în ordinea global (Neo-colonialism and Its Actors in the Global Order)

RELAŢII INTERNAŢIONALE ŞI STUDII EUROPENE

 

Neo-colonialismul și actorii săi în ordinea global

(Neo-colonialism and Its Actors in the Global Order[1])

 

Mădălina Virginia ANTONESCU

 

 

 

Abstract:  In this paper, we are trying to analyze the relation between state sovereignty , the Westphalian  state and, on the other hand, the  non-state actors (especially, the transnational companies), that are capable to shape and control forms of economic dominance over new peripheries, in a world based on general, universal and imperative prohibition (inscribed in major documents of international law) regarding imperialism and colonialism, as well as all forms of neo-colonialism and neo-imperialism. 

 

Keywords: state sovereignty, globalist order, neo-colonialism, neo-colonial actor, transnational companies

 

   

 

State sovereignty and actors of the globalist order

According to a definition, state sovereignty is the independence of a state in undertaking actions in relation to an external force[2]. Sovereignty is also a principle designating the place where  are born the ability to issue rules and the duty of allegiance, but also the power exercised by the state (setting political goals, drafting decisions) within its borders, without external interference[3].

These two definitions are quite broad in scope, which is why they cannot be applied to the features of the globalist order at the beginning of the 21st century: thus, in the context of the globalist forces, from the proliferation of non-state actors (transnational companies, non-governmental organisations, clubs, groups of persons, more or less institutionalised[4]) to the proliferation and strengthening of unilateral decision-making power (in relation to states) of international organisations specialised in the fields of banking, economy, finances (the IMF[5], the World Bank or groups of industrialised states, such as G7 or G8[6]) that do not function based on a special agreement with specific rights and obligations[7], we can talk about the inclusion of globalist actors in the scope of these definitions. More precisely, the phrase “external forces” or “external interferences” can include not only states, groups of states (organised in more or less institutionalised forms, from international intergovernmental organisations, such as the IMF[8] or the World Bank[9], to informal decision-making groups or forums with composite participation, not only at the level of states, such as the Davos Economic Forum) whose decisions and/or actions generate, directly or indirectly, at the level of concrete political and economic decisions and measures, a series of changes[10] which would not have taken place if the state in question had benefited from its full sovereignty (internal and external, that is at national level, including economically and in its international relations)[11]. The concept of “international relations” has a much broader meaning, including relations between state and non-state actors in the globalist order who exceed the framework of international legal order and, moreover, are within a field which has not yet been regulated by it (as a state-centric right[12]).

Therefore, starting from the above-mentioned definitions of state sovereignty, we can say that we are in the presence of a phenomenon of “neo-colonialism” when “the direct or indirect intervention of external forces or external interferences[13]” affect the content of sovereignty and its concrete exercise by the state in question, on its territory, concerning persons, goods and activities (including economic ones) on its territory or subject to its jurisdiction”[14].

Starting from the second definition, we may say that we are clearly in the presence of a phenomenon of neo-colonialism (in a globalist sense, that is mostly economic[15]) when sovereignty (defined as “the place where are born the ability to issue rules and the duty of allegiance, but also the power exercised by the state”) is affected by external interferences (or, more than that, they illegally substitute themselves for the state and issue rules in its stead, generating a duty for the citizens to obey the new centre of power – the external colonial force – instead of the lawful power exercised by the state). It is clear that we are talking about phenomena of neo-colonialism which have not been rigorously identified or analysed by legal experts or economists at the beginning of the 21st century. In our opinion, they continue to be either enthusiastic promoters of the forces of globalisation[16] (without thinking of the consequences that these radical globalisation theories have on the future of the nation-state) or the promoters of a rigid state-centrist vision on international law, in which non-state actors and even international organisations such as the IMF or World Bank are seen from a classical, obsolete perspective, being considered “cooperation frameworks of member states” and not active globalist forces, autonomous in relation to states, able to exercise forms of neo-colonialism in the radically changed context (compared to the one of the 20th century) of today’s international world (marked and profoundly changed by globalisation).

At the beginning of the 21st century, these phenomena of neo-colonialism can be exercised by: 

– state actors (state-nations, individually or as groups of state-nations which, politically or economically, are highly industrialised states, developing information societies as third wave societies, states that benefit from advanced military technologies, developing knowledge societies specific to the 21st century) forming the First World”[17].

– secondary actors (international intergovernmental organisations, derived from the will of states, but which gradually fall outside the scope of their trusteeship system, transforming either into hegemonic decision-making centres of a member state, or into integration organisations, by transferring sovereign attributes from member states to a supranational political and legal level)[18]

– non-state actors[19] (international NGOs, individuals, transnational companies,  groups of interests, clubs, associations, various periodic forums attended by a composite audience – partly at the level of state representation, partly as globalist actors – directors of banks, corporations, various notable persons, the media etc.)[20].

 

Understanding colonialism and neo-colonialism from the perspective of the principle of state sovereignty

 

According to the legal literature, state sovereignty is, in a world marked by conflicts and inequality of power and resources, the best rampart for defending their identity, their rights as states, their independence and dignity[21]. A sovereign state is considered to be the main instrument for implementing the new rules of international law, for which it is internationally accountable[22].

For a correct understanding of the phenomena of colonialism and neo-colonialism, we think it is relevant to recall the content of the political-legal concept of “sovereignty”: as the supreme power of state on the subjects located on its territory and as freedom from the action of other states (internal and external aspect of sovereignty)[23].

Authors of international law converge towards admitting that a state’s sovereignty is made up of three important elements: the right to domestic independence, the right to equality and independence in the relations with other states and the right to self-determination. Concerning a state’s internal sovereignty, we must recall that no other authority (in that connection, we are talking about “territorial sovereignty”) shall be exercised on a state’s territory. According to authors of international law, this dimension of a state’s sovereignty includes the exclusive right of that state to adopt laws and regulations applicable on its territory, the right to ensure all aspects of state organisation, the right to determine freely various issues of political, economic, social and cultural life[24].

The sovereign state exercises this essential capacity over all persons and goods subject to its jurisdiction, as well as over the activities exercised on its territory.

Especially from the perspective of globalist order and proliferation of non-state actors, but also of the strengthening of the economic and financial decision-making role of international financial institutions and international organisations (including regarding the strengthening of their power in relation to member states), it is important to recall the fact that a key element of state sovereignty is economic sovereignty[25], that is “the orientation and management of national economy according to the options freely chosen and assumed by each state[26]” (obviously, by complying with the rules of international law and ius cogens).

This is essential in order to correctly understand the new forms of colonialism[27] that continue to be practiced during 21st century[28], in a world that, politically and legally, has decreed ever since the end of the 20th century the collapse of colonial systems and placed the phenomenon of colonialism[29] itself under international legal prohibition.

It is important to add the opinion of legal authors concerning the relations between states, from the perspective of state sovereignty; thus, other states may legitimately be concerned with the compliance by another state of its internationally assumed commitments and of rules of international law (since sovereignty is not absolute) when it exercises sovereign attributes on its territory, on persons, goods and activities on its territory or subject to its jurisdiction. But what is essential is that states cannot lawfully substitute themselves, under the current international law, for another state concerning the activities of adopting and implementing its laws or the orientation and management of its economic activity[30].

Also regarding a state’s economic sovereignty, according to the legal literature, it does not preclude the state in question from exercising certain powers of its sovereignty beyond the limits of its territory (for instance, exercising certain sovereign rights in the contiguous area of its territorial seas, on the continental plateau or in the exclusive economic area)[31].

Or, neo-colonialism and neo-imperialism are forms of domination and exploitation of countries and peoples, which constantly, permanently and brutally affect (unlike interventions or interferences, which have a temporary nature) the economic sovereignty of the latter. These forms of intervention can be exercised in the globalist order both by traditional actors [states, especially highly industrialised states or states which own on their territories the offices/headquarters of transnational corporations (TNCs)] and globalist actors (TNCs, international media, international financial institutions etc.)[32].

 An action carried out by traditional actors and by non-state actors, that breaches full permanent sovereignty of a state over its natural resources and wealth, of which, according to current international law, every people is free to dispose, without any pressure, constraints or interference, falls within the category of (economic) neo-colonialism and neo-imperialism, thus falling within the scope of the general, broad prohibition in current international law. Moreover, the legal safeguard of international compliance with the economic sovereignty of all countries can be found ever since 1962, being enshrined by United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1803 (XVII) of  14 December 1962, but also by Resolution 3281 (XXIX) of 12 December 1974, by which the fact that “every state has and shall freely exercise full permanent sovereignty, including possession, use and disposal, over all its wealth, natural resources and economic activities” is internationally recognised.

 

The prohibition of colonialism and neo-colonialism: the legal framework in force at international level

 

In the United Nations Legal Order, consolidated at the end of 20th century, numerous international documents of universal and imperative value, opposable erga omnes[33] (since they refer to ius cogens)[34] clearly enshrine, both directly and indirectly, the prohibition to exercise colonialism and neo-colonialism[35], together with other phenomena associated with the idea of domination, inequality and exploitation of peoples in international relations (hegemony, imperialism[36], racism).

First of all, we must refer to an indirect prohibition of the forms of colonialism and neo-colonialism at international level:

          through the enshrinement, in the UN Charter, of the principle of non-intervention[37] in the domestic affairs of a state;

          through the enshrinement, in the UN Charter, of the principle of sovereign equality of rights among all states;

          through the enshrinement, in the UN Charter, of the right of all peoples to self-determination[38];

          through the enshrinement, in the UN Charter, of the principle that States shall settle their international disputes exclusively by peaceful means in such a manner that international security, peace and justice are not endangered;

          through the enshrinement, in the UN Charter, of the principle that States shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations;

          through the enshrinement, in the UN Charter, of the principle that all signatory States shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the Charter;

          through the enshrinement, in the UN Charter, of the obligation of all States to co-operate with one another in accordance with the Charter.

All these clear regulations, made indirectly (implicitly regarding the prohibition of the forms of colonialism and neo-colonialism in the relations among states) are adopted and consolidated in the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States, according to the UN Charter[39]. This legal document of universal and imperative value erga omnes (since it contains ius cogens) mentions elements from the substance of the above-mentioned principles and duties of states. Their analysis results in the identification of the international prohibition, according to UN standards and values, of the forms of colonialism and neo-colonialism.

For instance, in the context of the principle of states refraining in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations, this declaration mentions (including concerning forms of exercising colonialism and neo-colonialism) the following: “Every State has the duty to refrain from any forcible action which deprives peoples referred to in the elaboration of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of their right to self-determination and freedom and independence” (correlated with the statement in the Preamble of the Declaration, that “the subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a major obstacle to the promotion of international peace and security”, but also with another statement in the preamble, that “the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples constitutes a significant contribution to contemporary international law and its effective application is of paramount importance for the promotion of friendly relations among States, based on respect for the principle of sovereign equality”).

The most indirect references (that is by regulating a principle of international law) to the prohibition concerning colonialism and neo-colonialism are related to the regulation of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, from the above-mentioned Declaration. There are clearly precise obligations of States, of universal and imperative value[40], with an incidence on the shaping of the prohibitory scope, in the relations among states, on the phenomena of colonialism and neo-colonialism:

– every state shall bring a speedy end to colonialism, having regard to the freely expressed will of the peoples concerned, bearing in mind that subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a violation of this principle and a denial of fundamental human rights and is contrary to the UN Charter.

By this express obligation, clearly addressed to all States in the above-mentioned international document, the essence of colonialism and neo-colonialism (“systematic, constant actions of subjugation, domination and exploitation of peoples or states by other states”) is implicitly stated. Moreover, a triple perspective on this phenomena, namely the provisions of the UN Charter, human rights and the principle of sovereign equality of states  and peoples’ right to self-determination, is expressed.

In the „General Part”, the above-mentioned Declaration recognises the principles of the UN Charter, also embodied in the Declaration; it admits they “constitute basic principles of international law”, calling upon all states “to be guided by these principles in their international conduct and to develop their mutual relations on the basis of the strict observance of these principles”.

Therefore, these are examples of some indirect legal bases which are part of the legal and political prohibitive scope of colonialism and neo-colonialism, including for the century that has just begun.

Concerning the shaping of the scope of direct prohibition of the phenomena of colonialism and neo-colonialism, there are many international documents expressly prohibiting them, among which we mention the following:

          United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) – Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples – adopted on 14 December 1960, during the 15th session (1960) of the United Nations General Assembly[41]

          United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2131 (XX) – Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty – adopted on 21 December 1965, during the 20th  session (1965) of the United Nations General Assembly 

          United Nations General Assembly Resolution 34/103 – Declaration on the inadmissibility of the policy of hegemonism in international relations, adopted on 14 December 1979.

          United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV) of 24 October 1970 – Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States, considered to be the text codifying peoples’ right to self-determination, having an obvious decolonising basis (since, from this perspective, the holders of the right to self-determination are only “the peoples in the colonies or other non-self-governing territories whose status is different from the one of the territory of the state that administers them or who are subject to discriminatory governance”[42].

          The two international Covenants on human rights, adopted in 1966 – Article 1 of both legal documents referring to ”all peoples”[43] (without making any distinction between peoples who were subject to the process of European colonisation and the other peoples, thus enshrining this right universally, not restrictively).

The substance of this right is a universal one (with erga omnes opposability), providing a powerful and concrete legal safeguard to states and peoples against the phenomena of neo-colonialism and neo-imperialism, both in the relations among them, but also in their relations with globalist actors. Thus, according to the United Nations General Assembly Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, peoples’ right to self-determination is given a broad legal definition: it is understood as the right of peoples “freely to determine, without external interference, their political status and to pursue their economic, social and cultural development”. The definition of this right is a broad and flexible one and it can operate successfully as a legal safeguard (being enshrined in the UN Charter) also in the globalist order, so that it can protect peoples in their relations with the great powers, with other states wishing to exercise forms of neo-colonialism and neo-imperialism over them, but also with other globalist actors (NGOs, informal groups and other types of actors).

According to the legal doctrine, the above-mentioned right is a permanent, imprescriptible right, granted without any historical or spatial conditions or related to certain categories of peoples[44] (according to the Western perspective of the countries which had empires and exercised forms of colonialism over certain peoples).

       We notice that the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 34/103 – Declaration on the inadmissibility of the policy of hegemonism in international relations – apparently provides quite a broad definition of the phenomena of colonialism and neo-colonialism (it does not refer strictly to states, unlike the definition of hegemonism laid down in the previous paragraph in the Preamble of the same Declaration, which is seen only as a “manifestation of the policy of a State, or a group of States”). Thus, according to the above-mentioned Declaration, colonialism and neo-colonialism are included in the same category as imperialism and racism (including zionism and apartheid), being “forces which seek to perpetuate unequal relations and privileges acquired by force and are, therefore, different manifestations of the policy and practice of hegemonism”. Therefore, although initially the definition of these phenomena seemed to be a “broad” one, in the end it must be limited (in the state-centrist vision of the Declaration) to the scope of the relations between states and groups of states (through the express reference to the legal definition of hegemonism). Accordingly, in this Declaration, colonialism and neo-colonialism are seen from a state-centrist perspective which today, in the 21st century (in the globalist order of more and more diverse and powerful non-state actors and in the age in which the Westphalian order foundation is eroding, under the pressure of these actors, rivals of state-nations), has become a rigid and obsolete legal framework (from the perspective of the possibilities to extend international accountability, necessary for state and non-state actors and for their actions which actually fall within the scope of colonialism and neo-colonialism or economic colonialism).

Despite all these deficiencies, the above-mentioned legal grounds (direct and indirect) remain in force, regardless of the globalist order marked by the proliferation and rise of non-state actors, representing a solid and universal legal safeguard for the compliance with the state sovereignty principle[45] in the framework of this cultural, economic, political heterogeneous and transnational order.

 

 

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BRAFMAN, Ori; BECKSTROM, Rod A., Steaua de mare și păianjenul, translated by Iuliana Raluca Hiliuță, Ed. All, București, 2004

CHIRILĂ, Marian, ”Suveranitatea şi dezvoltarea economică independentă”, in Suveranitatea şi progresul, Nicolae Ecobescu (coord.), Ed. Politică, Bucureşti, 1977

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DIACONU, Ion, Tratat de drept internațional public, vol.I, Ed. Lumina Lex, București, 2002

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GORRA-GOBIN, Cynthia, coord., Dictionnaire des mondialisations, Ed. Armand Colin, Paris, 2006

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HIRST, Paul, Război şi putere în sec. 21, translated by Nicolae Năstase, Ed.  Antet, s. l., 2001

KHANNA, Parag, Lumea a Doua. Imperii și influență în noua ordine globală, translated by Doris Mironescu, Polirom, Iași, 2008

KUMAR Malhotra, Vinay, International relations, Anmol Publications, New Delhi, 1993

MEISTER, Albert, ”Le système transnational”, Civilisations, L’Institut International des Civilizations Differentes, Bruxelles, No.1-2, 1975

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[1] The present paper reflects only the author’s personal opinions and doesn’t involve other juridical or physical persons.

[2] Sergiu Tamaş, Dicţionar politic, Instituţiile democraţiei şi cultura civică, Ed. Academiei Române, Bucureşti, 1993, p. 267.

[3] Idem, p. 266. Also see Genoveva Vrabie, Drept constituţional şi instituţii politice contemporane, Ed. Ştefan Procopiu, Iaşi, 1993, pp. 70-74. Ion Diaconu, Tratat de drept internaţional public, vol. I, Ed. Lumina Lex, Bucureşti, 2002, pp. 275-276. Ludovic Takacs, Marţian Niciu, Drept public, Ed. Didactică şi Pedagogică, Bucureşti, 1976, pp. 35-36. Jean-Jacques Roche, Relations internationals (Relații internaționale, my tr.), LGDJ, Paris, 2005, pp. 84-85. Dominique Carreau, Droit international (Drept internațional, my tr.), Ed. Pédone, Paris, 1999, p. 326. Pierre Pactet, Institutions politiques et droit constitutionnel (Instituții politice și drept constituțional, my tr.), Ed. Armand Colin, 2002, p. 44.

[4] Jean-Jacques Roche, op. cit., pp. 296- 299, 358-359.

[5] The role played by the IMF and the World Bank is more and more challenged by Southern developing countries and alter-globalists who denounce their lack of representation and accountability. As a matter of fact, these aspects were identified in a global Human Development Report (UNDP, 2002) which states that they “have always been weak in these institutions”; there are two “weaknesses” that are manifest mainly in the manner they operate and in their policies, since “the institutions are being called on by their powerful members to intrude much more deeply into areas previously the preserve of national governments – especially in developing countries”. We think that the forms of neo-colonialism exercised indirectly (through international financial organisations) by certain states over other states have already been identified in the current international community. See Cynthia Ghorra-Gobin (ed.), Dictionnaire des mondialisations (Dicționarul mondializărilor, my tr.), Ed. Armand Colin, Paris, 2006, p. 208.

[6] Jean Jacques Roche, op. cit., p. 313. The G7 countries hold more than 45% and 42%, respectively, of the voting rights within the IMF and the World Bank, both including about 184 member states. The United States de facto exercise a veto right, with more than 15% of the voting rights, decisions being adopted by a majority of 85%. The legitimacy crisis within the IMF and the World Bank is due to the lack of transparency in the decision-making process, the functioning of institutions, the control held through voting rights, but also to the principle of weighing member states’ votes according to their financial contribution (which favours highly industrialised states, to the detriment of Southern developing countries), as well as other factors such as: formal representation of developing countries, the challenged nature of economic austerity policies upon which these institutions make conditional the granting of financial aid to the member states, or their way of governance.  See Cynthia Ghorra-Gobin (ed.), op. cit., p.  208.

[7] And it would not even be legal from the perspective of international law, based on the principle of sovereign equality of all states – right that does not allow the adoption of decisions with a global impact by certain member states which can de facto affect the rest of the international community that did not participate in making these decisions.

[8] International organisation set up in 1945, by virtue of an interstate agreement. Starting from 1962, on the basis of an agreement concluded between 10 industrialised states, members of the Fund, the other member states may be granted credits. Although each member state is represented by a governor within the bodies of the IMF  (Board of Governors, the supreme body), in practice, the Managing Director (Chairman of the Executive Board) is commonly appointed from among the states that used to have colonial empires and now represent great industrialised world powers. See Grigore Geamănu, Drept internaţional public, vol. II; Ed. Didactică şi Pedagogică, Bucureşti, 1983, pp. 277-278. In our opinion, the great industrialised powers of today’s world exercise, through organisations such as the IMF or the World Bank, indirect forms of control over states that resort to credits from this organisation. This way, forms of neo-colonialism and neo-imperialism (mainly in the economic sense) are created, which represent forms of relativisation of the principles of the UN Charter, with universal applicability and opposability erga omnes  (therefore, they also apply to the member states of the IMF, the World Bank or the EU who use such organisations and interstate cooperation frameworks in order to achieve new ways of indirect economic and political control over other states).

[9] Jean Jacques Roche, op. cit., p. 314.

[10] On the three missions of the IMF (manage, finance and control the international monetary system) and the criticism concerning it, see Jean Jacques Roche, op. cit., pp. 311-313.

[11] Marie-Claude Smouts, Dario Battistella, Pascal Vennesson, Dictionnaire des relations internationals (Dicționar de relații internaționale, my tr.), Dalloz, Paris, 2006, pp. 1-2.

[12] Jean Jacques Roche, op. cit., p. 139.

[13] An expression with an extremely wide scope that allows us to include non-state actors, but also groups of states (international cooperation organisations, international organisations specialised in banking, financial and economic fields, or supranational actors – integration organisations, to which member states voluntarily transferred certain sovereign rights, weakening the content of sovereignty as defined in the constitutional and international law).

[14] Graham Evans, Jeffrey Newnham, Dicţionar de Relaţii Internaţionale, translated by Anca Irina Ionescu, Ed. Universal Dalsi, București, 2001, p. 90.

[15] Vinay Kumar Malhotra, International relations, Anmol Publications, New Delhi, 1993, pp. 217-218. The author reiterates the fact that neo-colonialism was born once the old type of imperialism ended, in the second half of the 20th century, also being known as “economic imperialism”, “red imperialism” or “dollar imperialism”. It is a type of indirect, covered imperialism, adapted by different strong, industrially developed countries, especially in the economic field. Thus, a country exercises “neo-colonialism” when it indirectly controls, by way of economic levers, another sovereign and independent country (a status relativised through the destruction of economic sovereignty). These countries can apparently be free, sovereign and independent, but, in fact, they are victims of the predatory policy of the great powers using indirect control levers (for interventions through various means, including by using international financial organisations as instruments for controlling the economy and politics of the country in question) in order to ensure that these countries are economically dependent on them. It is a permanent exploitation and domination (indirect, economic, political, cultural, but also military) of a country, especially in the form of “trade, aid, investments” in that country. These forms are subtle, but colonialism and neo-colonialism are forbidden in all forms, under the declarations of the United Nations General Assembly and the principles of the UN Charter.

[16] David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt, Jonathan Perraton, Transformări globale. Politică, economie şi cultură, translated by Ramona–Elena Lupaşcu, Adriana Ştraub, Mihaela Bordea, Alina-Maria Turcu, Polirom, Iaşi, 2004, pp. 26-29. 

[17] Pharag  Khanna, Lumea A Doua. Imperii şi influenţă în noua ordine globală, translated by Doris Mironescu, Polirom, Iaşi, 2008, pp. 24-31. Robert Cooper, Destrămarea naţiunilor. Ordine şi haos în sec. XXI, translated by Sebastian Huluban, Ed. Univers Enciclopedic, 2007, pp. 52-68.

[18] On the hypothesis of a globalist world in which the state is declining and the new forms of organisation are transnational, private or quasi-public (with a dominant actor such as transnational corporations), among which economic organisations will end up absorbing a wide range of political functions, including the ones of the state (state decline would generate the decline of the international system made up of states), see Paul Hirst, Război şi putere în sec. 21, translated by Nicolae Năstase, Ed.  Antet, s. l., 2001, p. 93.

[19] Some authors envisage the transformation of democracy into a participatory political regime, focusing on the corporation, as the new government of the 20th century, and not on the traditional state-citizen relation, which explains the shift of reshaping people’s participation in corporations (from a closed, rigid hierarchical system to a democracy involving participation in the decision-making process). Practically, non-state authors themselves (TNCs) are affected by a profound change, due to the change of generation, which modifies the meaning of “form of organisation” and any institution through which this generation passes. We are witnessing not only a transformation of the state, following internal and external reforms, but also to profound changes modifying globalist actors, such as corporations, international organisations, and which dissociate them from their traditional conception, the bureaucratic, pyramidal age, of closed, uncommunicative systems, in which decisions were taken exclusively at the top.  See John Naisbitt, Megatendinţe, translated by Constantin Coşman, Ed. Politică, Bucureşti, 1989, pp. 255-272.

[20] David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt, Jonathan Perraton, op. cit., pp. 79-81. Ori Brafman, A. Rod Beckseckstrom, Steaua de mare şi păianjenul. Puterea de neoprit a organizaţiilor fără lider, translated by Iuliana Raluca Hiliuţă, Ed. All, Bucureşti, 2011, pp. 32-46.

[21] Ion Diaconu, op. cit., p. 275.

[22] Nico Schrijver, ”The Changing  Nature of State Sovereignty”, in BYIL, 1999, p. 65, quoted by Ion Diaconu, op. cit., p. 331. Enciclopedia Blackwell a gândirii politice, coord. David Miller, translated by Dragan Stoianovici, Humanitas, Bucureşti, 2006, p. 705.

[23] Genoveva Vrabie, op. cit., pp. 69-74.

[24] Ion Diaconu, op. cit., p. 277.

[25] Ion Diaconu, op. cit., p. 277. Marian Chirilă, ”Suveranitatea şi dezvoltarea economică independentă”, in Suveranitatea şi progresul, Nicolae Ecobescu (coord.), Ed. Politică, Bucureşti, 1977,  pp. 238-245.

[26] Ion Diaconu, op. cit., p. 277.

[27] On the formal independence of countries and the overt or covert forms that can be taken by colonialism (different forms of dependence between the metropolis and the countries subject to this phenomenon), see extensively Jacques Arnault, Procesul colonialismului,  translated by I. Băluş, Ed. Ştiinţifică Bucureşti, 1960, pp. 122-126.

[28] According to certain authors, the forms of neo-colonialism are practiced especially by transnational corporations (TCNs) acting both in industrialised countries and in developing countries, without always having the approval of the countries where their main office or headquarter is located concerning their policies of conquering new markets and profit maximisation, undertaking tax evasion in relation to these states. Transnational corporations are considered to practice a type of neo-imperialism that does not involve the use of armed force in metropolises against colonies in order to ensure their allegiance and exploitation, but that is rather related to re-importing financial resources, as previous investments are being reimbursed or withdrawn. According to Martin Bronfenbrenner, ”Radical Economics in America- A 1970 Survey”, The Journal of Economic Litterature, September 1970, quoted in Ilie Şerbănescu’s book, Corporaţiile transnaţionale, Ed. Politică, Bucureşti, 1978, p. 235.

[29] Despite legal prohibitions (existing in current international law), the forms of neo-imperialism and neo-colonialism are exercised indirectly, without necessarily involving state mechanisms and structures, precisely to avoid the current legal prohibition. Thus, non-state actors, such as transnational corporations, become, in the globalist world, agents creating an original type of trans-state capitalist system, introduced by them in the economic field, in which poorly developed countries are used and exploited by transnational corporations as economic enclaves (apud prof. Javed Burki, quoted by Albert Meister in  ”Le système transnational”, Civilisations, L’Institut International des Civilizations Differentes, Bruxelles, No.1-2, 1975).

[30] Ion Diaconu,  op. cit., p. 277.

[31] Idem, op. cit., p. 279.

[32] David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt, Jonathan Perraton, op. cit., pp. 76-85.

[33] Raluca Miga-Beşteliu, Drept internaţional. Introducere în dreptul internațional public, Ed. All, București, 1998, pp. 77-78, 81 (the overriding nature and the special importance of the provisions of the UN Charter for the entire international legal order).

[34] Ion Diaconu, op. cit., p. 365 (among ius cogens, the sovereign rights of states and peoples – sovereign equality, territorial integration and peoples’ self-determination – are mentioned).

[35] Concerning the actors, we think that this prohibition refers to the globalist order and non-state actors, such as transnational corporations (considered, for instance, according to Jean Ziegler, to be “the main aggressor of poor peoples, following a fundamental shift of actors, which occurred in the economic international order: there is a transition from the capitalist state as conqueror, protector, tutelary state, as it is known from the forms of classic colonialism, to transnational corporations, as agents creating a trans-state capitalist system”. See Jean Ziegler, Une Suisse au-dessus de tout supçon (O Elveție deasupra oricărei suspiciuni, my tr.), Ed. Du Seuil, Paris, 1976, p. 15, quoted by Ilie Şerbănescu, op. cit, p. 235.

[36] Regarding the phenomenon of imperialism and neo-imperialism, some authors think that humanitarian intervention, enshrined ever since the 21st century, is a form of imperialism that requires a great capacity of a political actor to act outside its jurisdiction, including by using armed force, in order to protect its nationals, threatened minorities, including religious ones. This form of interference in the domestic affairs of a state, for reasons related to the granting of humanitarian protection to certain groups considered to be oppressed or in danger, is considered by some authors to be “a particular form of neo-imperialism”, especially when we refer to the selective use of armed force, the use and manipulation of the compassion of public opinion and the participation or complacency of the media in observing and considering such an intervention to be legitimate”. The right to interfere, assumed by certain great powers, by using and invoking in the international community the individual and his protection (human rights) against his state (the right to non-interference, non-intervention in domestic affairs, respect for its sovereignty) thus becomes an instrument of neo-imperialism under the above-mentioned circumstances. See Marie-Claude Smouts, Dario Battistella, Pascal Vennesson, op. cit., pp. 292-293.

[37] This legal principle is a rule of international law, while intervention is considered to be in close connection with a form of neo-colonialism or neo-imperialism (this is the reason for its exceptional, temporary and illegal nature, according to the current rules of international law). But recent developments of the same law have made it somewhat flexible, allowing intervention, under certain circumstances. According to James Rosenau, this notion has two dimensions: a brutal interruption of the course of the relations established between political establishments and the tendency to influence the structure of public authority in the society in question. Thus, intervention occurs when, through his actions, an international actor significantly alters the form of the pre-existing relations in that society (for instance, deploying armed forces in a sovereign state). Interventions are different from external state policies that have a permanent nature and involve a continuous presence of the actor who interferes in the respective society/state. See Marie-Claude Smouts, Dario Battistella, Pascal Vennesson, op. cit., pp. 304-305.

[38] Or “peoples’ right to freely dispose of themselves”. It is every people’s right to freely determine its political destiny, to freely establish its political status. It is a right historically related to the process of decolonisation, enshrined in the UN Charter and followed by a series of international resolutions issued against colonialism and neo-colonialism. See Marie-Claude Smouts, Dario Battistella, Pascal Vennesson, op. cit., pp. 162-163.

[39] The United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV), adopted on 24 October 1970, during the 25th session (1970).

[40] Raluca Miga-Beşteliu, Drept internaţional, op. cit., pp. 77-78, 81.

[41] Also called “the genuine charter of decolonisation”.

[42] This legal perspective is clearly restrictive, since it argues “peoples’ right to self-determination does not concern all peoples, but only the colonised ones and their right to form independent states” (therefore, it aims the populations that were subject to European colonial domination)”; given the fact that it has an exceptional, restrictive interpretation, it is a right concerning a particular moment in history and, therefore, it is not universally applicable (according to Marie-Claude Smouts, Dario Battistella, Pascal Vennesson, op. cit., pp. 163-164). But we think it is a dynamic, flexible legal construction which, far from being limited to particular historical periods (European colonialism), since it was classified among other legal principles which are fundamental for the contemporary international legal order (universally applicable), it concerns not only the peoples colonised by Europeans, but any people who faced a phenomenon of colonialism or neo-colonialism (here – economic, cultural, political) in the contemporary age, both from the State and from various other globalist actors. Therefore, this right is universally applicable, designed to provide the necessary legal safeguard for peoples defence in a globalist order which is improperly regulated.

[43] Raluca Miga-Beşteliu, op. cit., p. 134.

[44] Idem, p. 135.

[45] Ion Diaconu, op. cit., pp. 275-276.

Rădăcinile bolșevismului: o perspectivă ideologică asupra intelighenției ruse din secolul al XIX-lea (Roots of Bolshevism: An Ideological Overview of the 19th Century Russian Intelligentsia)

VARIA

 

 

Rădăcinile bolșevismului: o perspectivă ideologică asupra intelighenției ruse din secolul al XIX-lea

(Roots of Bolshevism: An Ideological Overview of the 19th Century Russian Intelligentsia)

 

 

Emanuel COPILAȘ

 

Abstract: The present article generally aims to prove that Bolshevism had very little to do with European social-democracy. They are two distinct intellectual and political traditions, although the influence of the latter upon the former cannot be denied. To confirm this hypothesis, the main part of the article consists in a diachronic analysis of the ideas of the Russian intelligentsia, the nursery of the future Bolshevik dictatorship, starting with its humanist origins and ending with its terrorist degeneration. For a better understanding of the origins of Russian populism, the first part of the article presents the Marxist origins of European social-democracy. The research methods I made use of are political comparative analysis and ideological analysis.

 

Key words: Enlightenment, social-democracy, populism, nihilism, terrorism, dictatorship.

 

 

European social-democracy: an offspring of Enlightenment

 

The struggle for social emancipation is a product of Enlightenment and of the liberal philosophy which it gave birth to[1]. Republicanism, democracy, human rights, universal suffrage, individuality, free market[2] – all of these invaluable achievements reflect the imposition of the modern era with its growing urbanization, extended commerce, secularization and a major emphasis on human reason. However, after several decades it became rather clear that the above mentioned gains were not universal, as the French revolutionaries postulated them, but confined to a certain social category, namely the rising bourgeoisie. The industrial revolution that made modern Europe possible thrived on slavery and barbarous exploitation of other continents[3]; later, as slavery was increasingly difficult to maintain due to uprisings, the emancipation of public opinion and most importantly because of the technological advancement that allowed former slave owners to become respected businessmen and former slaves to become employees without any decrease in profits, on the contrary – one of modernity’s promises, human rights and individual dignity, was therefore fulfilled. Not without major conflicts (if we take into account only the American civil war), but essentially going along with the historic tide: slavery was abolished after it begun to hamper the profits of major European and American companies, not as a direct consequence of Enlightenment’s ideals[4].

Could the promises of modernity such as liberty and equality be extended also to peasants and industrial workers and not be confined exclusively to the bourgeoisie? Could they become truly universal? This was the main question of some intellectuals later labeled as the utopian socialists. Saint-Simon, Charles Fourier, Robert Owen, all of them imagined perfect communities where social conflicts would be abolished by means of grassroots democracy and an emphasis placed on public property understood as the antidote of private property that tended to dismantle the social texture and entail abuses and exploitation[5]. They received the label ‘utopian’ because their revolt was purely moral.

‘Scientific socialism’ on the other hand, the one Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels pretended to discover – affirmed that the growing inequalities between the capitalists who own the means of production and the workers who do not will eventually led to the disintegration of the capitalist mode of production. This was, in their opinion, a scientific fact: the internal logic of capitalism is based on accumulation, profit, and the exploitation of unpaid labor. As the concentration tendencies of capital amplify, meaning the big businesses getting bigger by incorporating or eliminating potential rivals – the number of capitalists decreases (as they became richer) while the number of workers which fuel profit making for their bosses increases, as they become poorer. This contradiction will sooner or later lead to an explosive tension and thus bring about a social revolution that will end capitalism and its unjust social stratification. This outcome was for Marx inevitable and therefore scientific. The historic laws of social development which he pretended to discover were embodied in the political economy of every stage humanity had passed through: primitive commune, antiquity, feudalism and capitalism. They consisted in forces of production and relations of production. The firs signified inventions or goods that the community or society benefited from mostly free and which entailed progress and welfare. Gradually, those inventions or goods came to be monopolized by a ruling class which pretended a certain price for them. Their production and reproduction, dominated by the ruling class, created patterns of economic and social stratification based on inequality and polarization, patterns which deemed property more and more private, in accordance with the interests of the ruling class. This status-quo was given a legal form and, from generation to generation, was regarded by society as being fair and natural. Marx called this status-quo relations of production. When the relations of production became increasingly oppressive, obstructing progress and well-being to the point that most people considered it intolerable, a social revolution occurred, releasing the structural tensions that have build up. Afterwards, the whole process would start all over again, the new forces of production becoming relations of production and so on. This materialistic philosophy of history offered the dialectic method as a tool for understanding the passing from one mode of production (the material dimension of a certain type of society in general, in Marx’s terms) to another. Thus the primitive commune gave way to antiquity, antiquity to feudalism and feudalism to capitalism[6].

Taking into account history’s dialectic, capitalism already contained the ‘germs’ of its future replacement, communism. Here, relations of production are codified in legal terms as private property, while the increasing forces of production, the workers, find themselves deprived of the means of production. As progressive it was at the beginning, when it replaced feudalism, capitalism, Marx argued, no longer facilitated social progress, but disrupted it. Why? Because capitalism’s core consists in a neverending succession of economic and social crises. By working, the proletarians create surplus-value, namely the difference between their salary and the total income the capitalist extracts from their work. The objective value of a product resides in the socially necessary work time needed to create that product. Since the capitalist seeks only profit, he will rely more and more on machines instead of workers. This means more and cheaper goods. But an increased productivity also means less valuable products: the time spent creating each product decreases proportionally with the number of machines that replace the worker. What follows is an abundance of cheap goods. But this is nevertheless a signal of the crisis which is to come. Marx argues that only workers can create surplus value; for the capitalist, workers represent the variable capital (their number fluctuates according to the needs of the business), while the machines represent the constant capital (meaning that they cannot be fired or hired as easy as the proletarians; moreover, machines cannot create themselves goods, in the absence of human intervention; they can only transmit a small part of their utility to the final product, proportional with their deterioration during the time spent forging it – this is the reason why Marx does not credit technology with the power to create surplus-value). By increasing the share of constant capital in order to raise productivity and sell cheaper goods, the capitalist is driven not only by its greed, but also by its creditors, most of them banks. Therefore he is forced by a structural mechanism to behave in this way; it is not a matter of simple choice, as utopian socialists would consider. Machines, bought with expensive loans, gradually replace workers; they do the job much faster and with incomparable efficiency. Salaries decreases and unemployment rises (this wave of unemployment is called by Marx the ‘proletarian reserve army’). The remaining workers are compelled to accept lower salaries or face the prospect of unemployment. Cheap goods are everywhere, but fewer and fewer people buy them: many have lost their jobs. We are now in the middle of an overproduction crisis. Having lost its clients, the capitalist goes bankrupt, thus leading to more unemployment and the bankruptcy of other capitalists as well. Banks can no longer recuperate their loans, not to mention their interest rates. The resulting general collapse can be compared to a forest fire: after it passes, the forest is regenerated. But this regeneration, brought about with the same capitalist means, will implacable lead to the next fire and so on, until the contradiction between forces and relations of production (proletarians and workers) will entails such a massive breakdown that capitalism itself could no longer start over again. Finally controlling the means of production (factories), the workers victory would signal the appearance of a class free society in which economy is no longer driven by money and profits, but by man and for man[7].

One can observe that in Marx’s terms, there can be no reconcilement between work and capital: what he calls ‘the general law of capitalist accumulation’ is very clear in this respect: the capital’s prosperity is proportional to the growing of the ‘proletarian reserve army’[8]. In other words, capital and social conflict go hand in hand. Before publishing his magnum opus in 1867, Marx attempted to explain the demise of capitalism through another, simpler contradiction, that between utility and exchange value. For consumers, the commodity possesses utility, while for capitalists it possesses only exchange value, which is nevertheless the distinctive feature of commodity. But, in the process of getting from its producer to its consumer, which is interested exclusively in its utility, the commodity must pass an intermediary phase where it acquires exchange value: the market. The market is therefore a capitalist contradiction between producers and consumers. It does not facilitate social prosperity, only intermediary and parasitic profits. Social revolution means here getting rid of the market, the exchange values and the commodity itself, an inherent feature of the capitalist system[9].

            Capitalism entails structural contradictions and cannot be abolished only through moral means. A moral capitalist is a contradiction in itself: if he decides to increase salaries and the sums paid for the social insurance of his workers, he will also need to increase the price of his products in order to survive; selling his merchandise at the same price he practiced before applying these measures would mean a decrease in profits and finally bankruptcy. But a higher price for his goods means that he will slowly loose competitiveness on the market: immoral entrepreneurs can afford to sell their commodities cheaper because they spend less money with they employees. The outcome in this case is also bankruptcy. Either way, Marx argues, capitalism is a social relation inscribed in things and in the material processes that constitute our day to day life: it does not exist only in our mind and therefore it cannot be replaced through good deeds alone: an approach like this can only enforce the system. This is why the social revolution is indispensable for the real overthrowing of capitalism; its mere moral ‘taming’ leads nowhere. However, capitalism’s domination cannot be reduced to materialism, although this constitutes its backbone: ‘The ideas of the dominant class are in every epoch the dominant ideas, which means that the class which is the dominant material force of society is at the same time its dominant spiritual force’[10].

            To sum up, Marx’s revolution is first of all social, only afterwards political and cultural. Only the working class, numerically and technically fueled by capitalism itself – can accomplish the revolution by developing ‘class consciousnesses’. In this process, the role of intellectuals as guides is very important, but these intellectuals could never replace the proletarians in the revolutionary process. We are far from the Leninist party with its sectarian and conspirative behavior and with its dictatorial means. Also, for Marx proletarians are not only the factory workers, but virtually everyone who depends on a salary for a living, a salary delivered first of all by particular employers. What Marx eventually wanted was a larger and more profound democracy than the bourgeoisie had to offer: human rights and individual freedom cannot exist in a polarized society in which workers are compelled to sell their physical and intellectual capacities in order to survive: work should mean creativity, joy and fulfillment, not mind-numbing exhaustion, permanent stress and fear of losing one’s job: each men should work for its own purpose, not for the purpose of capitalist intermediary gains. But this outcome Marx rendered possible only in a post-capitalist world, where workers would benefit from their products, not being alienated with reference to them and where the social stratification entailed by the capitalist mode of production would cease to exist.

            From its Marxist form, European social-democracy gradually gave way to a progressive rapprochement with the Enlightenment ideals from which it was born: democracy and human rights.  Karl Kautsky, Eduard Bernstein and other second generation Marxists which’s ideas will be analyzed in the conclusions section are proof in this regard. The 19th century Russian revolutionary ferment cannot be properly understood in the absence of its European model, which it tried to emulate sometimes beyond the point of recognition. But unlike it, it will gradually move away from the humanism of Enlightenment, preparing the ideological and political ground from which Bolshevism was born.

 

Populism, nihilism, terrorism, Marxism: ideological stages of the Russian revolutionary movement

 

Intellectually speaking, Russia’s encounter with modernity had begun with Georg Friedrich Hegel’s philosophy. Thesis, antithesis, synthesis, dialectics, reconciliation of opposites, reason – all these concepts advanced or re-elaborated by the German philosopher highly influenced not only intellectual and social emancipation movements such as social-democracy, but the whole modern phenomenon[11]. Hegel’s famous sentence ‘the real is the rational and the rational is the real’ received a conservative interpretation in his native Germany, where it came to signify the praising of the exiting political status-quo, namely the Prussian absolutist monarchy. In Tsarist Russia, on the other hand, his maxim gained a whole different, revolutionary meaning: the real had to be rationalized. This meant the abolishment of autocracy and the institution of a democratic republic according to the principles of Enlightenment[12].

            The first organized movement against Tsarist autocracy was that of the so-called Decembrists, a group of officers inspired by the French Revolution who sought to replace the existent Russian political structure with that of a constitutional republic. In December 1825, after an open revolt against the new Tsar, Nicholas, their leaders were hanged and the group dismantled[13]. Although the first serious contestation against Tsarism, the Decembrist’s revolt was first of all a political movement; the populist movement which followed placed most of its emphasis on revolutionary ideas, hoping to create a social awareness capable of emancipating peasant Russia from the oppressing autocracy.

            Vissarion Belinski, a literary critic highly influenced by Hegel’s philosophy, is counted today as one of the founding fathers of Russian intelligentsia. Morality, the permanent quest for truth and regarding individuality and human dignity as the sole basis of a successful intellectual, social and political reform, Belinski’s romantic temper and oratory brilliance is well remembered by his friend and colleague Alexander Herzen. Unlike Belinski, who’s essentially liberal ideas were completed by social-democratic tendencies (he evaluated literary works on the count of exposing the precarious condition of peasantry and the intrinsically unjust structure of Tsarism)[14], Herzen, acknowledged even by Lenin[15], although their ideas were not at all compatible – as the first truly Russian populist – developed vivid and original social-democratic theories.

            Although Herzen influenced not only the development of Russian socialism, but that of liberalism as well, the two ideologies are mixed in his works sometimes beyond the point of recognition. He held individual freedom above all other values, although criticizing the bourgeois West whenever its governments obliterated social emancipation, like in 1848. ‘Despite his aesthetic dislike of the bourgeois West, he was a good European, at least insofar as prizing individualism and rejecting the use of violence before exhausting all the possibilities of persuasion and peaceful alteration’[16]. Like all populists, Herzen valued the peasant commune and insisted that Russia could achieve its own, specific democracy by abolishing Tsarism and creating a federative political structure between these communes. He therefore advocated for a sort of peasant grassroots democracy which, unlike Western Europe, could advance toward socialism avoiding the terrible social consequences the development of capitalism caused there. Most importantly, Herzen believed in this yet passive existence of rural democracy and its capacity to be spontaneously transferred to the entire Russian political system[17].

            More radical in his youth, Herzen gradually renounced prospects of violent revolution and insisted upon reforms, from above and also from below, as the key to social transformation[18]. However, he never became a convinced supporter of pluripartidism; after the crushing of the 1848 revolutions he sincerely hoped ‘Europe had figured out that the representative system is nothing more than an ingenious means to replace the satisfaction of social requests and determined action with empty words and endless debates’[19].

            Herzen’s rejection of all forms of intellectual and political dogmatism or authoritarianism made him lots of enemies, among which Karl Marx. Marx’s expeditious and abrupt personality, along with his deterministic philosophy of history was something Herzen could not reconcile with, especially because he shared Alexis de Tocqueville’s opinion that industrialization will not radicalize and organize workers towards revolutionary aims, but improve their life style thus transforming them into bourgeois. In Adam Ulam’s words, ‘Marx was for him the embodiment of the German bourgeois spirit: formal, unromantic, and devoid of those elements of humor and compassion that he deemed essential for a real fighter for the people’s rights. The news that Marx was to address or even to attend a political gathering or banquet was cause enough for Herzen to send his excuses’[20]. Unlike Marxists, who stood in favor of revolution, not reforms (see the first section of the article), Herzen argued for ‘gradual progress’ as means of social emancipation.

 

            I am not at all afraid of the word ‘gradual progress’, which was trivialized through the undecided attitude and reluctant steps of different reforming authorities. The gradual character, as continuity, are tightly connected to any process of understanding. Mathematics is learned progressively; why believe that the ultimate conclusions of sociology could be injected to a man like the vaccine against smallpox or poured into mind as a medicine is poured as once on the horse’s throat? Between the actual conclusions and the actual situation there are practical improvements, there are ways, compromises and diagonals. To choose the most short, comfortable, accessible ones is a problem of practical sense, of strategy. Going permanently ahead, without looking back, you can end up like Napoleon, to Moscow, and perish afterwards during the retreat, even without reaching Borodino. The international association of workers and their other associations, their organs and representatives must strive hardly that authorities do not interfere in work relating problems, as they do not interfere in the administration of properties. The forms which held people in the chains of a semi-imposed slavery will not resist a la longue to the pressure exercised by logic and by the development of public consciousness. Some of them are so rotten inside that you can strike them down with a kick; others maintain themselves, plunging their roots like a cancer in a bad blood. By crushing them altogether, we could also kill the organism and we would certainly make the great majority to step down and then the most fierce defenders of the ‘cancer’ will be exactly those who suffer the most from it. Of course this would be something very stupid, but it is time to understand that stupidity represents an enourmous force that has to be taken into account[21].

 

            And furthermore:

 

            A wild eruption, caused by constant obstacle, will not spare anything: to redeem personal deprivations, revenge will come upon the most impersonal goods. Together with the capital gathered by moneylenders, another capital will perish, transmitted from generation to generation, from a people to another, a capital which contains the essence of the personality and of creation of different ages, a capital in which was naturally inscribed the chronicle of human life and in which history has been crystallized. Along with the milestones, the destructive force unleashed will also crush the heights which people have reached through endless efforts in all domains, from the beginning of civilization until now[22].

 

            Herzen’s moderation, erudition, toleration and authentic concern for a gradual emancipation that would preserve the gains of civilization, not relinquish them as obsolete and hypocrite bourgeois achievements – will transform him into an outdated and even ridiculous figure for a newer and more radical generation of populists, the nihilists. Young, more or less educated young men and women, the nihilists were disappointed by Herzen’s teachings which did not help the peasants free themselves from autocracy. In their opinion, more was needed: a revolutionary elite who would organize, discipline and even accomplish the revolution for the peasants[23]. Considering ‘Herzen’s socialism was too humanistic, too much grounded in the hope of change by evolution’[24], they did not hesitate to attack the founder of Russian socialism in writing, calling him a ‘liberal’ (among the intelligentsia, the term started to have a pejorative nuance in the second half of the 19th century), a right-winger and a supporter of the ‘reaction’. Herzen replied with disappointment ‘that the attacks upon him and his position served the interests of the most reactionary part of the tsarist bureaucracy, and that the young radicals might live to be decorated by the government’[25].

            Nihilism, a label which the famous novelist Turgenev used to describe the new wave of populism and it was readily adopted some of its most representative members – still considered themselves Marxists, despite the numerous doctrinary incongruences with Marxism which will come into open a generation later[26]. The young rebels made use of a ‘correct radical style in dress, speech and general attitude’, of equal importance for them as their ideology. Nihilists usually were condescending in their speeches and conversations and displayed a ‘casual attitude towards dress and appearance, if not downright eccentricity’ which created a sober and austere impression. Nihilist women were highly emancipated for that period, wearing ‘short hair, drab clothing’, smoking and going to all kind of public spectacles. ‘Nihilists denied not only the traditional role of women, but also the family, property, religion, art – in a word, all of the traditional aspects of culture and society’. It was this vehement denial the ‘conservative press’ indefatigable condemned and ridiculed that they owe their name to[27].

            Perhaps the best known nihilist was Dmitri Pisarev, a young literary critic. Striving to replace the humanistic materialism of Belinski and Herzen with a presumably Marxist scientific materialism, Pisarev insisted upon ‘rational agriculture’ as a means of advancement towards social prosperity and civilization, a goal obliterated by the ruling elites who did not benefited from the emancipation of the ‘masses’[28]. Rationality in general, not only in agricultural matters, was to be achieved through a proper education in natural sciences[29]. Following the positivist trend of the epoch, Pisarev insisted that social sciences will someday achieve the precision of natural sciences and help bring about the inevitable revolution. ‘It is very natural for astronomy and chemistry to have left long ago the fog of fantasy babbling, while social and economic doctrines still resemble the characteristic modes of astrology, chemistry, magic and obsolete theosophy. It is very likely that these cabalistic theories will someday mold themselves in pure scientific forms and in time influence practical life’, Pisarev firmly wrote[30].

            Another influential nihilist was Nikolay Chernyshevsky. His well-known novel, What is to be done?, which’s title was borrowed by Lenin half a century later for a not less known political strategy book – became a sort of Bible for the nihilist generation. The novel, not exactly exceeding in literary qualities, presents the story of a young woman, Vera Pavlovna, which got married and ran away only to escape her parents plan to marry someone who she did not love. Her husband, the young nihilist doctor Lopuhov, helps her start a tailor shop organized on egalitarian, socialist bases. The shop prospers, but Vera realizes she fell in love with Lopuhov’s best friend, Kirsanov. Proving an inflexible rationality, Lopuhov stages a fake suicide, allowing his wife and friend to form a couple. In a few years, he returns under a fake identity, marries someone else and maintains a close friendship with his former wife and her husband. Briefly, the figure of a fanatical, ascetic revolutionary appears that of Rahmetov[31], an incarnation of the ‘new man’ the nihilists treasured: highly devoted to his work, his personal interest coinciding with the public interest and his reason being in perfect harmony with his passions[32]. Considered by Adam Ulam ‘the real source of Bolshevism’ and ‘an ancestor of Soviet socialist realism’, Chernyshevsky took great precautions to conceal his political activity, using fake names and camouglaging as much as possible his ties with the revolutionary groups. Even so, he was arrested in 1862, after a series of devastating fires that ravaged Moscow and were thought to be the work of nihilists. Two years after, he was condemned to seven years o hard labor and exiled, being allowed to return to European Russia only after nineteen years[33].

            The end of the 1860s witnessed the progressive decay of nihilism. Mikhail Bakunin, a renowned Russian anarchist living abroad and hostile to Marx as well as, to a certain extent, to Herzen, arguing for an immediate and total revolution to abolish first of all the state, along with all other aspects of a civilization that only hampered humanity’s emancipation potential – befriended with Sergei Nechayev, a former school teacher who attempted to create a revolutionary organization in Russia. They wrote together The Revolutionary Catechism, portraying the ‘revolutionary’ as a ‘doomed man’ who ‘knows only one science, the science of destruction’. This was no longer nihilism, but terrorism. Nechayev was soon to be arrested for the murder of a ‘cell member’ he considered to by a spy. The whole affair inspired Dostoevsky to write his famous novel, The Possessed[34]. The next decade gave birth to intransigent and ruthless revolutionaries like Petr Tkachev who did not hesitate to contradict and ridicule Engels himself for expressing reservations regarding his rudimentary methods and emphasis placed on peasantry as the key to the future Russian revolution if guided by a small and determined revolutionary elite[35] – but also to a ‘mass movement’ which remained in history under the name ‘going to the people’. Herzen’s slogan, ‘To the people!’, inspired ‘hundreds of young people, girls as well as men’, to go into the countryside and spread ‘revolutionary ideas’ among the peasants. ‘No immediate results were achieved. Some peasants listened with sympathy, many were hostile, and most understood hardly anything of what they heard. The preachers were extremely conspicuous, and soon they were rounded up by the police’. 1611 arrests were made between 1873 and 1877, but ‘only a minority received prison sentences’. However, ‘many of those who were acquitted were afterwards deported by the police to remote provinces of European Russia and Siberia’ as ‘administrative exiles’[36].

            Despite the police’s efforts, not all the agitators could be arrested. The ones who escaped formed in 1874 the direct ancestor of the Bolshevik Party, Zemlea i Volya (Land and Liberty). Thoroughly organized around a ‘basic circle’ – all the local groups responded to it and it consisted from an administrative section (propaganda and ‘providing false papers for persons living illegally’), a second section responsible for relations with intelligentsia, another section for strengthening ties with urban workers and another one for agitation among peasants. The final and soon to become the most important section ‘was known as the “disorganizing section”, and was concerned with the rescue from prison of arrested comrades, assassination of government officials as reprisals for maltreatment of revolutionaries, and the detection and punishment of traitors or police spies’[37]. Zemlea I Volya failed to carry the revolutionary message to the peasants, recruiting more proselytes among the poor factory workers of small cities. The growing reliance on terrorist tactics and political assassinations prompted in 1879 a split within the organization. Georgi Plekhanov, the only authentic Russian Marxist theorist, along with the future Menshevik Pavel Axelrod, formed a new group, named Chorny Peredyel (Black Partition), which was against terrorist tactics and stressed the importance of peasants rather than workers for the social emancipation of Tsarist Russia; on the other hand, ‘The politically minded terrorists took the name People’s will (Narodnaya Volya), and made the assassination of the Tsar their main aim’. After a series of failed attempts, they will finally succeed in 1881[38]. But this outcome will also entail the political and also physical destruction of Narodnaya Volya, only several years after. During 1881 and 1894, 5851 people were arrested for connections with Narodnaya Volya, 27 executed and 342 received jail sentences or were exiled to labor camps. The rest manage obtain milder sentences[39]. But the intellectual and political movement that started with Herzen’s populist humanist, became increasingly radicalized with Pisarev and Chernyshevsky’s nihilism and finally degenerated into plain terrorism with the Zemlea y Volya and especially Narodnaya Volya movements was finally over.

            Among the Russian intelligentsia, Georgi Plekhanov was, as mentioned above, the single truly Marxist theorist. This may seem a bit odd for someone who placed the peasants above factory workers within the Russian revolutionary process, but Plekhanov was no populist: he simply argued, along with Marx, that the abolition of serfdom in 1861 pushed Russia, slowly, but surely, on the path of capitalist development. Peasants were to become workers, only after this metamorphosis could they accomplish the revolution. Populists, as we remember, strongly believed that Russia could avoid the capitalist phase and plunge directly into a peasant based socialism[40]. This is why Plekhanov strongly criticized populists for having not understood the scientific course of history, while in the same time acknowledging their important contributions to the revolutionary struggle. No revolutionary elite could ever replace the proletariat during the emancipatory task, and no isolated terrorist act or conspiracy could ever be considered part of a real ‘class-struggle’[41]. For him, even Herzen was a ‘semi-Slavophil’ because he insisted on a unique path of development for Russia which din not imply the capitalist stage[42]. Drawing a sharp distinction between Marxists and populists, Plekhanov stated:

 

            The distinction between us resides in the fact that, while the development of the actual economic relations estranges you more and more from your rural community ideals, we, due to the same development, we are getting more and more close to our communist ideals. You are like a man which, wanting to go north, got up in a train which takes him south; but we know our road and ride the historic train, which takes us full speed ahead to our goal. But you are surprised by our orientation, because you believe a socialist cannot look upon the development of the bourgeois mode of production with sympathy. But this is due to the fact that your logic is highly vernacular.

            You imagine that a socialist who wants to stay true to his ideals must hamper, everywhere, the development of capitalism. This time as well you reason in the most primitive way; to hamper the development of capitalism, you say, means to prejudice the interests of the entrepreneurs; and because their interests are diametrically opposed to the interests of the workers, everything that damages capitalism benefits work. You do not even suspect that capitalism is opposed not only to the link which follows it in the chain of historic development, but also to the one that precedes it, that it fights not only against the revolutionary attempts of the proletariat, but also against the reactionary tendencies of nobility and of the petite bourgeoisie. You hate capital to death and are ready to attack it wherever and whenever. This zeal often makes you look with sympathy upon those defeats of capitalism that can benefit only to the reactionaries. In this case, the program of your ‘Russian’ ‘socialism’ coincides with the program of the German ‘social-conservatives’ and not a trace is left of its progressive tendencies. In order to avoid such pathetic metamorphoses you must, finally, appropriate the dialectic conception of history. You must support capitalism in its struggle against reaction and in the same time be the arch enemies of capitalism regarding its struggle against the future workers revolution. Only such a program is worthy of a party which considers itself the representative of the most progressive aspirations of its time. To situate yourself on this point of view you must abandon your actual intermediary position between different classes and fuse with the workers[43].

 

            Plekhanov’s writings is what compelled Russian socialists to make the distinction between populism and Marxism[44], although Marx was well known and appreciated within Russia especially since his major work, the first volume of the Capital, was published in Moscow in 1872. Curiously enough, although Marx’s previous books were banned from the Tsarist Empire, the censors were certain that this time the dimensions of the volume and the dense and difficult prose would discourage potential readers[45]. But until 1884, when not only Marx’s but Adam Smith’s books as well were ‘banned from public libraries’[46], it was already too late. The book was a major success, selling 3000 copies over a year, while the German first edition of 1000 copies was sold in five years. Dialectically enough, ‘Slavophiles and Populists both welcomed the book as an exposé of the horrors of the Western capitalist system, which they wanted Russia to avoid’[47].

            At the end of the 19th century, the Russian revolutionary movement lost in strength but gained in diversity. Populism was resuscitated by the Socialist revolutionary Party in 1896. They will soon obtain a substantial influence among the villages, even if they did not renounce the terrorist tactics put into use two decades earlier[48]. They will govern with the Bolsheviks until 1918 when, for opposing the Brest-Litovsk peace treaty with Germany which ended the war for Russia with major territorial costs but allowed Lenin and his followers to preserve Russia’s new political organization – they will be executed, imprisoned or exiled, and their party banished.

            Officially, the Russian Social-Democratic Labor Party held its first Congress in 1898. Two years after, the so-called ‘legal Marxists’ separated and after the 1905 revolution created the Constitutional Party (the Kadets). The Kadets shared a social-liberal ideology, arguing for universal vote and a parliamentary republic, an aspiration which they abandoned in 1906 for constitutional monarchy. Needless to say, both the social-democrats and the Tsarist political elite looked upon them with mistrust or even hostility[49]. Their intellectual mentor, Peter Struve, was criticized by Plekhanov since the beginning of the 1890s for his thesis that in the capitalist society contradictions do not grow, as Marx predicted, but on the contrary, they are softened – and for his appeals to social reforms rather than revolution[50].

            But the most important split that affected Russian social democracy consumed itself in 1903 during the second party Congress when between the moderate and radical tendencies existent among its members occurred a breach that will never be overcome. The maximalists Bolsheviks, in favor of transforming the party into a disciplined organization composed strictly of devoted and unscrupulous revolutionaries were outvoted at first by the minimalist faction, the Mensheviks, who advocated for a not so restrictive definition. The factional struggle which arose was not so much principled as it was personal: both the Bolshevik leader Vladimir Ilich Lenin and the Menshevik leader Dan Martov sought to expand their influence and place their collaborators in key positions[51]. Soon after, Lenin managed to obtain a fragile and temporary majority and imposed his viewpoints. He ‘called his group the “majoritarians” (boslheviki), and his opponents the “minoritarians” (mensheviki)’[52]. Due to the weakness of the party in the provinces, although the Mensheviks held their first separate Congress in 1912, both factions worked together under the social-democratic label. But the events will growingly push them apart, despite hopes of reunification coming from both sides[53]. Although the Mensheviks considered themselves ‘rather orthodox than reformists in the Marxist European sense’[54], they were, however, ‘democrats by instinct, and their actions as revolutionaries were always held back by the moral scruples which this entailed. This was not true of the Bolsheviks. They were simpler and younger men, militant peasant-workers (…); doers rather than thinkers’[55].

 

Instead of conclusions: European social-democracy and Bolshevism, two incompatible intellectual and political traditions

 

The Bolshevik dictatorship was strongly criticized by prominent European social-democrats. Even at the end of the 19th century, Eduard Bernstein argued that democracy and socialism are inseparable and the present cultural and economic conditions allow a non-violent transition to a broader degree of social emancipation[56]. Marx’s writings needed to be extensively revised: capitalism had gradually managed to overcome profound crises and the social polarization which would bring about the revolution was replaced by a growing social and political conscious middle class[57]. Democracy also entails a culture of moderation and compromise because ‘the parties and the classes supporting them soon learn to recognize the limits of their power and, on each occasion, to undertake as much as they reasonably hope to achieve under the circumstances’. Furthermore, ‘the right to vote in a democracy makes its members virtual partners in the community and this virtual partnership must in the end lead to real partnership. With a working class underdeveloped by in numbers and culture, universal suffrage may for a long while seem no more than the right to choose “the butcher” .However, as the workers grow in number and awareness, it becomes an instrument for transforming the peoples representatives from being the masters to being the real servants of the people’[58]. Bernstein insists that Marx’s works are not to be interpreted as a dogma and that those who rely on the final goal of the socialist movement (abolition of capitalism) rather than its movement (meaning practical achievements) are nothing more than utopians: Marx’s writings were sometimes ambiguous and ‘what deserves to survive’ from its legacy is rather the questions he asked and the social awareness he helped create, not his deterministic dialectic and his coercive philosophy of history[59].

            The ruthless methods of Bolsheviks, who suppressed critical thinking and freedom of speech in the name of party discipline and who did not hesitate to impose a brutal an violent dictatorship in Russia, similar in many respects with the one they have overthrown, worried Eduard Bernstein. He called this model ‘Blanquist Marxism’ (August Blanqui was a French socialist and political activist admired by Lenin who sought destroy the bourgeois society through a violent revolution put into practice not by the working class, but by a devoted and fanatic group of revolutionaries) – and condemned it in harsh and unambiguous terms: ‘The Bolsheviks are the true counter-revolutionaries in Europe; they will kill the socialist revolution. Their interpretation of Marxist theories on the dictatorship of the proletariat is absolutely false. They have known only how to create an army commanded by the officers of the Tsar and intended to combat the will of the people. Their rule is the rule of corruption. (…). Bolshevism leads directly to the decadence of humanity’. Regarding the extreme repressiveness of Bolsheviks against other socialists or social-liberal currents (like the above mentioned Socialist Revolutionaries or the Kadets) or against Russian workers themselves, the revolts of which have been promptly and mercilessly crushed, Bernstein wrote:

 

The Bolshevist government was the first socialist regime that had peacefully demonstrating workers shot down with machine guns. The Bolshevik government was the first to simply lock up socialists of other persuasions – Socialists who are not putschists, but who were robbed of their rights outside the law and in breach of the law, repeating in all this things previously done by reactionary governments. In Russia Socialists, comrades who were at many international congresses and who have fought for socialism all their lives, are locked up and robbed of their rights… We need only to read the Bolsheviks’ own reports, we need only to read their government’s own statistics on the state of finances and social life as a whole, to see that a rotten, fraudulent system is at the helm, a system that compromises itself further by trying, after having bankrupted its own country, to pull other countries into this bankruptcy[60].

 

Another powerful critic of Bolshevism, although from a more orthodox Marxist position, was Rosa Luxemburg. She insisted that the actions of the political party who represent the workers cannot be separated from the general movement for social emancipation. Furthermore, the ‘strong tendency towards centralization’ she observed in the Bolshevik Party meant that ‘it did not count on the direct action of the working class. It therefore, did not need to organize the people for the revolution. The people were expected to play their part only at the moment of revolution. Preparation for the revolution concerned only the little group of revolutionists armed for the coup. Indeed, to assure the success of the revolutionary conspiracy, it was considered wiser to keep the mass at some distance from the conspirators’[61]. Lenin did not take into account that the leading organs of the party were also, to some extent, conservative, thus their exacerbated power obliterating future political tasks. Lenin’s aim was to control the party, not to help its development. He also ‘mechanically’ extrapolated ‘to Russia formulae elaborated in Western Europe’, not taking into account Russia’s specific social and economic conditions. The elitism, opportunism, dictatorial practices and betray of social-democracy by Bolsheviks was for Rosa Luxemburg an undeniable reality: ‘Nothing will more surely enslave a young labor movement to an intellectually elite hungry for power than this bureaucratic straitjacket, which will immobilize the movement and turn it into an automaton manipulated by a central committee[62].

Karl Kautsky was another prominent adversary of Bolshevism. For him, ‘Socialism without democracy is unthinkable. We understand by Modern Socialism not merely social organization of production, but democratic organization of society as well. Accordingly, Socialism is for us inseparably connected with democracy’[63]. The Bolsheviks were accused of being ruthless, hypocrite and opportunistic politicians who managed to retain power by renouncing the principles they were supposedly guided by: ‘To reach power they have renounced the democratic principles. To maintain their power they did the same with the socialist principles’. Kautsky finally concludes that ‘Bolshevism has triumphed in Russia, but socialism has suffered a defeat’. By replacing ‘private capitalism’ with ‘state capitalism’ Bolshevism only strengthened the arbitrariness of bureaucracy, an outcome described by Kautsky as being ‘the most oppressive despotism Russia had ever known’ and placing the workers under ‘the greatest economic slavery they have ever endured’[64]. Under Bolshevik dominance, Russia’s social and educational decay was a reality, a program which had nothing to do with Marx’s project[65]. ‘Only fascist Italy may be compared to Russia in this respect’, Kautsky opines, before generally concluding that a generation later, in the 1930s,

 

What we see in Russia is, therefore, not Socialism, but its antithesis. It can become Socialism only when the people expropriate the expropriators now in power, to use a Marxian expression. Thus, the socialist masses of Russia find themselves with respect to the problem of control of the means of production in the same situation which confronts the workers in capitalist countries. The fact that in Russia the expropriating expropriators call themselves Communists makes not the slightest difference. The difference between Soviet Russia and Western Europe is that the workers in the developed capitalist countries are already strong enough to have limited to some extent the dictatorship of capital and to have altered the power relations to a point which makes the socialization of important economic monopolies a matter of the political victory of the workers in the near future, whereas in Russia the means of production are highly concentrated in one hand and their ownership protected by an absolutist state machine, while the workers, being divided, without organization of their own, without a free press or free elections, are completely shorn of any means of resistance[66].

 

This is how Bolshevism looked to the European social-democrats. Even the most radical amongst them, such as Rosa Luxemburg, who did not renounce the aim of replacing the ‘bourgeois’ democracy existent in the capitalist society with a democracy which would not be only an expression of class struggle and a means of oppression of workers by a conservative elite – criticized Lenin and his political organization for its intolerable departure from the principles of socialism[67]. Had they been alive at the beginning of the 20th century, Marx and Engels would certainly not have considered Bolshevism a variety of socialism. Their radical democracy, growing more and more tempered as decades went by, is, as I have tried to prove in this article, a product of Enlightenment, while Bolshevism is the outcome of a degenerated form of populism, namely the nihilists and the terrorist sects which formed the majority of the Russian intelligentsia during the 1870s and the 1880s. The test of socialism is the test of democracy, real, immediate, palpable democracy; this is what really sets apart socialism from communism[68]. Without it, socialism cannot exist, although the history of the 20th century abounds in sectarian, non-democratic terrorist and criminal groups which called themselves socialist. Indeed, as Karl Kautsky wrote in a posthumous work, ‘The fundamental aim of the Communists of every country is not the destruction of capitalism but the destruction of democracy and of the political and economic organizations of the workers[69].

 

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VENTURI, Franco, Roots of Revolution. A history of the Populist and Socialist Movements in Nineteenth Century Russia, Alfred Knopf, New York, 1960.

 



[1] Eduard Bernstein, The Preconditions of Socialism, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002, p. 147, 160.

[2] Adam Smith, the author of the ‘invisible hand’ metaphor which symbolizes free market – possessed a very different semantics of the notion than the one usually attributed to it today. For Smith, powerful entrepreneurs (not public property) which have monopolistic, not competitive interests, are the main dangers a free market encounters.  One or two generations after Smith’s death, the descendants of those entrepreneurs, fewer and richer, used The Wealth of Nations, Smith’s most important work, to pursue their own interests in creating a market dominated by their huge businesses, where small and medium entrepreneurs (or capitalists) were gradually pushed aside and forced into bankruptcy. Ray Canterbery, A Brief History of Economics. Artful Approaches to the Dismal Science, World Scientific Publishing, London, 2001, pp. 39-60.

[3] Karl Marx judiciously exposed Europe’s image of itself as being prosperous due to a different work ethics, Christianity and cultural superiority – for what it truly was, a fraud. Europe’s advancement was not the result of a better economic system (capitalism) based on profit-making trough intelligent investments, commitment and hard work; quite the contrary, the massive plunder of colonies provided the start for the Industrial Revolution which led to Enlightenment and the whole process of modernity. Capitalul. Critica economiei politice, vol. I (Procesul de producție al capitalului), Editura de Stat pentru Literatură Politică, București, 1957, pp. 573, 712-714, 745-746, 749.

[4] M.L. Bush, Servitutea în epoca modernă, Antet, București, 2003.

[5] Gheorghe Popescu, Evoluția gândirii economice, Editura Academiei Române, Editura Cartimpex Cluj, Cluj-Napoca, 2004, pp. 269-305.

[6] Karl Marx, Contribuții la critica economiei politice, Editura de Stat pentru Literatură Politică, 1954, pp. 9-10; Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, Ideologia germană, Editura de Stat pentru Literatură Politică, București, 1956, pp. 14-24.

[7] Karl Marx, Capitalul…, pp. 638-757.

[8] Ibidem, p. 646.

[9] Karl Marx, Contribuții…, pp. 65-66, 133-139, 146-148. See also Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, Opere alese, vol. I, Editura Partidului Muncitoresc Român, București, 1949, pp. 374-375 and Karl Marx, Mizeria filosofiei. Răspuns la ‘Filosofia Mizeriei’ a d-lui Proudhon, Editura Partidului Comunist Român, București, 1947, pp. 31-41.

[10] Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, Ideologia germană…, p. 44. See also Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, Opere alese, vol. II, Editura de Stat pentru Literatură Politică, București, 1955, pp. 534, 552-553.

[11] An excellent introduction to Hegel’s thinking is to be found in Terry Pinkard’s book Hegel. A biography, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2000.

[12] James Billington, Russia in search of itself, Woodrow Wilson Center Press, Washington D.C., 2004, p. 15. See also Giovanni Sartori, Teoria democrației reinterpretată, Polirom, Iași, 1999, pp. 67-69.

[13] Hugh Seton-Watson, The Russian  Empire, 1801-1917, Oxford University Press, London, 1967, pp. 183-198.

[14] Isaiah Berlin, Russian Thinkers, Penguin Classics, London, 1998, pp. 170-211.

[15] V.I. Lenin, ‘În amintirea lui Herțen’, preface to A.I. Herțen, Opere filosofice alese, Cartea Rusă, București, 1950, pp. 5-14.

[16] Adam Ulam, Ideologies and Illusions. Revolutionary Thought from Herzen to Solzhenitsyn, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1976, p. 21; Isaiah Berlin, Russian…, p. 236; Isaiah Berlin, Adevăratul studiu al omenirii. Antologie de eseuri, Editura Meridiane, București, 2001, pp. 504-505.

[17] Franco Venturi, Roots of Revolution. A history of the Populist and Socialist Movements in Nineteenth Century Russia, Alfred Knopf, New York, 1960, pp. 34-35; Philip Pomper, The Russian Revolutionary Intelligentsia, Harlan Davidson, Arlington Heights, 1993, p. 47; Adam Ulam, The Bolsheviks. The intellectual and political history of the Triumph of Communism in Russia, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1998, p. 48; Isaiah Berlin, Adevăratul studiu …, p. 499.

[18] Philip Pomper, The Russian…, 66.

[19] A.I. Herțen, Opere filosofice alese, vol. II, Cartea Rusă, București, 1954, p. 74.

[20] Adam Ulam, Ideologies…, pp. 26-27.

[21] Herțen, Opere…, vol. II, pp. 331-332. Emphasis in original.

[22] Ibidem, pp. 342-343. Emphasis in original.

[23] Franco Venturi, Roots of Revolution…, p. 316.

[24] Adam Ulam, The Bolsheviks…, p. 50.

[25] Adam Ulam, Illusions…, pp. 24-25.

[26] Iver Neumann, Russia and the idea of Europe. A study in identity and international relations, Routledge, London and New York, 1996, p. 41; Hugh Seton-Watson, The Russian…, p. 550.

[27] Philip Pomper, The Russian…, 64.

[28] D. I. Pisarev, Studii filosofice și politico-sociale, Cartea Rusă, București, 1950, pp. 193-200.

[29] Hugh Seton-Watson, The Russian…, pp. 364-365.

[30] D.I. Pisarev, Studii…, p. 153.

[31] N.G. Cernîșevski, Ce-i de făcut?, Editura pentru Literatură Universală, București, 1963.

[32] D. I. Pisarev, Studii…, p. 234.

[33] Adam Ulam, Ideologies…, pp. 28-41.

[34] Philip Pomper, The Russian…, 93; Hugh Seton-Watson, The Russian…, p. 419.

[35] Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, Opere alese, vol. II, pp. 45-57; Philip Pomper, The Russian…, p. 115.

[36] Hugh Seton-Watson, The Russian…, p. 422.

[37] Ibidem, pp. 423-424.

[38] Ibidem, pp. 427-428.

[39] Philip Pomper, The Russian…, p. 141.

[40] G.V. Plehanov, Opere filozofice alese, vol. I, Editura Politică, București, 1958, p. 562.

[41] Ibidem, pp. 76-86, 242, 275, 279-280, 285-289; G.V. Plehanov, Opere filozofice alese, vol. II, Editura Politică, București, 1961, p. 387.

[42] G.V. Plehanov, Opere…, vol. I, p. 139.

[43] G.V. Plehanov, Opere…, vol. I, pp. 281-282. Emphasis in original.

[44] Hugh Seton-Watson, The Russian…, p. 550.

[45] Orlando Figes, A people’s tragedy. The Russian Revolution, 1891-1924, Random House, London, 1996, p. 139.

[46] Iver Neumann, Russia…, pp. 61-62.

[47] Orlando Figes, A people’s tragedy…, p. 139.

[48] Hugh Seton-Watson, The Russian…, pp. 557-560.

[49] Iver Neumann, Russia…, pp. 73-76; Orlando Figes, A people’s tragedy…, pp. 148-149.

[50] G.V. Plehanov, Opere…, vol. II, pp. 433-444, 501, 509-512.

[51] André Liebich, De pe celălalt țărm. Social-democrația rusă după 1921, CA Publishing, Cluj-Napoca, 2009, pp. 41-42.

[52] Hugh Seton-Watson, The Russian…, p. 565.

[53] André Liebich, De pe celălalt țărm…, p. 54; Orlando Figes, A peopletragedy…, p. 153.

[54] André Liebich, De pe celălalt țărm…, p. 55.

[55] Orlando Figes, A peopletragedy…, p. 153.

[56] Eduard Bernstein, The Preconditions…, p. 142, 145-146, 160.

[57] Donald Sassoon, One Hundred Years of Socialism. The West European Left in the Twentieth Century, Tauris, London, New York, 2010, p. 17.

[58] Eduard Bernstein, The Preconditions…,  p. 144.

[59] Ibidem, pp. 198-199; Manfred Steger, The Quest for Evolutionary Socialism. Eduard Bernstein and social democracy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997, pp. 107-108.

[60] Quoted in Manfred Steger, The Quest…, pp. 237-239.

[61] Rosa Luxemburg, ‘Leninism or Marxism?’, in Helmut Gruber (ed.), International communism in the era of Lenin. A documentary history, Anchor Books, 1972, pp. 31-33.

[62] Ibidem, pp. 40-41. Emphasis in original.

[63] Karl Kautsky, The Dictatorship of the Proletariat, The National Labour Press, Manchester, 1918, p. 6.

[64] Karl Kautsky, Terorism și comunism. Contribuție la istoria revoluțiilor, Cartea Românească, București, 1921, pp. 147-150.

[65] David Lovell, From Marx to Lenin. An evaluation of Marx’s responsibility for Soviet authoritarianism, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1984,  pp. 167-168.

[66] Karl Kautsky, Communism and Socialism, The American League for Democratic Socialism, New York, 1932, pp. 37-39.

[67] Contemporary critics are stressing the ‘one-sidedness’ of this peculiar breed of Russian Marxism (if it can really be called Marxism), also referred to as ‘Vanguard Marxism’. See Michael Lebowitz, The Contradictions of ‘Real Socialism’. The Conductor and the Conducted, Monthly Review Press, New York, 2012, pp. 173-188.

[68] Geoff Eley, Forging Democracy. The History of the Left in Europe, 1850-2000, Oxford University Press, New York, 2002, pp. 178-179.

[69] Karl Kautsky, Social-Democracy versus Communism, Rand School Press, New York, 1946, https://www.marxists.org/archive/kautsky/1930s/demvscom/index.htm, accessed in 20. 08. 2013. Emphasis in original.

„Mă simt fără patrie”: construcții identitare etno-culturale în diaspora românească din Grecia („I feel like having no country”: ethno-cultural identity constructs in the Romanian Diaspora in Greece)

„Mă simt fără patrie”: construcții identitare etno-culturale în diaspora românească din Grecia

(„I feel like having no country”: ethno-cultural identity constructs in the Romanian Diaspora in Greece)

 

 

Delia ȘTEFENEL

 

 

Abstract: Romanian migration in Mediterranean area has generated plenty of studies, but only few of them are analyzing the situation of Romanian minority in Greece. Starting from a hybrid methodology, the present paper is an attempt to localize and to nominate ethnic and cultural identity formation patterns among first-generation Romanians living in the Athens (n = 198). The main findings of our study reveal the auto/hetero – identification mechanisms specific to the bicultural practices, which are activated by means of attachment and cultural/ethnic salience and shaped by the ethno-categorical and intergroup relations.

 

Keywords: ethnic/cultural identity, migration, attachement, acculturation.

 

 

 

Introducere

 

Identitatea etnică și identitatea culturală sunt două concepte cheie în spațiile cultural eterogene, care s-au bucurat de cercetări substanțiale, din discipline complementare și perspective diferite.

Abordarea pentru care am optat în acest studiu se încadrează în orientările teoretice constuctivist – interacționiste, unde identitatea nu se mai definește în termenii unui dat înnăscut (conform modelelor substanțialist – existențialiste), ci devine un construct activat în procesul de negociere eu/noi – celălalt diferit [1]. Acest construct social este mult mai vizibil, odată expus experiențelor interculturale, care determină, prin comparație, diferite forme de afirmare identitară, precum identitatea națională, etnică, culturală sau „interculturală” [2].

Departe de a oferi o prezentare exhaustivă a corpusului conceptual și metodologic în materie de identitate, acest studiu propune mai degrabă o analiză articulată a tipologiilor de identificare etnico-culturală, surprinse în contextul particular al relațiilor exo-grupului românesc cu majoritarii eleni. Astfel, încercarea constă în reașezarea acestor entități, produse și re-produse în funcție de alegerile și percepțiile aculturative ale celor două grupuri conlocuitoare, care variază de la integrare/multiculturalism, la asimilare/melting-pot. Resuscitând modelul clasic ale aculturației [3] și subsumând pluritatea abordărilor academice referitoare la identitatea etnică și culturală, lucrarea propune o lectură apropiată psihologiei interculturale, urmând două linii convergente: una conceptuală, care sintetizează teoriile și postulatele identității etnice și culturale din domeniu, iar alta empirică, fundamentată pe o construcție demonstrativă mixtă.

La o examinare mai atentă a literaturii referitoare la identitatea etnică, se observă repetabilitatea sinonimică a atributelor descriptive ale acesteia. Identitatea etnică este „un construct elastic”, „multidimensional și complex” [4] un concept „dinamic și variabil” [5], care se supune unei analize diferențiate în funcție de tendințele teoretice, unde și aici privilegiate rămân cele din psihologia socială [6] sau developmentală [7]. Desigur, abordările sociologice diferă de cele psihologice, prin poziționarea accentului pe care cei din urmă îl plasează pe internalizarea atașamentului și a percepției sinelui, la nivel individual și nu pe atributele identității evaluate ca proces social, la nivel situațional și contextual [8]. În ciuda diversității în operaționalizarea și instrumentalizarea identității etnice, în studiul de față preluăm ca definiție de lucru formularea oferită de S. Ting-Toomy et. al. (2000), pentru care identitatea etnică este: „un compus de atitudini, sentimente și percepții față de gradul de afiliere și apartenență la propriul grup etnic sau/și la cultura mai largă” [9].

O tipologizare sintetică a structurii acesteia, fără a cădea în trivialitate, ar cuprinde elemente precum: saliența și componența etnică[10] categorizarea sinelui, angajamentul și atașamentul, explorarea și implicarea comportamentală, atitudinile față de membrii in-grupului, valorile și credințele etnice” [11], activate la interacțiunea dintre membrii in/out-grupurilor. Acestea, în cazul nostru au fost inventariate și subsumate triadei afiliere-practică-atașament etnic.

Sensul atașamentului s-a dovedit a fi mult mai pronunțat la nivelul identității culturale, unde și aici abordăriile și formulele de definire variază. Pentru unii cercetători [12], identitatea culturală este o entitate ontologică fluidă și negociabilă, care oscilează între being şi becoming, mai degrabă o sumă a parţilor activate în funcţie de contextul cultural, decât o entitate unitară, statică.

Mai mult, în culegerea de texte fundamentale asupra teoriilor comunicaţionale interculturale realizată de W. B. Gudykunst, 2005 [13], identitatea rămâne monada teoriilor variabilităţii culturale în interacțiunea in/out-grup, printre care: teoria constrângerilor conversaţionale propusă de M. S. Kim [14]; teoria contextuală a comunicării interetnice lansată de Kim Y., 2005b [15]; teoria managementului identitar formulată de T. Imahori şi W. Cupach, 2005 [16]; teoria comunicării identităţii aparţinând grupului de cercetători M.L. Hecht, J.R. Warren, E. Jung şi L Krieger, 2005 [17]; sau în teoriile adaptării şi aculturaţiei [18]; teoria schemelor culturale în interacțiuni sociale, H. Nishida, 2005[19]; teoria adaptării migranților propusă de Orbe și Spellers, 2005[20];teoria contractelor culturale – Jackson, 2002a [21]; teoria negocierii identităţii construită de Ting-Toomey, 2005[22].

Spre exemplu, S. Ting-Toomey defineşte identitatea culturală ca fiind „semnificaţia emoţională pe care o acordăm sentimentului de apartenenţă sau afiliere la o cultură mai largă,“ [23] concepută deopotrivă ca imagine de sine (self-image) cât și ca imagine a sinelui proiectat (others’ image), care ajunge să fie „construită, experimentată şi transmisă”, o dată ce indivizii ajung în medii culturale mixte. În consecinţă, conform autoarei, procesul de negociere identitară devine un schimb interacțional personal și reflectat, în cadrul căreia actorii confruntaţi cu o situaţie interculturală „doresc a-şi afirma, defini, modifica, incita şi/sau susţine imaginile de sine”, fie ele personale sau sociale”[24]. Nevoia de afirmare, de evaluare, de securitate și împărtășire identitară devine mai pregnantă în situații de ruptură, sau la impactul cu altă cultură, când „identităţile sunt co-create şi re-create” [25]. Astfel, re-fabricarea identitară se realizează în funcție de opțiunile pentru care migrantul optează pentru menținerea identității etnice și/sau a identității culturală a societății gazdă. Combinarea celor două dimensiuni, generează o tipologie identitară, structurată în concordanță cu grila stategiilor aculturative, astfel: „identitatea tradiționalistă”, care se produce în cazul strategiei aculturative de separare, „identitatea alienată”, singularizată în cazul marginalizării, identitatea asimilată”, ce corespunde opțiunii de renunțare la tradițiile și valorile etnice în favoarea absorbției în cultura societății majoritare și identitatea biculturală” recunoscută unanim ca un model al integrării favorabile[26]. Cercetările arată că aceste tipuri identitare variază în funcție de generația de migrație, de factorii situaționali, economici [27], de politicile de migrație, de relațiile intergrupale din diferite domenii și arii de activitate [28], de percepțiile subiective vizavi de discriminare, sau de diverse forme de prejudiciu și amenințare exercitate asupra societății majoritare [29] .

În cazuistica noastră, dincolo de situația geopolitică actuală, atitudinea defensivă a majoritarilor greci față de migranți derivă și din raportarea la „celălalt” perceput ca xenos, o traducere în fapt a refuzului intimității mixturii culturale, simțită în discursul laic, prin sintagma „βγάλαμε τα άπλυτα στην φόρα” (trad. rufele murdare sunt scoase la iveală), și s-ar explica parțial prin faptul că, Ellada de astăzi, până nu demult o ţară imigrantă, s-a convertit într-o țară emigrantă ce manifestă o atitudine cvasi-integratoare îndeosebi vizavi de migranţii din blocul ţărilor fost comuniste.

 

Metodologie

 

Cercetarea empirică care fundamentează această analiză s-a derulat în două etape de cercetare. În  prima frază a cercetării, prin ancheta pe bază de chestionar și interviurile semi-structurate am căutat să realizăm o radiografie de grup a migranților români din zona ateniană, în încercarea de a da un răspuns robust întrebărilor referitoare la istoricul, tipologia și rețelele de migrație, urmărind dimensiuni socio-demografice pre și post migrație. Ulterior, pornind de la o metodologie hibridă, am demarat a doua etapă de cercetare, mult mai amplă, menită să aprofundeze aspecte legate de adaptarea psiho-socială și comportamentul comunicațional, în spectrul aculturației românilor din Grecia. Pentru a analiza dimensiunile identităţii etnice am recurs la o versiune adaptată a inventarului propus de Phinney, J. (1992)[30], MEIM – Multigroup Ethnic Identity Measure. Variabilele testate vizau aspecte legate de: mândria de a fi român, gradul de participare la forumuri şi activităţi ale diasporei şi sentimentul de apartenenţă vizavi de cultura română. Respondenţii au fost rugaţi să îşi exprime măsura în care sunt de acord cu enunţuri precum: „În ce măsură este important participaţi la diferite activităţi/organizaţii în care sunt implicaţi şi alţi români, în Grecia? sau „vă simţiţi mai ataşat de tradiţiile/obiceiurile româneşti decât de cele greceşti (sau ale altei culturi)?”. Variantele de răspuns au fost măsurate pe o scală de la 1 la 5 (1= dezacord puternic, 5 = acord puternic). Acestei scale i s-a adăugat, în faza secundă a studiului, o întrebare deschisă, referitoare la strategiile de identificare şi promovare a acesteia: „Preferaţi să spuneţi că sunteţi român atunci când…?” Proba aplicată pentru măsurarea preferinţelor aculturative a fost inventarul propus de Zagefka şi Brown (2002)[31], o adaptare a modelului eco-cultural al lui J. Berry (1997), care cuprinde două tipuri de atitudini poziţionate bidimensional: cel al preferinţelor şi percepţiilor atitudinale de menținere a culturii native și a contactului cu membrii din societatea majoritară. Astfel, menţinerea culturii a fost măsurată prin următorii itemi: „Eu cred că este important ca noi, românii, în Grecia să ne menţinem propria cultură”, „să ne menţinem propria limbă”, „să ne menţinem propriul stil de viaţă”. De asemenea, în cadrul celei de-a doua etape de cercetare, am încercat să surprindem formele de manifestare şi percepţiile obiective şi subiective ale identităţii culturale, precum şi reprezentările vizavi de comunităţile minoritare conlocuitoare şi de românii din România. Deși ambele etape de cercetare s-au realizat la nivelul a două eşantioane, român şi grec, selectate la nivelul regiunii metropolitane Attika, în acest studiu vor fi discute rezultate din eșantionul românesc.

 

Participanți

 

Prima etapă de cercetare a acoperit un lot de 275 de participanți, dintre care 148 migranți români și 124 de greci nativi, ambele grupuri conlocuind în zona metropolei ateniene. (Pentru o prezentare amplă a caracteristicilor eșantionului românesc și a rezultatelor secvențiale din această fază de cercetare, a se vedea Ștefenel, D., 2011[32]).

În etapa secundă, eșantionul a fost compus din 630 de respondenți, 432 greci și 192 de români aflați la  prima migrație. Grupul non-dominant investigat este unul preponderent tânăr, cu studii medii și pregătire profesională dobândită în prealabil în țară, dar care, pentru majoritatea (74,5%) nu este exersată în societatea gazdă. Tabelul 1.1 oferă o descriere a grupului minoritar.

 

Tabelul 1: Structura socio-demografică a eșantionului românesc ( N=198)

Etapa II

 

Procente

Sex

masculin

40,4%

feminin

59,6%

NR

2,0%

Nivel de instruire

4 clase

4,7%

Liceu/şcoală profesională

65,3%

licenţă

30,0%

master/doctorat

 ,0%

De cât timp sunteţi în Grecia?

mai puţin de 1 an   

7,7%

2-5 ani   

30,6%

6-10   

39,3%

11-15  

20,4%

16-20 

2,0%

peste 20 ani

,0%

Experienţă în alte ţări

da

11,1%

nu

88,9%

Cât de bine vorbiţi limba greacă ?  

foarte bine   

30,6%

bine   

46,6%

satisfăcător

21,8%

deloc

1,0%

Planuri de şedere

vă întoarceţi în România  

32,5%

plecaţi în altă ţară   

3,6%

rămâneţi în Grecia    

23,4%

nu ştiu

39,6%

NR

1,0%

Vârstă    (medie)

33

La ce vârstă aţi venit în Grecia?    (medie)

26

 

Astfel, conform caracteristicilor grupului și a reperelor teoretice sintetizate anterior, în continuare  încercăm o definire a acestora de-a lungul demersului nostru cazuistic.

 

 

Rezultate

 

Urmând linia diacronică de culegere a datelor, această secțiune de analiză este structurată dihotomic: în prima parte vor fi prezentate rezultatele privind mărcile identității etnice, care ne-au condus la o delimitare a răspunsurilor culese în funcție de reprezentările surprinse fie prin autoidentificare, prin spectrul „celuilalt”, fie prin raportare la alte comunități de migranți; în partea secundă vor fi dezbătute aspectele identității culturale relevate prin intermediul narațiunilor cu specific etnografic, care, cu riscul de a îngreuna lectura vin să întărească și să completeze cifrele, decupând ceea ce ar mai rămâne specific cultural într-o zonă atinsă de globalizare, informatizare și recesiune economică.

 

 

Etno-localizări identitare

 

Structura identității etnice a fost concepută tridimensional și s-a configurat în jurul componentelor atitudinale și emoționale ce subsumează recunoașterea etnică, afilierea la tradițiile și obiceiurile grupului non-dominant versus orientarea către cutumele grupul majoritar precum și participarea activă la activitățile organizate de comunitatea, ambasada și asociațiile românești care figureză în Atena. După cum se observă din tabelul 1.2, scorurile peste medie înregistrate la dimensiunea identificării etnice plasează comunitatea românească ca fiind deschisă într-o măsură destul de mare către asumarea etnică participativă/pasivă.

 

Tabelul 2: Dimensiuni ale identităţii etnice

Etapa I (N=148)

 

Media

Abaterea standard (SD)

Afiliere etnică

3,05

1,394

Practici etnice

3,47

1,301

Ataşament

4,26

,866

Identitate etnică – total

3,5903

,80050

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Mai mult, atașamentul vizavi de obiceiurile și tradițiile românești înregistrează valorile cele mai ridicate, ceea ce transpune o atitudine negativă vizavi de abandonarea acestora în noua țară gazdă. Identificarea etnică se face mai întâi prin afiliere emoțional-simbolică (M=4.26), apoi printr-un angajament atitudinal-participativ și în ultimă fază printr-un comportament declarativ al etnogenezei (M=3,05). Interesul redus vizavi de ultima opțiune, ne-a condus la aprofundarea a ceea ce Phinney numește saliență etnică, întrebându-ne participanții când preferă să spună că sunt români.

Analiza răspunsurilor justifică și diversifică cifrele de mai sus, poziționându-le în funcție de tipul de identificare, accentuată sau disimulată. Astfel, pentru adepții transparenței etnice, conceptualizarea acesteia  pare să se activeze o dată cu apartenența națională:

„Ori de câte ori mă întreabă de unde sînt, nu de ce naționalitate, că așa e întrebarea în greacă, le răspund politicos, din România, iar răspunsul lor, e tipic: „aa…, frumos”… și acolo terminăm politicos, deși știu că, în mintea lor nu găsesc ceva  frumos în asta. Pentru cei care mai știu cu ce se mănâncă România, de Ceaușescu știu mulți, încerc să le povestesc despre patria mea, dar încerc să îi fac să mă trateze pentru ceea ce fac, ce sînt, nu de unde sînt” (Femeie, 33 ani).

Mai mult, transparenţa etnică este o opțiune declarată deliberat sau constrictiv de către participanți:

„După ce mă prezint, le spun că sînt româncă, nu mi-e rușine” (Femeie,consultant juridic, 36 ani);                    „ Totdeauna spun când sunt întrebată ce naţionalitate am, sau când vreau să subliniez ceva într-o discuţie cu greci care nu ştiu că eu sunt româncă ”, (Femeie, 38 ani); „Numai cine nu-şi cunoaşte istoria nu e mândru să fie român” (Femeie, jurnalist, 45 ani).

Atunci când se încearcă disimularea provenienței etnice aceasta este devoalată de aspectul exterior: „Dacă ai noroc să lucrezi cu greci deschiși, nici nu se simte că nu ești de-al lor…când e nevoie le spun că sunt român, dar de multe ori mi s-a întâmplat să nu fie nevoie, căci se vede. Se vede pe noi!”

Tabelul 3: Corelații

 

Etapa I (N=148)

Afiliere etnică

Practici etnice

Ataşament

Experiență de migrație

Planuri

de ședere

Afiliere etnică

1

,222**

,090

,056

,001

Practici etnice

,222**

1

,187*

,168*

,009

Atașament

,090

,187*

1

-,214**

-,123

Experiență de migrație

,056

,168*

-,214**

1

,298**

Planuri de ședere

,001

,009

-,123

,298**

1

**Corelație semnificativă la prag de 0.01

*  Corelație semnificativă la prag de 0.05

 

Tabelul 1.3 prezintă relațiile dintre componentele identității etnice și durata de ședere înregistrată sau planificată în Grecia. Scorurile corelaționale pozitive dintre variabilele ce descriu recunoașterea etnică și respectiv atașamentul față obiceiurile românești și implicarea în activități de promovare a acestora explică relația de cauzalitate dintre acestea. Factorul timp, este decisiv în schimbarea raporturilor de afinitate față de valorile culturii native. Astfel, observăm că odată cu longevitatea migraţiei scade şi ataşamentul faţă de obiceiurile şi tradiţiile româneşti (r= – 0.214, p<0.01) şi acest fapt este valabil îndeosebi în cazul persoanelor asimilate în societatea elenă. Nu au existat însă diferenţe de gen, vârstă sau mediu de proveninţă între dimensiunile identităţii etnice în rândul persoanelor investigate.

 

Meta-percepții identitare

 

Alături de componentele atitudinale și emoționale vizavi de apartenența etnică, definiția de lucru pentru care am optat includea și percepțiile față de afilierea la grup. În acord cu aceasta și în urma analizei răspunsurilor culese am ajuns la o tipologizare a mecanismelor perceptuale de identificare, structurată în funcție de raportul de: a) autoidentificare (self-image), b) etero-identificare (others’image), c) identificare intercomunitară (comparativ cu alte comunități minoritare conlocuitoare) și d) trans-identificare etnică (imigranții români comparativ cu românii din România).

Astfel, auto-imaginea etnică a grupului minoritar românesc are deopotrivă conotații pozitive și negative: („Noi înșine, de multe ori nu îi vedem bine pe conaționalii noștri”, bărbat, artist plastic, 34 ani), însă identificarea sinelui nu este un mecanism per se, ci depinde și se modifică în funcție de o serie de indici .

Spre exemplu, pentru cei care aparțin categoriei „hilly-skilled”, autodefinirea se face în termeni evaluativi, după atributele și cunoștințele lor și chiar după beneficiile ambelor părţi:

„Eu muncesc într-o companie multinațională, cu filială în România. Am avut noroc de ei și ei de mine. Vorbesc limbi străine și sunt apreciată pentru munca și seriozitatea mea” (Femeie, consultant, 33 ani).

Mai mult, conotațiile pe care apartenența la categoriile sau grupurile sociale le dobândește se particularizează printr-un așa-zis noi-categorial”[33], evaluat după criteriile antagonice ale evoluției profesionale:

Există  două feluri de români: maiștrii, bine pregatiți, pretențiosi, cu capacitate, voință, și care vor rezista pe piața de muncă a construcțiilor. Ăștia își iubesc munca, spre deosebire de greci. […] Un maistru, român, bun știe să facă mai multe lucruri, se descurcă să facă combinații, știe să lucreze și în lemn și în fier, spre exemplu, spre deosebire de greci, care sunt specializați într-un singur domeniu, și atât. După care sunt holoangării, care au început ca holoangări și vor rămâne tot simpli holoangări” (Bărbat, 41 ani, constructor, întreprindere individuală).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    

Frecvent enunțati, vectorii de sorginte geo-politică și spiritul competitiv neloial în interiorul exo-gupului versus loialitatea relațională cu out-grupul intensifică raporturile de departajare între conaționalii, mai ales în câmpul lucrativ:

„Românașii aici nu se văd bine între ei…sînt invidioși și e o întrecere murdară între ei, la muncă. Prinde cine apucă! Nu mai găsești de muncă, ca înainte. Dacă nu ai păstrat din legăturile vechi, e greu să stai pe piață, chiar și pe bani mai puțini și la negru… faci de toate. Înainte primeam lucrări și nu găseam oameni, acum nu am din ce să-i plătesc. Cei care au apucat să se realizeze sînt cei care au lucrat în drahme. Cine știe, la vremurile ce le trăim ne-om întoarce iar la drahme”(Constructor, 37 ani).

În plus, longevitatea experienței de migrație este un indice semnificativ în harta auto-percepției mentale, a etno-stereotipurilor și etno-discriminării, care se reduc la formele unui favoritism intergrupal. Acesta din urmă ajunge să traseze linia de demarcație intracomunitară, între „românii vechi și noi”, după cum subliniază unul dintre respondenți:

„E o „privire” diferită între noi românii, care am venit imediat după revoluție și cei care au invadat Grecia, după ce România a întrat in UE. Românii vechi, au atu-ul limbii, al muncii după stilul lor,  al „nootropiei ”[…] au „nume”, cum s-ar zice [34]. Pe când, pentru românii „târzii”, cei nou-veniţi cu buletinul, e mult mai greu. Şi văd, în ultima vreme, că ne trag şi pe noi toţi în jos, în ochii grecilor” (Bărbat, inginer, 47 ani, 18 ani în Grecia).

Printre formele etno-lingvistice de re-facere identitară, regăsite de altfel în majoritatea strategiilor secundare de adaptare, am întâlnit idiosincrasiile verbale, preluarea numelor greceşti (Vassilis-Vasile, Mihalis – Mihai), precum și un limbaj elenizat” specific gamei semantice administrative sau profesionale. Mai mult, nootropia”, deşi contestată la început, conduce la auto-observare și ulterior la auto-descoperire, ajungând ca normele acesteia să fie importate și reproduse, automat sau nu, la re-emigrare sau la întoarcerea temporară în țară. În plus, locusul căutării identitare poate atinge schimbări de comportament apropiate unui patriotism liber consimțit:

„Aici (în Grecia) am învăţat să mă zbat pentru ţara din care am fugit. Aici am început să caut și să înțeleg obiceiurile noastre, să ascult muzică autentică, din zona mea, nu manele. Astea le găseşti la vânzătorii ambulanţi din bazarul din Pireu […] au la standul lor un steag mare, care nu prea bate cu marfa cu specific românesc de pe tarabă” (Femeie, 30 ani).

Identificarea prin intermediul celuilalt (others’image) se face prin intermediul atitudinilor evaluative de tip bun/rău. Aici, efectul oglinzii grupează răspunsurile referitoare la aria lucrativă, diferențe semnificative înregistându-se între migranții instruiți” versus migranți economici”:

Românii, în general nu postează pentru cea mai bună imagine. Aș zice că grecii ne văd printr-un geam crăpat pe de-o parte de cei care vin și muncesc pe bani puțini, în condiții neomenești, merokamatiarides (trad. zilieri), pe la case, munci pe care în România nu le-ar face, iar pe de altă parte de către cei care chiar îl sparg. Sunt puțini cei care au noroc să vină din țară cu diplome tari, să li se recunoască și să mai și muncească în ce sînt școliți. Problema e că acceptăm, cu capul plecat muncile pe care ei nu le pot face. Și cum să nu ne trateze ca pe niște servitori?” (Bărbat, inginer, 42 ani).

Argumentațiile centrate în jurul opiniilor depreciative, rezidă și din răspunsurile legate îndeosebi de imaginea diasporei românești din Grecia:

Românii sunt prost văzuți. Un lucru la nu s-a lucrat încă destul e imaginea romanilor. Nici din partea autorităților și nici a comunităților nu există semnale. Pentru că, din partea românilor care vin, pretențiile nu sunt mari în ceea ce privește imaginea pe care o oferă, deseori emigranții provenind din pături sociale care au avut de suferit în România” (Bărbat, artist plastic, 34 ani ).

Percepția grupală survenită în urma cunoașterii directe a grupului non-dominant și a legăturilor de similitudine  poziționează diferențiat percepția majoritarilor vizavi de grupul minoritar:

„Grecii care au studiat în România, sau au o legătură de familie, de prietenie sau de afaceri cu România au, în general, o părere bună despre românii din Grecia. Restul, care n-au avut niciodată vreun contact personal, de cunoaștere, cu românii, au o părere proastă, consideră românii țigani și prostituate” (Femeie, 38 ani).

Etichetările singularizează discursul majoritar vizavi de ceea ce este perceput ca prototip românesc de afiliere identitară, particulatizat în cazul transferului de bunuri și remitențe:

„Am întâlnit greci care nu îi pot înțelege pe străini. Îmi ziceau, deși voi stați aici, gândiți grecește, aveți viețile voastre aici, lucrați în bani grecești dar vă faceți case românești” (Femeie, 34 ani).

Particularitățile identității colective devin mult mai vizibile atunci când identificarea se face prin raportare la rețelele sociale și comunitare. În confesiunile înregistrate am surprins o atitudine refractară vizavi de comunitatea românească din diaspora elenă, manifestă prin diferitele ei forme de instituționalizare: 

„Noi nu avem o comunitate în adevăratul sens al cuvântului. Bine, e biserica românească, dar ce e la Plateia (piața) Vathi, nu se poate numi comunitate românească. Când ne prindea poliția pe străzi, vai de noi, munciți, fără hârtii, ce a făcut comunitatea pentru noi? Acum, nu sîntem decât un burete pentru voturile din diasporă” (Bărbat, 43 ani, 18  ani în Grecia).

Istoricul recent versus târziu al migrației și suportul în organizarea și funcționara comunitățiilor și asociațiilor românești, comparativ cu al celorlalte grupuri minoritare conlocuitoare din Grecia, justifică interesul și spiritul participativ al migranților români în activitățile pe care acestea le desfășoară :

Există, în Atena comunități cu o organizare mai solidă decât a noastră. De obicei sunt cei care au mai mulți membrii înscriși, un statut și o istorie mai veche, cum e cea pakistaneză, rusă, poloneză. Efortul nostru de a face o școală de duminica pentru copiii românilor din Atena a eșuat, din lipsa resurselor, deși școala a funcționat foarte bine, timp de un an școlar, cu profesori specialiști, care s-au oferit să predea voluntar. Mai sunt așa zise comunități, care nu au un statut legal, dar care stau mai bine decât Ștefan cel Mare”, din Atena. Cei din Lakonia, organizează spectacole în colaborare cu primăria de acolo, poate și pentru că sunt mai puțini și mai ușor de adunat. Sunt iarăși organizațiile româno-elene care lăudabil, organizează evenimente culturale de excepție” (Femeie, profesor, 31 ani).

Antagonismul și intoleranța interetnică sunt vizibile și la nivel intercomunitar:

Unele comunități îmi plac. Acolo unde oamenii se adună și sunt uniti, îmi place. La cât de dezbinați suntem și cât de preocupați cu „capra vecinului” suntem, sigur ca majoritatea comunităților sunt mai bine organizate decât a noastră. Plus ca noi avem șapte! In „Divina Comedie” oamenii cară  bolovani în spate și nu au voie să ridice privirea spre ceilalți. Trebuie să-și vadă de bolovanul lor […]Dacă fiecare ar fi preocupat de „bolovanul lui”, să facă doar ce știe și ce e mai bine pentru el, fără să-și piardă timpul încercând să-i nenorocească pe ceilalți, cred ca am ajunge mult mai departe decât vom ajunge „faultându-ne” continuu unul pe celălalt” (Femeie, jurnalist, 45 ani).

Cu toate acestea, diversitatea culturală, deși e pozitiv interceptată, nu este susținută îndeajuns de politicile inserționiste: Câteodată e superb să trăiești într-un „sat olimpic”  (bărbat, 34 ani, profesor), dar sunt, ca și românii, alte comunități de imigranți care încearcă să-și facă loc în societate, dar oficialitățile grecești nu fac mai nimic să-i îndrume legal (Femeie, 38 ani).

Securitatea identitară a migranților este surprinsă atunci când aceștia se raportează la românii din România, care „trăiesc pe altă lume. Sunt altfel decât românii de-afară. Noi avem o experienţă în plus. Oricare ar fi ea, ceva ne-a învaţat” (Femeie, jurnalist, 45 ani). Desăvârșirea și asumarea identitară survin din afirmații ce denotă sentimentele de desconsiderare față de cei rămași în țară și de valorile pe care aceștia le promovează în relațiile interpersonale:

„În comparaţie cu noi, cei care am plecat, românii din România trebuie să recupereze peste cincizeici de ani de blocaj comunist şi să reînveţe să trăiască şi să se comporte normal, aşa cum se întâmplă înainte de comunism. Să reînveţe ca fiecare individ e de fapt o persoană care trebuie respectată, cu bunurile ei materiale cu tot şi că orice în viaţă se dobândeşte prin muncă serioasă şi susţinută” (Femeie, 48 ani).

 

Semiotica apartenenței culturale

 

În încercarea de a examina dimensiunile identității culturale care alcătuiesc, prin combinare, modelul aculturativ, observăm prevalența identității subiective, măsurată prin opțiunile personale ale migranților pentru păstrarea elementelor ce definesc cultura de origine. Regula reciprocității însă nu se aplică și în cazul identității obiective, evaluată prin filtrul răspunsului pe care migranții îl primesc de la membrii culturii extinse. Mai mult, discrepanța dintre cele două tipuri identitare se accentuează prin decalajul în ceea ce este stabilit ca normalitate în stilul de viață al românilor din diaspora elenă.

 

Tabelul 4: Importanța acordată preferințelor* și percepțiilor de păstrare a culturii române (%)

 

 

Etapa II (N=198)

Preferințe menținere

cultura, tradiţii, limbă*

Preferințe menținere

stil de viaţă*

Percepții menținere

cultură, tradiţii limbă

Percepții menținere

stil de viață

 

dezacord puternic

1,5

3,0

13,1

20,2

dezacord

18,7

24,2

28,3

37,4

lipsă de opinie

6,1

14,1

24,2

24,7

acord

42,4

42,4

26,3

13,6

acord puternic

31,3

16,2

8,1

4,0

Total

100,0

100,0

100,0

100,0

 

„Stilul de viață” al migranților, diferit de cel al băștinașilor greci nu funcționează întotdeauna după regula mimetismului. Mai mult, acesta devine un indicator de departajare în integrarea socială a românilor aflați în primii ani de migranție și care se disting printr-o structură identitară predominat separaționistă (21,7%): noi nu stăm toată ziua la cafea”, noi nu ne permitem ce îți permit grecii”;noi nu mâncăm la tavernă, noi nu știm ce-a aia bouzouki”, care în majoritatea cazurilor se datorează activităților de tip ”in-door” de petrecere a timpului liber și de resursele materiale limitate alocate acestuia: Noi facem o vacanță pe an, și atunci când mergem în România, nu prin insule. Am avut ocazia să văd câteva insule și o parte din țărmul peloponez, când am avut lucrări acolo” (Bărbat, 31 de ani, tehnician).

De asemenea, pentru majoritatea respondenților mecanismele aculturative funcționează după regula securizării identității culturale și aici se încadrează categoria migranților cu o structură identitară biculturală, care activează în conformitate cu regulile ambelor culturi.

În continuare, câteva dintre narațiunile înregistrare exemplifică şi întăresc afinitățile și reproducțiile identitare biculturale ale migranților români:

M-am format în România, dar am apucat să trăiesc mai mulţi ani din viata mea deja în Grecia. Prietenii mei sînt aici, realizările, aici le-am avut” (Femeie, economist, 59 ani);

România mă atrage ca trecut, ca experienţă de viață, cultură, dar mă respinge mentalitatea și atitudinea celor care te tratează ca venind din străinătate, ca si cum nu ai mai aparține acestei lumi, uneori și numai pentru faptul ca ai un paşaport în mână și nu un buletin. Legislaţia în România lasă de dorit. România e o țară bogată, chiar dacă românii câştigă puţin … în Grecia am 15 ani, am o nouă  familie aici”  (Femeie, angajat, 37 ani);

Particip și la competiţii în România, pregătiri acolo cu copii în baze sportive romaneşti, deci sunt strâns legat prin activitatea mea de ambele tari” (Bărbat, antrenor, 53 ani);

Grecia mă face să mă simt bine, mă umple căldura, clima, marea, dar îmi displace puturoşenia și stilul de faţadă al oamenilor, iar de  România mă leagă familia, prietenii, acolo îmi sînt rădăcinile. Când am un dezechilibru emoţional, mă duc în România și acolo mă regăsesc, îmi găsesc liniştea” (Femeie, consultant juridic, 36 ani).

Incertitudinea identitară este exprimată de cei care, deși își exprimă dorul de țără, se simt străini când se întorc acolo: mă simt fără patrie” ( Bărbat, proprietar al unui magazin cu specific românesc, 45 ani), sau în discursul ambiguu al celor aflaţi “pe graniţă”: pentru greci sunt român, pentru românii din ţară sînt grec „nu te poţi integra, ajungi aici, (în Grecia), eşti privit ca străin, te duci acasă te simţi străin […] Ştii istoria aia care zice, munţii noştri aur o poartă, noi cerşim din poartă-n poartă ?!” (preot, 16 ani în Grecia).

Dar există și cazul celor care se bucură de beneficiile unei identități multiple: Eu mă simt deopotrivă grec și român, îmi place asta, că pot să jonglez cum vreau, în funcție de circumstanțe”( Bărbat, angajat agenție de turism, 31 ani); „În munca mea am contact cu toate categoriile de oamenii, de la oamenii de rând, la deţinuti, până la oameni cu o pregătire profesională înaltă, dar beneficiile vin după modul cum îl abordezi, trebuie să vorbeşti fiecăruia pe limba lui. Am avantajul limbii şi la mentalitaţii – nu doar că ştii cum să îi iei dar ştii cum să te aperi de ei, de exemplu, ştii cum caută să te fure.  Te implici în ambele părţi, ai o experienţă în plus. Dacă nu trăieşti printre ei, nu ai cum să îi înţelegi, pe niciunii” (Jurnalist şi interpret la Curtea Supremă de justiţie din Atena , 36 ani).

Un aspect interesant relaționat re-producțiilor identității biculturale îl constituie faptul că acestea nu s-au manifestat doar la nivel afectiv și emoțional, ci au fost corelate contextului politic și social al țării gazde.

Biculturalismul este un proces încă în fază incipientă în Grecia, care a cunoscut diferite stadii de dezvoltare, dacă luăm în calcul valurile de migrație și legislația aferentă fiecăruia. În acest sens decisivă rămâne legea 2910/2001, care viza gestiunea pe termen mediu a fenomenului migraţionist și a rețelelor de migrație, legiferare ce subsuma eliberarea de premise de şedere şi de muncă precum și naturalizarea cetăţenilor străini. Astfel, pentru a ajunge în faza identității biculturale, migranții români au trecut prin următoarele etape identitare : Până în 2001 migranții se aflau în faza identității camuflate (recunoşteau cu greu ca sunt români, majoritatea celor veniți în scop lucrativ nefiind înregistraţi legal). În perioada 2001-2007 s-a înregistrat un flux masiv de forţă de muncă de origine migrantă, aceasta afirmându-se îndeosebi ca identitate metisată (odata cu abolirea viselor în spațiul Schengen). Abia după momentul 2007, odată cu deschiderea granițelor imigranţii români cunosc ceea ce noi numim etapa identității asumate, adică identitatea în devenire becoming identity”, în terminologie halliană.

 

 

Considerații finale

 

Pe fondul încercării de a testa binomul identitate culturală/etnică, scopul studiului a fost de a localiza și de-problematiza aceste două concepte complementare în context aculturativ.

Modelul nu este unul nou. Dar, noutatea lucrării rezidă tocmai din aplicabilitatea modelului într-un câmp intercultural care nu a mai făcut obiectul unei cercetări similare . 

Urmărind linia de analiză a datelor statistice și a fragmentelor narative, rezultatele studiului converg către o imagine complexă, unde culturii nu i se atribuie doar rolul de a purifica ci și de a genera diversitate, într-un spațiu în care omogenitatea culturală primează.

Paradigmele identitare surprinse nu pot fi singularizate sub un numitor comun (de exemplu, în sensul grecesc al cosmopolitismului – cetățean al lumii – „πολίτης του κόσμου”), dat fiind că identitatea, prin definiție, rămâne un fenomen complex și mobil care oscilează după un cumul de factori (politici, economici, situaționali, individuali). De altfel, din înregistrarile de teren am încercat să sintetizăm tocmai acele tipologii și atribute care definesc conceptele de identitate etnică și culturală, întrucât „nu există identitate în sine, nici măcar pentru sine. Ea constituie întotdeauna o relaţie cu altă identitate” [35] (D. Cuche, 2003, p.127).  

Etno-focalizarea realizată fie prin autoidentificare sau prin efectul oglindirii „celuilalt diferit” este legitimată de disconfortul cultural, derivat din constrângeri și etichetări determinate cultural, intoleranță intra și inter-etnică, discrepanțe între așteptări și realitate și nu în ultimă instanță, de locul pe care migrantul economic îl ocupă în piața locurilor de muncă din Grecia („noi, străinii, am muncit ca să construim casele grecilor și unii, chiar am plătit pentru pensiile lor”).

În mecanismul identificării culturale a minoritarilor primează regula atașamentului bicultural, înţeles în termeni integrativi, dar perceput ca periculos” de către membrii societății majoritare.

Dacă apartenența culturală se face mai mult afectiv-emoțional și mai puțin participativ sau declarativ, nu înseamnă că aceasta este anihilată de către afirmarea etnică sau viceversa. Modul în care cele două activează în rândul celor instruiți (”hilly-skilled”) este redat sugestiv de către unul dintre participanții implicați în activitățile  atelierului de traduceri organizat sub conducerea unei asociații culturale , la Atena:

 

„Ca întotdeauna, întâlnirile de la Balkania Contemporană ne trezesc sentimentul de mândrie naţională, ne reamintesc faptul că dacă eşti un „dezrădăcinat”… nu înseamnă că ţi-ai rupt toate legăturile cu patria în care te-ai născut. Manifestările organizate ne reamintesc că românii au avut, de-a lungul veacurilor, multe personalităţi culturale, politice sau sociale, de talie europeană sau chiar mondială şi, totodată, ne arată că, de multe ori, chiar şi în afara graniţelor ţării, românii se pot afirma. E nevoie doar de talent, profesionalism, perseverenţă şi respect de sine…. Atelierul de Traduceri, e un fel de „up-date” pentru cei care fac traduceri: ne reamintim expresii pe care, poate, le-am uitat de-a lungul anilor, departe de locurile natale, auzim noi cuvinte şi expresii care au fost integrate, în ultimii ani, în limbajul cotidian, explicăm regionalismele sau jargonul folosit, de multe ori, în literatură; [… ] Atelierul de Traduceri e numit „groapa cu lei”, traducerea pusă în discuţie e „sfârşiată” de cei prezenţi, fiecare traducător îşi aduce contribuţia „colorând” anumite expresii, adaptând textul la mentalitatea şi modul de recepţie a cititorului dintr-o ţară sau alta.”[36].

 

Deși migrația schimbă legăturile de atașament, pentru adepții majoritari ai biculturalismului beneficiile migrației la nivel valoric, atitudinal și economic îi fac să se poziționeze pe o treaptă superioară vizavi de cei rămași acasă. Câștigul, oricare ar fi el, se traduce, în cazul minoritarilor români din Atena, printr-o mai bună orientare și exploatare a resurselor, deci o îmbogăţire și nu un handicap.

 


 

 

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PHINNEY, Jean, S., BERRY, J. W., VEDDER, P., LIEBKIND, Karmela, ”The acculturation experience: Attitudes, identities and behaviors of immigrant youth”, In Immigrant youth in cultural transition: Acculturation, identity and adaptation across national contexts, BERRY, John W.; PHINNEY, Jean S.; SAM, David L.; VEDDER, Paul, Mahwah, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2006, pp. 71-116;

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ȘTEFENEL, Delia, ”The Southern model of post-communist migration. Reconfiguration among Romanians’ acculturation in Athens”, Studia Securitatis, 2, 2011, pp. 85-92;

SAM, David L., BERRY, John, W., Cambridge handbook of acculturation psychology, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 2006;

SIMON, Bernd, KLANDERMANS, Bert, ”Politicized collective identity: A social psychological analysis”, American Psychologist, 56, 2001, pp. 319-331;

SINGER, Marshall, R., Perception and identity in intercultural communication, Intercultural Press, Yarmouth, 1998;

HENRI, Tajfel, ”Social identity and intergroup behaviour”, Social Science Information, 13, 1974, pp. 65- 93;

TAJFEL Henri, TURNER, John, ”The social identity theory of intergroup behavior”, In Psychology of intergroup relations , S. WORCHEL, W. AUSTIN, Nelson- Hall, Chicago, IL, 1986, pp. 7-24;

TING-TOOMEY, Stella, ”Communicative resourcefulness: an identity negotiation perspective”, in Intercultural communication competence, R. WISEMAN, J. KOESTER (Eds), Sage, Newbury Park, CA, 1993, pp. 72–111;

TING-TOOMEY, Stella et.al., ”Ethnic/cultural identity salience and conflict styles in four U.S. ethnic groups”, International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 24, 1, 2000, pp. 47-81;

TING-TOOMEY, Stella, OETZEL, John, G., Managing Intercultural Conflict Effectively Sage, Thousand Oaks , 2001;

TRIMBLE, Joseph E., DICKSON, Ryan, ”Ethnic Identity”, in FISHER, Celia B LERNER, Richard M. Applied developmental science: An encyclopedia of research, policies, and programs, Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2005, pp. 415-420;

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VERKUYTEN, Maykel, ”The benefits to social psychology of studying ethnic minorities”, European Bulletin of Social Psychology, 12 ,3, 2000, pp. 5-21;

YEP, Gust., A., ”My three cultures: Navigating the multicultural identity landscape”. In MARTIN, J. N., NAKAYAMA, Thomas K., FLORES, Lisa A. , Readings in cultural contexts, Mission View, CA, 1998, pp. 79-85;

ZAGEFKA, Hanna, BROWN, Rupert, ”The relationship between acculturation strategies, relative fit and intergroup relations: immigrant-majority relations in Germany”, European Journal of Social Psychology, 32, 2002, pp. 171-188.

 



[1] Alin Gavreliuc, Psihologie Interculturală, Polirom, Iași, 2011. Pentru o analiză aprofundată a teoriilor identității a se vedea și Corneliu Ioan Bucur, Adela Popa, Horațiu Rusu, ”Identitatea etno-culturală la români în contextul procesului de integrare europeană. Studiu de caz comparativ rural-urban în judeţul Sibiu”, Revista de Politica Ştiinţei și Scientometrie, Număr Special, 2005, pp. 1-36; 

[2]  Young Yun Kim, ”Ideology, Identity, and Intercultural Communication: An Analysis of Differing Academic Conceptions of Cultural Identity”, Journal of Intercultural Communication Research, 36, 3, 2007a, p. 244;

[3] David L. Sam, John W., Berry, Cambridge handbook of acculturation psychology, Cambridge University Press Cambridge, UK, 2006; John W. Berry, Ype H. Poortinga, Janak Pandey, (Eds). Handbook of Cross-Cultural Psychology: Theory and Method, Allyn and Bacon, Boston, 1997;

[4] Stella Ting-Toomey, et.al. ”Ethnic/cultural identity salience and conflict styles in four U.S. ethnic groups”, International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 24, 1, 2000, p. 49;

[5] Jean S., Phinney, Anthony D. Ong. ”Conceptualization and measurement of ethnic identity: Current status and future directions”, Journal of Counseling Psychology, 54, 3, 2007, p. 271;

[6] Henri Tajfel, ”Social identity and intergroup behaviour”, Social Science Information, 13, 1974, pp. 65-93; Henri Tajfel, John Turner, ”The social identity theory of intergroup behavior”, in William G. Austin, Stephen Worchel, Psychology of intergroup relations Nelson-Hall, Chicago, 1986, pp. 7-24; Xenia Chryssochoou, ”Multicultural societies: Making sense of new environments and identities”, Journal of Community and Applied Social Psychology, 10, 2000, pp. 343-354;

Xenia Chryssochoou, ”Studying identity in social psychology. Some thoughts on the definition of identity and its relation to action”, Language and Politics, 22, 2003, pp. 225-242; Bert Klandermans, Bernd Simon (Eds.)”Politicized collective identity: A social psychological analysis”, American Psychologist, 56, 2001, pp. 319-331; Maykel Verkuyten, ”The benefits to social psychology of studying ethnic minorities”, European Bulletin of Social Psychology, 12 ,3, 2000, pp. 5-21;

[7] Ann S. Masten, ”Developmental psychopathology: Pathways to the future”, International Journal of Behavioral Development, 31, 2006, pp. 46-53; Jean S. Phinney, Tina Kim-Jo, Saloniki Osorio and Perla Vilhjalmsdottir. ”Autonomy and relatedness in adolescent-parent disagreements: Ethnic and developmental factors”, Journal of Adolescent Research, 20, 2005, pp. 8-39; Jean S Phinney, Alipuria, L., ”Ethnic identity in college students from four ethnic groups”, Journal of Adolescence, 13, 1990, pp. 171-184;

[8] Joseph E. Trimble, Ryan Dickson, ”Ethnic Identity”, in Celia B Fisher, Richard M. Lerner.(Eds). Applied developmental science: An encyclopedia of research, policies and programs, Sage, Thousand Oaks, 2005, pp. 415-416;

[9] Stella Ting-Toomey et.al. op.cit. p. 49;

[10] Jean S., Phinney, Anthony D. Ong, op.cit. p. 273;

[11] Ashmore et al. 2004, citat în Jean S., Phinney, Anthony D. Ong , ibid. p. 272;

[12] Stuart Hall, ”Cultural Identity and Diaspora” in Identity: Community, Culture, Difference, Rutherford (Eds.), Lawrence, Wishart, London, 1990; Gust Yep, ”My three cultures: Navigating the multicultural identity landscape”, in Martin, Judith N. , Thomas K. Nakayama, and. Lisa A. Flores, Readings in cultural contexts, Mission View, CA, 1998, p. 82; Collier, Mary J. and Thomas, Milt, ”Cultural identity and intercultural communication”, in , Lary. A. Samovar, Richard, E. Porter, Intercultural communication: a reader, Wadsworth Publishing Company, California, 1997, pp. 36-44; William R. Cupach, Tadasu Todd Imahori, ”Identity management theory”, in William B. Gudykunst, Theorizing about intercultural communication, (Eds.), Thousand Oaks, CA Sage, 2005,pp. 195-210; Kim, Y. Y , op. cit p. 242;

[13] William B. Gudykunst op.cit. 93-419;

[14] Min-Sun Kim,” Culture-Based Conversational Constraints Theory: Individual- and Culture-Level Analyses” in William B. Gudykunst, ibid. pp. 93-118;

[15] Young Yun, Kim,”Association and dissociation: A contextual theory of interethnic communication”, in William B. Gudykunst, ibid. pp. 323-349;

[16] Imahori, T. T., Cupach, W. R. ”Identity management theory”, in William B. Gudykunst ibid. pp. 195-210;

[17] Hecht, M.L., Warren, J.R., Jung, E. şi Krieger, L., ” A Communication Theory of Identity: Development, Theoretical Perspective, and Future Directions”, in William B. Gudykunst, ibid. pp. 257-278;

[18] Kim, Young Yun,”Adapting to a New Culture: An Integrative Communication Theory”, in William B. Gudykunst, ibid. pp. 375-400;

[19] Hiroko, Nishida, H, op.cit. pp. 401-418;

[20] Mark P.Orbe.,Regina E., Spellers, ”From the Margins to the Center: Utilizing Co-Cultural Theory in Diverse Contexts”, in William B. Gudykunst, op. cit., pp.173-192; Mark P Orbe, Constructing co-cultural theory: An explication of culture, power, and Communication, Thousand Oaks, CA, Sage, 1998;

[21]Ronald, L., Jackson,”Cultural contracts theory: Toward an understanding of identity negotiation”, Communication Quarterly, 50, 3, 2002a, pp.359-367;

[22] Stella,Ting-Toomey, ”The Matrix of Face: An Updated Face-Negotiation Theory”, in William B. Gudykunst., ibid. pp. 71-90; Stella Ting-Toomey,”Communicative resourcefulness: an identity negotiation perspective”, in Intercultural communication competence, Richard L. Wiseman, Jolene Koester (Eds) Newbury Park, CA, Sage, 1993,pp. 72-111;

[23] Ting-Toomey, S., op.cit. p. 214;

[24] Ting-Toomey, S., op.cit. p. 217;

[25] Yep, G. A. op.cit. p. 81;

[26] Kim, Y., Y., ibid, p. 245; Ting-Toomey, S., ibid. pp. 223-224;

[27] Jean S.,Phinney ”Ethnic identity and acculturation”, in Kevin Chun, Organista, Pamela Balls, Gerardo, Marin, Acculturation: Advances in theory, measurement, and applied research, American Psychological Association, Washington: 2003, pp. 63-81;

[28] Verkuyten, Maykel ,op.cit., p.7;

[29] Jean S., Tina Kim-Jo, Saloniki Osorio, Perla Vilhjalmsdottir., ibid, p. 91;

[30] Jean S. Phinney, ”The Multigroup Ethnic Identity Measure: A new scale for use with diverse groups”, Journal of Adolescent Research, 7, 1992, pp. 156-176;

[31] Hanna Zagefka, Rubert Brown, ”The relationship between acculturation strategies, relative fit and intergroup relations: immigrant-majority relations in Germany”, European Journal of Social Psychology, 32, 2002, pp. 171-188;

[32] Delia Ștefenel, ”The Southern model of post-communist migration. Reconfiguration among Romanians’ acculturation in Athens”, Studia Securitatis, 2, 2011, pp.85-92;

 

[33] Taxonomia ”categorial we”este desemnată de Jarymowicz, M, 2002, citat în Katarzyna H, Katarzyna H. ”Social identities and well being”, in European, national and regional identity, Proceedings of the international conference, Balogh, B, Bălţătescu, S, Bernáth, K. , Editura universităţii din Oradea, Oradea, 2011, p. 313

[34] Nootropia, νοοτροπία” în greacă, este echivalentul terminologic al termenului mentalitate. „ Numele” la care face referire interlocutorul este traducerea automată a sintagmei peiorative ”έχει όνομα” folosită  în vorbirea curentă, pentru a desemna prestigiul, încrederea, dobândite în interiorul unei comunități.

[35] Denys Cuche, Noţiunea de cultură în ştiinţele sociale, Institutul European, Iași, 2003, p. 127;

[36] Ioana Diaconu, în ”O bucurie a minții și a sufletului” , Agenția de presă Așii Români, http://www.asiiromani.com /stiri -diaspora/grecia/12392 -o-bucurie-a-mintii-si-a-sufletului.html, (accesat în 10 aprilie, 2012);

 

Overcrowding in Italian Jails. A Quantitative Analysis of Foreigners (Supraaglomerarea în închisorile italiene. O analiză cantitativă asupra străinilor)

Overcrowding in Italian Jails. A Quantitative Analysis of Foreigners

(Supraaglomerarea în închisorile italiene. O analiză cantitativă asupra străinilor)

 

Stefania GIRONE

Francesca De PALMA

 

 

     Abstract: Victims of prison-overcrowding in Italy are part of a structural and systemic problem which is still struggling to find plausible solutions. When natives and foreigners are separately considered, the overcrowding phenomenon assumes a perspective that goes beyond the mere Italian attribute and, therefore, better focalises on the ones who, having the status of foreigner,  are somehow in a weaker position in comparison with the native ones. As a matter of fact, the combination  foreign prisoner-overcrowding has allowed to address the prison issue in accordance with a more specific approach that compares the Italian native component and the foreign one. This highlights that the overcrowding phenomenon in Italy is not an aspect suffered mainly by foreign prisoners, but it is equally endured by most of the native ones. Additionally, this analysis takes into account, on the one hand, the most outstanding foreign nationalities housed in Italian prisons and, on the other hand, the Regions having the highest rates of overcrowding, foreign inmates, and prison capacities. The outcomes reveal that Moroccans, Romanians, Tunisians and Albanians are the ones at increased risk of prison overcrowding since, in fact, they represent 60.0% of the total foreign presence in the Italian jails. However, there is a sort of “equal overcrowding distress” that comes out of this context: actually, the four major foreign presences are housed at the same percentage by the six selected Regions (the most overcrowded by foreigners), circumstance that generates a kind of homogeneity of the unlivable conditions in prisons.

 

     Keywords: Italianprisons, inmates, overcrowding, migration.

 

 

            Europe calls on Italy to address prison overcrowding

           

     Prison population in Italy has had a sharp increase in recent years, phenomenon that can generally be attributed to the crisis of the welfare state and the corresponding – fair or unfair – criminal responses made in relation to security issues. Undoubtedly, in this circumstances, the weakest human categories are the ones that pay the utmost costs since they have to face greater difficulties in accessing rights and guarantees offered by the social system. Foreigners are fully-fledged placed in the above categories as, in fact, they are included by the UN in the category of people with special needs[1].

     Regardless the complications of making international comparisons (due to different legal systems and different statistical methods), there are some common traits found among the conditions of detainees in general and foreigners in particular. Specifically referring to foreigners, there are lots of problems related to the lack and/or the restraint of communication (mainly due to language obstacles), knowledge of legal rights, adequate legal assistance, Embassy or Consular support, health care and psychiatric care, employment and training opportunities (both inside and outside jails), know-how of management of foreigners by prison staff, family contacts and/or friendships outside the jail system, access to alternative measures to imprisonment, and so on.

     Nonetheless, scholars and politicians keep calling into question those causes and implications link to the sharp increase of foreigners in European prisons. Recent data[2] show that the foreign population in the EU prisons reached almost 120 thousand units, that is, about 20.0% of the total prisoners (over 631 thousand units made up of natives and foreigners). Taking into account the single member States, foreign inmates have – in percentage terms – a significant impact in Luxembourg (representing around 70.0% of total prisoners), Cyprus and Greece (close to 60.0%). However, the greatest incidences – in absolute terms – are found in Italy and Spain (more than 23,000 foreign prisoners in each country), Germany (around 17,500) and France (about 12,000) .

     The theme chosen by the Authors comes from their strong scientific interest in Migration, phenomenon that is inevitably leading to significant changes in the Italian demographic and socio-economic scene. Besides that, their attention on the combination foreigners-inmates has proved to be particularly significant, especially after the recent sentence imposed on Italy by the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, on the issue concerning the overcrowding in Italian prisons.

     Indeed, the Strasbourg Court has called on Italy to address overpopulation in prisons as the overcrowding rate (Ov = Pp / Pc *100)[3] reached 142.5% in November 2012[4] and, though slightly declined, kept the alarming level of 139.9% in March 2013, that is, far exceeding the European one (99.6%). In other words, the above percentages tell that the whole 206 prisons located Italy were housing 140 inmates for every 100 places of standard capacity.

     Ultimately, the Strasbourg Court took the decision to reject the final appeal advanced by Italy and, consequently, adopted the former request of the European Court of Human Rights[5] which obliges the Italian country to rapidly resolve prison overcrowding (within a year from May 27th 2013) and provide for compensation the prisoners who are victims of that situation.

 

The prison population contained by the Italian country

           

     As already said above, Italy has some of the worst prison overcrowding in Europe, with a current total prison population of 65,831 units, which is 18,786 people above capacity (DAP[6], 2013, Tab. 1).

 

Regions

Number Prisons

Standard

Capacity

Prisoners*

Ov

Foreigners

(%)

Total

Females

Foreigners

Abruzzo

8

1,512

1,860

79

304

123.0

16.3

Apulia

11

2,459

4,078

221

741

165.8

18.2

Basilicata

3

441

441

16

60

100.0

13.6

Calabria

12

2,151

2,879

72

395

133.8

13.7

Campania

17

5,794

8,296

360

981

143.2

11.8

Emilia Romagna

13

2,465

3,631

131

1,871

147.3

51.5

Friuli Venezia Giulia

5

548

838

28

462

152.9

55.1

Lazio

14

4,834

7,231

482

2,974

149.6

41.1

Liguria

7

1,088

1,881

72

1,098

172.9

58.4

Lombardy

19

6,051

9,289

572

4,095

153.5

44.1

Marche

7

777

1,200

35

558

154.4

46.5

Molise

3

391

520

0

63

133.0

12.1

Piedmont

13

3,679

4,979

168

2,497

135.3

50.2

Sardinia

12

2,257

2,010

34

785

89.1

39.1

Sicily

27

5,559

7,081

179

1,279

127.4

18.1

Tuscany

18

3,261

4,124

160

2,225

126.5

54.0

Trentino Alto Adige

2

280

395

22

281

141.1

71.1

Umbria

4

1,332

1,628

72

681

122.2

41.8

Valle d’Aosta

1

181

271

0

199

149.7

73.4

Veneto

10

1,985

3,199

144

1,887

161.2

59.0

Total

206

47,045

65,831

2,847

23,436

139.9

35.6

Table 1: Inmates, regulatory capacity and overcrowding in Italian prisons by Region of detention.  March 31st 201.  Source: authors’ processing based on DAP data.

*The inmates in day-release are totaled in the number of prisoners.

 

     Among the prisoners housed in the Italian jails, there are great quotas of males (women do not exceed 4.3%) and foreigners[7] (35.6% of the total inmates are foreigners, unlike the 20.0% share held by the European Union).

     According to DAP statistical information (updated  to March 31st  2013, Fig. 1), the prison population is concentrated in the regional territories of Lombardy (9,289), Campania (8,296), Lazio (7,231) and Sicily (7,081), thus collecting nearby 50.0% of the total inmates in the country. The Regions detaining the smallest numbers of prisoners are Valle d’Aosta and Trentino Alto Adige (181 and 280 units, respectively).

Figure 1: Territorial distribution of total population detained in the Italian prisons.                March 31st 2013. Source: authors’ processing based on DAP data.

 

     However, as prison population is split into natives and foreigners, it’s interesting to observe that the former ones are mostly gathered in the South of the country while the latter ones, in the North. More specifically, the Regions housing large amounts of Italian inmates are Campania, Sicily, Lombardy, Lazio, Apulia and Calabria. Among the regional areas with great numbers of foreigners stand out, instead, Tuscany, Veneto, Emilia Romagna and Piedmont. Yet, in both Lombardy and Lazio, the quota of native prisoners is quite significant as the foreign one (Fig. 2).

     Several regional areas show strong foreign traits: as a matter of fact, only seven Regions (Abruzzo, Basilicata, Calabria, Campania, Molise, Apulia and Sicily) have a percentage of foreign inmates below the national average (that is, 35.6%).

     Even though the quota of foreign prisoners is quite high in Valle d’Aosta and Trentino Alto Adige (areas where ¾ of the total prisoners are foreigners), the foreign overrepresentation may certainly have greater impact in Regions with bigger capacity. Veneto,  Liguria, Friuli Venezia Giulia, Tuscany, Emilia Romagna and Piedmont are regional areas where, indeed, foreigner inmates exceed 50.0% of the respective total detained population (Tab. 1, Fig. 2).

 

              

    Figure 2:Territorial distribution of the (native and foreign) population detained

in the Italian prisons. March 31st 2013. Source: authors’ processing based on DAP data.

 

     As table 1 shows, prison overcrowding is an unlivable condition that, except for Basilicata and Sardinia, spares no Italian Region. Besides, only nine Regions are placed below the national overcrowding threshold (Ov = 139.9%), which means that 61.2% (that is, 40,309 units) of the total inmates is deeply affected by overcrowding (Fig. 3).

     The territorial analysis points out that only two Regions (Apulia and Campania) cause strong unlivable-suffering for native prisoners while, instead, six Regions (Liguria, Veneto, Emilia Romagna, Valle d’Aosta, Friuli Venezia Giulia and Trentino Alto Adige) do the same for foreign detainees (Tab. 2).

     However, by observing the different overcrowding rates of the above Regions, it looks like that the living-discomfort tolerated by foreigners may be less threatening than the one suffered by the Italians in Campania and Apulia. Yet, in Lombardy and Lazio, overcrowding is (more or less) equally underwent by both natives and foreigners.

Figure 3: Prison Overcrowding inItalian  Regions according to the National

Average (139,9%). March 31st 2013. Source: authors’ processing based on DAP data.

 

Regions

Ov

Natives

Foreigners

Total

    units

      %

      units

     %

       units

                %

Liguria

172.9

783

41.6

1,098

58.4

1,923

100.0

Apulia

165.8

3,337

81.8

741

18.2

4,160

100.0

Veneto

161.2

1,312

41.0

1,887

59.0

3,240

100.0

Marche

154.4

642

53.5

558

46.5

1,254

100.0

Lombardy

153.5

5,194

55.9

4,095

44.1

9,345

100.0

Friuli Venezia Giulia

152.9

376

44.9

462

55.1

883

100.0

Valle d’Aosta

149.7

72

26.6

199

73.4

298

100.0

Lazio

149.6

4,257

58.9

2,974

41.1

7,290

100.0

Emilia Romagna

147.3

1,760

48.5

1,871

51.5

3,679

100.0

Campania

143.2

7,315

88.2

981

11.8

8,384

100.0

Trentino Alto Adige

141.1

114

28.9

281

71.1

424

100.0

Total

– 

25,162

62.4

15,147

37.6

40,371

100.0

Table 2:Inmates in Italian prisons by Regions with great Ov (above national average = 139,9%). March 31st 2013. Source: authors’ processing based on DAP data.

 

Foreigners housed in the Italian prisons

    

     This analytical focus on foreign detainees perfectly fits the progressive increase of immigrants in Italy, phenomenon that – following the widespread trend of the Western world[8] is inevitably leading to significant changes in both demographic and socio-economic scenes[9]

     According to table 3, among the foreigners caged in the Italian prisons, there is a clear prevalence of Africans (49.0% of the total foreign prisoners), most of all coming from the Maghreb area (35.8%). They are followed by Europeans – members of EU (20.7%) and non (19.9%) – and then Americans and Asians who are certainly less (respectively 5.7% and 4.9%).

     Moreover, in the above context does not go unnoticed the high percentage of Nigerian females imprisoned, trait that is almost negligible in the other African countries.

     The most outstanding nationalities[10] among the foreign inmates are the Moroccan (19.0%), the Romanian (15.8%), the Tunisian (12.5%) and the Albanian (12.3%) ones, which all together sum 60.0% of the total, that is, nearby 14,000 of the whole foreigners housed in Italian prisons (23,436 units).

 

Area of Origin

Foreign Prisoners

M

F

Total

     units

        %

         units

          %

       units

                  %

Africa

10,918

49.0

241

21.1

11,159

47.6

Maghreb

7,987

35.8

60

5.2

8,047

34.3

Nigeria

878

3.9

132

11.5

1,010

4.3

Egypt

478

2.1

1

0.1

479

2.0

rest of Africa

1,575

7.1

48

4.2

1,623

6.9

Europe

9,042

40.6

665

58.1

9,707

41.4

EU

4,606

20.7

436

38.1

5,042

21.5

out EU

4,436

19.9

229

20.0

4,665

19.9

America

1,276

5.7

187

16.3

1,463

6.2

Perù

211

0.9

23

2.0

234

1.0

Dominican Republic

192

0.9

36

3.1

228

1.0

Ecuador

214

1.0

13

1.1

227

1.0

rest of America

659

3.0

115

10.1

774

3.3

Asia

1,088

4.9

49

4.3

1,137

4.9

China

309

1.4

27

2.4

336

1.4

Pakistan

125

0.6

1

0.1

126

0.5

India

115

0.5

0

0.0

115

0.5

rest of Asia

539

2.4

21

1.8

560

2.4

Total

22,292

100.0

1,144

100.0

23,436

100.0

Table 3Foreign prisoners by geographical area of origin. March 31st 2013.

Source: authors’ processing based on DAP data.

 

     As shown in figure 4, the four most representative foreign nationalities are differently distributed in the Italian territory:

 

           

 

 

 

             

Figure 4:Territorial distribution of the most outstanding foreign nationalities

(Moroccan, Romanian, Tunisian and Albanian) in Italian prisons.

March 31st 2013. Source: authors’ processing based on DAP data.

 

a) Moroccan prisoners are mainly concentrated in the area of Lombardy, Tuscany and Piedmont;

b) Romanian detainees are most of all located in Lazio. Yet, their lesser extend presence in Lombardy and Piedmont cannot be completely ignored;

c) Tunisian inmates are the most spread on whole Italian land. As a matter of fact, they are housed in Tuscany, Emilia Romagna, Lombardy and Veneto;

d) the Albanian ones are essentially hold in Lombardy and Tuscany.

     The Italian Regions gathering significant presence of all four nationalities (that means more than 1,000 units) are Lombardy (2,358), Tuscany (1,540), Lazio (1,476), Piedmont (1,439), Veneto (1,262) and  Emilia Romagna (1,254).

     At this point, in order to deepen the study on the four major foreign nationalities, it has been taken into account only those Regions featuring the following traits in their own penitentiary structure:

     1) a very high overcrowding rate, that is, above the national average (139.9%);

     2) a relevant share of foreign inmates, higher than the national one (35,6%);

     3) a considerable prison capacity (above 1,000 standard places)[11].

     By doing so, as tables 4a and 4b show, it has been identified the six Regions (Lombardy, Lazio, Emilia Romagna, Veneto, Liguria and Marche) where the most outstanding foreign prisoners (Moroccans, Romanians, Tunisians and Albanians) may “extremely” suffer of unlivable-overcrowding. Specifically, the outcomes reveal that each Region of the ones mentioned above:

a) holds a considerable amount of foreign inmates of all four nationalities, aggregates that range from nearby 50.0% in Lazio to 67.0% in Emilia Romagna (Tab. 4a);

b) causes “equal overcrowding distress” to each foreign group. Basically, since the four major foreign presences are hold by the six Regions at quite the same percentage (ranging from 52.3% for Moroccans to 54.6 for Romanians), it is certainly fair to say that there is a kind of “prison unlivable homogeneity” among the four nationalities. Likewise, a fifty-fifty discomfort can be found even among each single nationality (Tab. 4b).  

 

Region

A*

B**

C***

Morocco

Romania

Tunisia

Albania

subtotal

rest

for.

total

for.

Lombardy

9,289

153.5

44.1

23.1

14.2

7.9

12.3

57.6

42.4

100.0

Lazio

7,231

149.6

41.1

7.6

26.6

6.3

9.1

49.6

50.4

100.0

E. Romagna

3,631

147.3

51.5

23.4

10.6

21.1

12.0

67.0

33.0

100.0

Veneto

3,199

161.2

59.0

20.1

13.8

18.7

14.3

66.9

33.1

100.0

Liguria

1,881

172.9

58.4

24.8

11.6

15.6

12.5

64.4

35.6

100.0

Marche

1,200

154.4

46.5

14.2

10.4

18.3

23.1

65.9

34.1

100.0

Table 4a:Distribution of Moroccans, Romanians, Tunisians and Albanians by Region

with great capacity, Oand foreign presence. March 31st 2013.

Source: authors’ processing based on DAP data.

AStandard Capacity; B**  Overcrowding rate; C*** Total Foreign inmates/Total inmates (x100).

 

     In addition, table 4a shows that the overcrowding-suffering is territorially diversified:

1) most of Moroccans are so much affected by the above phenomenon in Lombardy, Emilia Romagna, Veneto and Liguria;

     2) huge quotas of Romanians experience unlivable conditions in Lazio;

3) large amounts of Tunisians endure living-discomforts in Emilia Romagna and Veneto, and they do so quite as much as Moroccans do in the same Regions;

     4) lots of Albanians undergo same inadequacies in Marche.   

 

Region

Morocco

Romania

Tunisia

Albania

Lombardy

21.2

15.8

11.1

17.4

Lazio

5.1

21.4

6.4

9.4

Emilia Romagna

9.8

5.4

13.5

7.8

Veneto

8.5

7.1

12.0

9.3

Liguria

6.1

3.4

5.8

4.7

Marche

1.8

1.6

3.5

4.5

subtotal

52.5

54.6

52.3

53.1

the rest of Regions

47.5

45.4

47.7

46.9

Italy

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

Table 4b:Distribution of Moroccans, Romanians, Tunisians and Albanians by   Region

with great capacity, Oand foreign presence. March 31st 2013

Source: authors’ processing based on DAP data.

 

Conclusions

 

     The analysis performed on the combination  foreign prisoner-overcrowding has allowed to address the prison issue in accordance with a more specific approach that compares the Italian native component and the foreign one. This has enabled to highlight that the overcrowding phenomenon is not an aspect suffered mainly by foreign prisoners, but it is equally underwent by most of the natives ones.

     The outcomes show that Moroccans, Romanians, Tunisians and Albanians are the foreigners at increased risk of prison overcrowding since they collect the 60% of the total foreign presence in Italian prisons.

     Furthermore, this analysis revealed that there is a sort of “equal overcrowding distress” among the foreign inmates. Basically, the four major foreign presences are hold by the six Regions at the same percentage, circumstance that likely generates a kind of homogeneity of prison unlivable conditions.

     Although overcrowding is not exclusively suffered by foreign prisoners, the fact is that foreigners – as already mentioned in the introduction – undoubtedly form part of weak categories. Actually, the paradoxical effects that the Italian Criminal Justice has on immigration issues reverberate on the prison system: in fact, the number of foreign prisoners tends to increase for minor offenses (such as detention for the ones whose residence permit is expired). Likewise, there is a significant relapse on the individual rights of those foreigners who have to face greater difficulties in accessing rights and guarantees offered by the Italian social system[12].

     Additionally, foreigners have to – more than Italians do – undergo pre-trial detention because they usually lack of fixed residences and/or an adequate accommodations, circumstance that often makes the optional “arrest-at-home” impossible to get[13]. Actually, when foreigners are convicted, they have greater chances to be punished with imprisonment rather than with alternative penalties. Even the precarious economic conditions give foreigners few opportunities to replace a short period of imprisonment with a mere fine. Besides, foreigners can hardly rely on high-quality legal advocacy services, and usually have communication problems due to lack of knowledge of the Italian language[14].

     In short, overcrowding in Italian prisons is still hardly finding plausible solutions. The conclusion of the Strasbourg judges, in our opinion, is irrefutable: as any other developed country, Italy has to face the prison overcrowding and find adequate solutions right away.

 

    

Bibliography

 

BOCCI Elena, Sbarre dentro e fuori il carcere, Aracne, 2011, pp. 217.

BUFFA Pietro, “Prigioni. Amministrare la sofferenza”,  Le staffette Collana, EGA-Edizioni Gruppo Abele, 2013, pp. 296.

CAMPESI Giuseppe, RE Lucia, TORRENTE Giovanni (eds.), “Dietro le sbarre e oltre. Due ricerche sul carcere in Italia”, Diritto, devianza e società Collana, L’Harmattan Italia, Torino, 2009, pp. 288.

GALLIENA  Elena, BROCCHIERI Fabrizia, “Carcere e trattamento in alta sicurezza. Protagonisti a confronto”, Politiche e servizi sociali Collana, No. 299, Franco Angeli, 2012, pp. 160.

ISTAT, Gli Stranieri e il carcere. Aspetti della detenzione, Istituto Nazionale di Statistica, Sezione Giustizia, Roma, 2006, pp, 126.

NALDI, Alessandra, “Detenuti stranieri, un mondo a parte: il circolo vizioso tra disagio abitativo e percorsi penali”, in Alternative al cielo a scacchi. Problema abitativo e sistema penale, Massari Luca, Molteni Andrea (eds.), Franco Angeli, 2006, pp. 176.

TIDEI Pietro (ed.), La situazione penitenziaria in Italia. Problemi e prospettive,  Vecchiarelli, 2010, pp. 168.

 

Electronic resources

 

ANSA.IT cronache, Carceri sovraffollate al 142,5%, maglia nera Ue, 19/11/2012, http://www.ansa.it/ , (accessed on 23 November 2012)

DAP, Detenuti stranieri presenti, Dipartimento dell’amministrazione penitenziaria, Ufficio per lo sviluppo e la gestione del sistema informativo automatizzato statistica ed automazione di supporto dipartimentale, Sezione Statistica, Ministero della Giustizia, aggiornamenti al 31 marzo 2013,

     http://www.giustizia.it/giustizia/it/mg_1_14.wp?selectedNode=0_2 ,

     (accessed on 13 May 2013)

ICPS, Entire world Prison Population Rates. Europe, International Centre of Prison Studies, 2012, http://www.prisonstudies.org/info/worldbrief/?search=europe&x=Europe ,

     (accessed on 15 April 2013)

LA STAMPA.IT Cronache, Carceri, Strasburgo rigetta il ricorso In Italia un anno per la soluzione, 27/05/2013, http://www.lastampa.it/ , (accessed on 30 May 2013)

UN, Handbook on Prisoners with special needs, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime/Unodc,  2009,

     http://www.unodc.org/documents/justice-and-prison-reform/Prisoners-with-special-needs.pdf , (accessed on 13 May 2013).

 



[1] UN, Handbook on Prisoners with special needs, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime/Unodc,  2009, http://www.unodc.org/documents/justice-and-prison-reform/Prisoners-with-special-needs.pdf , (accessed on 13 May 2013).

[2] ICPS, Entire world Prison Population Rates. Europe, International Centre of Prison Studies, 2012, http://www.prisonstudies.org/info/worldbrief/?search=europe&x=Europe , (accessed on 15 April 2013).

[3] The Overcrowding rate (Ov) is given by the ratio of Total Prison Population (Pp) and Standard Prison Capacity (Pc).

[4] Higher levels were found in the jails of Mistretta in Messina-Sicily (270.0%), Brescia (255.0%) and Busto Arsizio in Varese (251.0%); in both latter ones, the foreign inmates were many more than the native ones – Ansa.it Cronache, Carceri sovraffollate al 142,5%, maglia nera Ue, 19/11/2012,  http://www.ansa.it/ , (accessed on 23 November 2012).

[5] According to the Court of Human Rights, Italy infringes Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which prohibits torture and inhuman or degrading treatment. Thus, the EU-court has fined Italy over violating inmates’ basic rights. (La Stampa.it Cronache, Carceri, “Strasburgo rigetta il ricorso In Italia un anno per la soluzione”, 27/05/2013, http://www.lastampa.it/ , accessed on 30 May 2013).

[6] DAP, Detenuti stranieri presenti, Dipartimento dell’amministrazione penitenziaria, Ufficio per lo sviluppo e la gestione del sistema informativo automatizzato statistica ed automazione di supporto dipartimentale, Sezione Statistica, Ministero della Giustizia, aggiornamenti al 31 marzo 2013, http://www.giustizia.it/giustizia/it/mg_1_14.wp?selectedNode=0_2 , (accessed on 13 May 2013).

[7] This connotation that has been established for several years now, although the Directive of Repatriation – which included imprisonment in case of breaches of the removal order – has been rejected by the European Court of Justice in April 2011. Indeed, in December 2010, the foreign inmates in Italian prisons reached 36.7%.

[8] Alessandra NALDI, “Detenuti stranieri, un mondo a parte: il circolo vizioso tra disagio abitativo e percorsi penali”, in Alternative al cielo a scacchi. Problema abitativo e sistema penale, Massari Luca, Molteni Andrea (eds.), Franco Angeli, 2006, pp. 176.

      [9] ISTAT,   “Gli  Stranieri  e   il  carcere.   Aspetti  della detenzione”,   Istituto   Nazionale  di  Statistica,    Sezione

Giustizia, Roma, 2006, pp, 126.

[10] The ten most representative foreign nationalities in Italian prisons are: 1) Morocco (19.0%), 2) Romania (15.8%), 3) Tunisia (12.5%), 4) Albania (12.3%), 5) Nigeria (4.3%), 6) Algeria (2.6%), 7) Egypt (2.0%), 8) former Yugoslavia (2.0%), 9) Senegal (1.7%), 10) Bulgaria (1.5%).

[11] In this regard, three regions  (Trentino Alto Adige, Valle d’Aosta and Friuli Venezia Giulia) have been discarded from this analysis as – though having a high overcrowding rate and a great foreign presence – have a small prison capacity, that is, below 1,000 places.

[12] Giuseppe CAMPESI, Lucia Re, Giovanni Torrente, “Dietro le sbarre e oltre. Due ricerche sul carcere in Italia”,  Diritto, devianza e società Collana, L’Harmattan Italia, Torino, 2009, pp. 288; Pietro TIDEI, La situazione penitenziaria in Italia. Problemi e prospettive,  Vecchiarelli, 2010, pp. 168.

[13] Pietro BUFFA, “Prigioni. Amministrare la sofferenza”,  Le staffette Collana, EGA-Edizioni Gruppo Abele, 2013, pp. 296.

[14] Elena BOCCI, Sbarre dentro e fuori il carcere, Aracne, 2011, pp. 217; Elena GALLIENA , Fabrizia BROCCHIERI, “Carcere e trattamento in alta sicurezza. Protagonisti a confronto”, Politiche e servizi sociali Collana, No. 299, Franco Angeli, 2012, pp. 160.

Rolul femeilor Roma în viaţa publică şi familială. O perspectivă de gen (The Role of Roma Women in Public and in Private Life. A Gender Perspective)

Rolul femeilor Roma în viaţa publică şi familială. O perspectivă de gen

(The Role of Roma Women in Public and in Private Life. A Gender Perspective)

 

Diana Maria HULEA 

 

            Abstract: Within the family, the community and the group to which they belong, Roma women have generally an inferior status, which is considered normal even by them, and is accepted as such. When talking about the involvement of Roma women in public life we must emphasize that they are subject to multiple discrimination, since they are subject to specific discrimination both because they are women and as Roma people.

 

Keywords: gender, family, Roma, women.

 

Introducere

 

Având în vedere faptul că romii sunt, în general, o populaţie săracă şi deseori marginalizată, aceştia au continuat să aibă un stil de viaţă tradiţional, care şi-a pus amprenta asupra vieţii de familie[1], dar şi asupra rolurilor pe care membrii familie le îndeplinesc în societate. Studiile realizate până în prezent[2] indică faptul că romii trăiesc, în cele mai multe cazuri, în familii extinse, se căsătoresc la vârste timpurii şi au un număr mai mare de copii, în comparaţie cu populaţia majoritară. Aceste aspecte îşi pun amprenta atât asupra statutului femeii în cadrul familie cât şi asupra implicării sociale a acesteia, în principal asupra participării la şcolarizare şi accesului pe piaţa muncii.

Într-o cercetare mai amplă, care a avut ca scop identificarea caracteristicilor comunităţilor rome tradiţionale, comparativ cu cele non-tradiţionale, am surprins, de asemenea, aspecte privind rolurile de gen în familia romă, cu accent pe rolul femeii roma în viaţa publică şi familială, aspecte pe care intenţionăm să le prezentăm în lucrarea de faţă. Am considerat că acest studiu este compatibil cu o abordare de tip calitativ, urmărindu-se „descrierea şi explicarea propriilor realităţi de către grupul însuşi”[3].

În studiul de faţă am avut în vedere familia extinsă deoarece, aşa cum afirmă Delia Grigore[4] la romi comunitatea însăşi este o familie extinsă, bazată pe trei tipuri de rudenie: sangvină, prin alianţă şi prin afinitate. „Familia de romi este, de fapt, comunitatea, prin sistemul de relaţii de înrudire culturală („phralipe”), fapt pentru care o putem numi familie comunitară”[5].

Astfel unitatea de analiză în cercetarea de faţă a fost reprezentată de familie. Eşantionul utilizat a fost împărţit în două categorii de subiecţi, din mediul rural şi mediul urban, care la rândul lor au fost împărţite în două grupuri în funcţie de apartenenţa la neam: neamuri foste nomade (respectiv în cercetarea de faţă am cuprins neamul romilor căldărari) şi neamuri sedentare (ne-am oprit la neamul romilor de mătase şi la cel al rudarilor). Din universul populaţiei am selectat un grup de persoane care am considerat că întruneşte caracteristica de reprezentativitate pentru ansamblul populaţiei studiate. Deoarece familiile sunt structurate într-un anumit fel, membrii lor pot fi subdivizaţi după anumite criterii: vârstă, sex, mediul de rezidenţă, neamul de apartenenţă, poziţia în cadrul familiei, poziţia în cadrul comunităţii. De aceea au fost intervievate persoane atât de sex masculin cât şi de sex feminin, din mediul rural şi urban, care aparţin neamurilor sedentare (romi de mătase, rudari) şi celor foste nomade (căldărari), de vârste diferite, de la 20 la 77 de ani, unele persoane fiind considerate