Pathways to cabinet. The Politics of Ministerial Selection in Romania: Party Influence and Coalition Dynamics (2020-2024)

 [Traiectorii spre cabinet. Politica selecției ministeriale în România: influența partidelor și dinamica coalițiilor (2020-2024)]

Laura VARTOLOMEI

Abstract: The study explores ministerial selection from 2020 to 2024, focusing on the vectors of influence and the role of political parties and coalition dynamics in the appointments of the executives in the three related cabinets: Cîțu, Ciucă and Ciolacu I. It observes how party structures, legal provisions, and political bargaining lead to cabinet formation. The analysis displays Romania’s party-centred system, where political appointments mainly reflect the party’s loyalty, internal power struggles and coalition agreements. Previous political experience within the party structures and public offices is also observed, as is the intertwining between parliamentary and minister’s careers. The study’s results offer insights into the fragmented Parliament after the 2020 elections. However, a united pro-European coalition of parties with various ideologies that were still centred, whether right or left, maintained the continuity in governance despite internal struggles inherent to coalitions. The composition of the newly formed government after the 2024 legislative elections looks like a slightly reshuffled version of the previous cabinet.

Keywords: political career, governmental elites, political elite, Romanian ministers, pathways to cabinet, Romanian executives

Introduction

The power relations that have existed in society since the beginning of times sought to be understood and explained through what we call now the elite theory, a thesis affirming that the state’s affairs are best managed by a chosen minority, the political elite, a bunch of people who constantly and significantly influence the lives of the majority. Simply put, those who govern are the political elite. Democratic systems are founded on representativeness in the election of leaders. Since direct democracy is not technically feasible, modern democratic systems rely on representation, placing political parties at the core of governance. This approach emphasises the role of political parties as gatekeepers to ministerial positions, shaping the composition and characteristics of the executive branch.

The article discusses the contemporary political elites in Romanian society, focusing on the 2020-2024 governments that faced a difficult period marked by the COVID-19 pandemic, the war in the neighbouring Ukraine, and the resulting economic crisis. The political scene was dominated by a few powerful parties, governing as dismantled and recomposed coalitions, not leaving much place for technocrats, except the portfolios traditionally occupied by those. This discussion about ministerial selection cannot take place in the absence of a party-centred approach. Ștefan^[1] dedicated a significant share of the paper Patterns of Political Elite Recruitment in Post-communist Romania to the paramount role of the political parties in the” rise and shine” of the political elite.

Parties select candidates for local, legislative, executive, or presidential offices and positions within the party itself, thus performing a complete leadership selection task. Therefore, the parties play a double recruitment role, nominating candidates for party office and public office. Party offices are generally considered only public office apprenticeships^[2].  At the same time, holding offices within the party represents an indicator of political professionalisation^[3].

In a party-driven system, political parties are the primary method for recruiting and choosing ministers. This framework posits that parties emphasise loyalty, ideological consistency, and internal structures when selecting individuals for ministerial roles. The selection and promotion of ministers reflect the power dynamics within political parties and coalitions. The Constitutional provisions, the party structures, and the political negotiations after the legislative elections shape the process. Examining ministerial appointments reveals the extent to which political parties influenced decision-making and how intra-party and inter-party factors affected ministerial selections.

Romania experienced government changes in the selected period, reflecting shifting political alliances and party competition. The trend of governmental instability aligns with the results of previous studies. In work 30 de guverne în 30 de ani, Ștefan^[4] observed that although ideally, each electoral cycle should correspond to a single government, in practice, the Romanian governmental dynamic displays volatility, and generally, the lifespan of a cabinet is approximately one year.

Political Analysis 

1. Legal provisions, political context, and portfolio allocation

Romanian law states that the Government is responsible for implementing internal and external policies and overseeing public administration based on a Parliament-approved program. It works with various social bodies and comprises the Prime Minister, ministers, and other officials as defined by law. According to the Constitution, the President nominates the Prime Minister after consulting the party with an absolute majority or, if none exists, other parliamentary parties. The designated PM then seeks Parliament’s confidence vote on the government program and proposed cabinet. Both chambers of Parliament debate and vote on the new government. If approved, the President officially appoints the government based on Parliament’s decision.

The 2020 Parliamentary elections resulted in a fragmented parliament, leading to coalition negotiations. The National Liberal Party (PNL) formed a centre-right coalition government with the Save Romania Union (USR-PLUS) and the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR). Out of the eighteen portfolios initially distributed, eight were allocated to the PNL, six were given to the USR-PLUS alliance, and three ministries were assigned to the UDMR, with the foreign affairs portfolio going to an independent. After only one year of government, on October 5, 2021, Cîțu cabinet was dismissed with 281 votes through the censure motion submitted by the PSD, thus gathering the highest number of votes with which a government was rejected in Romania.

Internal conflicts within the coalition, particularly between PNL and USR, led to the collapse of the government (due to internal conflicts and political instability, PSD regained power in 2021). After the dismissal of Prime Minister Florin Cîțu following a motion of no confidence, Nicolae Ciucă of PNL was appointed as Prime Minister, leading a newly formed coalition government, a political alliance between the leading right and left-wing parties, PNL and PSD, together with the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR).

Within the National Coalition for Romania, the three previously mentioned parties established an alternate in governance until the next electoral cycle, in two equal periods, by the leaders of the two mainstream right and left parties, PNL and PSD. This alliance was meant to ensure political stability, with an agreement to rotate the prime ministerial position between PNL and PSD. The governing formula combining right and left forces was previously experienced in Romania in 2011 when the Social-Liberal Union (USL) was formed through the alliance between PSD, UNPR, PNL, and PC.

Two more ministries were added to the 18 that functioned in the previous government. The portfolios were divided within the coalition: PNL received seven portfolios, PSD 9, and UDMR 3. The independent minister appointed in the mandate of the Cîțu government was kept at the head of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

Following the agreement established within the National Coalition for Romania, the alternation in governance occurred in the middle of 2023. Nicolae Ciucă resigned, and the state president designated Marcel Ciolacu of PSD as the new Prime Minister. Tensions over ministerial appointments appeared in the formation of the new cabinet, as PNL pushed to take over the Ministry of Development, Public Works, and Administration, which had been under UDMR’s control. This dispute ultimately led UDMR to leave the coalition in June 2023. Despite UDMR’s exit, the PSD-PNL coalition continued to govern, with the Ciolacu Cabinet receiving parliamentary approval on 15 June 2023. The number of ministries was reduced to 18, and they were allocated equally within the two coalition parties, with nine portfolios each going to PNL and PSD. The events reveal the challenges inherent in coalition governments, where negotiations for ministerial positions can affect the stability and composition of the coalition.

2. The central role of the political parties in the selection of ministers

Political selection is a key factor that strengthens and distinguishes a party’s identity from other parties^[5]. Alongside its programs, stances, and policies, the methods used to select its leadership and candidates for elective and cabinet positions provide a unique characteristic to each political party.

As shown by Ciprian Iftimoaei^[6], the formal selection procedures within the political parties require issuing a proposal within the party structure, depending on the party, Central Permanent Office, General Secretariat, or otherwise. The proposal is followed by approval from a party structure that can bear the name of the National Executive Council, Executive Committee, Permanent Council of the Union, etc. Finally, a party structure such as the Permanent Delegation or the National Council approves or rejects the received proposal. However, the party documents do not include details regarding an evaluation procedure regarding the training or the professional experience compatible with the minister’s job description, in balance with the seniority in the party, the positions held, or the proven loyalty.

Candidates’ selection is the basic function of political parties but is sometimes challenged by other interest groups, civil society, or even individuals. Moreover, the factions within the parties act as the real recruitment agents, each wanting to have the upper hand regarding the candidates for ministerial positions. The factions assume the role of selectors following the results of the parliamentary elections. The formation of the government is the result of a complicated algorithm, and the influence of the selectors is only part of the equation. Successfully fulfilling the minister’s role in previous mandates is a component of the selection algorithm. As we will see in the following lines, valuable assets could consist of holding one or more former parliamentary mandates, being a member of the Parliament in the current mandate, or holding leadership positions within the party.

Iancu^[7] observes that in coalition governments, high-ranking party leaders are typically the first to be appointed as ministers, ensuring they wield substantial influence in decision-making. Conversely, single-party executives, which follow a hierarchical structure, tend to have more flexible recruitment processes, often allowing for the inclusion of independent ministers.

3. Co-opting candidates from apolitical roles for executive office

Sometimes, political parties use the method of co-opting candidates from outside the party, either for parliamentary elections or for executive positions, shortly before elections or nominations. Credibility, expertise, and notoriety in specific fields may be among the values ​​that parties place on these candidates, for which they are willing to sacrifice the control they can exercise for ‘one of their own’ in exchange for maximising the chances of election or nomination^[8].

Several examples of persons co-opted from apolitical roles to the minister’s office can be found in the investigated cabinets in all the governing parties in the studied period: USR, UDMR, PSD and PNL. The count revealed five ministers endorsed by PSD, the main centre-left party, in the 2019-2022 period, some later becoming parliamentarians on the party’s lists. Some notable examples are linked also to the main centre-right party, PNL. They served in positions as ministers of Defence, European Investments, Finance, Foreign Affairs, and Education, most of them eventually joining the party and being elected as Parliament members in the legislative elections of 2024.

4. Party careers of cabinet members

The selection of personnel within the party structures is, per se, an arena of competing influences within the party. Once a politician is promoted to leadership positions within the party or public office, the sponsors and selectors anticipate maintaining influence over their actions and remaining involved even after the candidate takes office^[9].

Romanian ministers are primarily drawn from party elites. Being a high-ranking party member, such as a party president, vice president, or secretary-general, significantly increases one’s chances of securing a cabinet role. To get there, most of them go through an apprenticeship phase. This phase can include the activities within the party structures for the endorsed party members or represent visible activism in civic organisations or interest groups for those co-opted later by the party.

5. Strategic candidacies. The link between parliamentary and ministerial careers

Almost everywhere (except the US), recruiting the majority of the cabinet from among members of Parliament is a fundamental aspect of cabinet minister selection^[10]. The connection between the executive office and the dignity of being elected to the Parliament is obvious and aligns with previous studies^[11]. All the prime ministers of the governments in the studied legislature were members of the Romanian Parliament at the time of nomination to the head of the government. Not only the prime ministers are MPs, but also most of the ministers. More than that, there is a practice among the parties to propose them at the top of the lists in the next elections to preserve their privileged position as ministers.

Under the provisions of the Romanian Constitution, ministers can retain their parliamentary seats if they were already members of Parliament at the time of their appointment to the cabinet. This possibility of being simultaneously a member of the Parliament and minister makes the politicians who aim for a ministerial career also interested in winning a seat in the Romanian Parliament, knowing that the position of minister is as coveted as it is volatile.

The three governments discussed here had a total of 46 ministers, with some of them being part of several cabinets. Thirty-three of the ministers were MPs elected following the December 2020 election. Many of them were previously elected in 2012 and 2016.

6. Public office preferences of the executives

According to previous studies and general perception, in terms of political preferences, the most desirable position for a political elite is an office in the government (a non-elected role). Next is a seat in the European Parliament, followed by an executive role at the local level (such as mayor or county council chair). National parliament seats are the least sought-after.

The resignation of Cristian Ghinea from the Romanian Parliament in June 2019 to become a member of the European Parliament in 2020 and his withdrawal from the European role to join the Romanian Government is a notable example of the political career hierarchy^[12].This career path model reflects the ranking of political office preferences among Romanian politicians.

Almost half of the ministers appointed in the three governments studied held ministerial positions in previous governments (Boc, Ungureanu, Ponta, Cioloș, Grindeanu, Tudose, Dăncilă, Orban). As for the position of junior minister, 14 were appointed state secretaries in previous cabinets.

Rarely were executives from the studied period not previously appointed ministers, state secretaries, or both. In the few cases where this happens, it is about young people who” promise to deliver” or have proven leadership qualities within the party and are thus invested in the confidence and support of the party’s power brokers. Many of the ministers, as mentioned before, have already demonstrated to their selectors that they possess the necessary qualities to govern, from the positions of state secretaries and/or ministers in previous governments. Ex-ministers and ex-secretaries of state are more likely to be nominated ministers than those who do not have these types of public office experiences.

7. Selection criteria of the executive elite

Sociologist C. Iftimoaei^[13] distinguishes political and professional criteria for selecting government elites. General political criteria focus on party loyalty, political experience, and leadership roles within the party (e.g., president, vice president, general secretary). Commitment to the governing program is also essential. Specific political criteria include election performance at various levels (local, parliamentary, presidential, EU), strong party backing, public visibility, trust levels, and connections with key political or economic figures, including the country’s president or international partners.

On the professional side, general criteria involve education (university degrees, postgraduate studies, foreign qualifications), specialised training, and professional recognition. Experience in high-prestige roles and alignment with ministerial job requirements are also necessary. Completing programs at institutions like the National Defence College (CNAp) and the former National Information College (ANI) is viewed as an advantage. Specific professional criteria include strong communication and crisis management skills, government decision-making teamwork, and professional or civil organisation experience.

8. The 2024 Elections and the formation of the government

On December 1, 2024, Romania conducted parliamentary elections in which the Social Democratic Party (PSD) received the highest number of votes, followed by the Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR) and the National Liberal Party (PNL). Although PSD led the vote count, no party secured an outright majority. With PSD emerging as the leading party, a pro-European coalition government was formed between PSD, PNL, and UDMR, with Marcel Ciolacu of PSD appointed as Prime Minister in December 2024. The establishment of the new government highlighted the role played by Romania’s political elites. Despite their past rivalries, established parties united to create a coalition to sustain the country’s pro-European stance. The selection criteria mirrored the ones used in the previous three cabinets. Moreover, as of February 2025, 13 of the 16 ministers appointed in the Ciolacu II government had just served in the governments related to the previous electoral cycle.

Conclusions

Observing the ministerial selection in the monitored period, the persistent influence of political parties in shaping governmental elites is present. The findings reinforce that Romania’s executive appointments remain highly party-centric, with selection processes driven by party loyalty, internal power struggles, and coalition negotiations. The evolution of the three cabinets related to the studied electoral cycle (2020-2024) underscores the volatility of coalition governance, where political bargaining and strategic positioning dictate ministerial composition. At the same time, the study reveals the intertwined nature of parliamentary and ministerial careers. A significant proportion of ministers were either active members of Parliament before their appointments or strategically positioned to secure future legislative roles. The preference for experienced political figures with prior ministerial or state secretary experience further reinforces the tendency of Romanian parties to re-circulate elites rather than introduce new political actors.

Moreover, while parties occasionally co-opt technocrats and non-affiliated experts for strategic reasons, these individuals often transition into entire political careers, confirming the dominance of party structures in political recruitment. Despite this, coalition tensions and portfolio negotiations remain key factors in cabinet stability, as demonstrated by UDMR’s withdrawal from the Ciolacu I government.

The post-2024 electoral government formation, which continued the trend of coalition-building among pro-European parties, highlights the resilience of established political elites. The high continuity rate in ministerial appointments suggests that party-driven selection criteria remain unchanged, reinforcing the elite’s control over governmental leadership.

Ultimately, the study confirms that Romania’s ministerial selection remains deeply embedded in party structures, reflecting broader trends in post-communist political systems. Future research could explore whether emerging political actors or potential electoral shifts may challenge this entrenched model or whether party gatekeeping will continue to define the pathways to cabinet positions.

References

BECKMAN, Ludvig, „The professionalisation of politics reconsidered. A study of the Swedish Cabinet 1917–2004”. Parliamentary Affairs, 60(1), 2007, pp. 66–83.

CZUDNOWSKI, Moshe, „Legislative Recruitment under Proportional Representation in Israel: A model and a Case Study”. Midwest Journal of Political Science, 1970, 62, pp. 878-888.

CZUDNOWSKI, Moshe, „Political Recruitment”, Handbook of Political Science, Addison Wesley, Reading, 1975, vol II, pp. 155-242.

DOGAN, Mattei, Pathways to Power: Selecting Rulers in Pluralist Democracies, Westview, Boulder, 1989, p. 5.

GALLAGHER, Michael, Marsh Michael, The Secret Garden: Candidate Selection in Comparative Perspective. Sage, London, 1988, pp. 236-278.

IANCU, Alexandra, „Democratisation et professionnalisation politique en Roumanie”, Revue d’etudes comparatives Est-Ouest, 2017, 48, pp. 297-328.

IFTIMOAEI, Ciprian, Elite guvernamentale în România postcomunistă. Editura Lumen, Iași, 2015, pp. 144-149.

IFTIMOAEI, Ciprian, Sociologia elitelor. Abordări clasice și contemporane. Institutul European, Iași, 2023, pp. 218-223.

SELIGMAN, Lester, „Political Elites Reconsidered: Process, Consequences, and Values”. Comparative Politics, VI, 1974, pp. 294-315.

ȘTEFAN, Laurențiu, Patterns of political elite recruitment in post-communist Romania, Editura Ziua, București, 2004, pp. 128-309.

ŞTEFAN, Laurențiu, Pathways to cabinet: Selecting ministers in post-communist Romania. SFB 580, 2009, pp. 28-34.

ŞTEFAN, Laurențiu, „România: 30 de guverne în 30 de ani”. Sfera Politicii, 27(1/2), 2019, pp. 97-98.

ȘTEFAN, Laurențiu, The (S)Election of Legislators in Romania in the Aftermath of the Parliamentary Elections of December 2020. The International Republican Institute, Washington, 2022, pp. 71-77.

[1] Laurențiu Ștefan, Patterns of political elite recruitment in post-communist Romania, Editura Ziua, București, 2004, pp. 128-309

[2] Moshe Czudnowski, „Political Recruitment”, Handbook of Political Science, Addison Wesley, Reading, 1975, vol II, pp. 155-242.

[3] Ludvig Beckman, „The professionalisation of politics reconsidered. A study of the Swedish Cabinet 1917–2004”. Parliamentary Affairs, 60(1), 2007, pp. 66–83.

[4] Laurențiu Ştefan, „România: 30 de guverne în 30 de ani”. Sfera Politicii, 27(1/2), 2019, pp. 97-98.

[5] Moshe Czudnowski, „Legislative Recruitment under Proportional Representation in Israel: A model and a Case Study”. Midwest Journal of Political Science, 1970, 62, pp. 878-888.

[6] Ciprian Iftimoaei, Sociologia elitelor. Abordări clasice și contemporane. Institutul European, Iași, 2023, pp. 218-223.

[7] Alexandra Iancu, „Democratisation et professionnalisation politique en Roumanie”, Revue d’etudes comparatives Est-Ouest, 2017, 48, pp. 297-328.

[8] Lester Seligman, „Political Elites Reconsidered: Process, Consequences, and Values”. Comparative Politics, VI, 1974, pp. 294-315.

[9] Michael Gallagher, Michael Marsh, The Secret Garden: Candidate Selection in Comparative Perspective. Sage, London, 1988, pp. 236-278.

[10] Mattei Dogan, Pathways to Power: Selecting Rulers in Pluralist Democracies, Westview, Boulder, 1989, p. 5.

[11] Laurențiu Ştefan (2009). Pathways to cabinet: Selecting ministers in post-communist Romania. SFB 580, 2009, pp. 28-34.

[12] Laurențiu Ștefan, The (S)Election of Legislators in Romania in the Aftermath of the Parliamentary Elections of December 2020. The International Republican Institute, Washington, 2022, pp. 71-77.

[13] Ciprian Iftimoaei, Elite guvernamentale în România postcomunistă. Editura Lumen, Iași, 2015, pp. 144-149.