

Azerbaijan in the Context of Europe's Alternative Energy Source

Khatira HAJIYEVA

Abstract: *The national security of every state is closely connected not only with economic, military, ecological, and political fields but also with energy security. Energy security refers to the shortages that arise in the provision of energy and energy resources to states and citizens as a result of natural, technical, social, economic, internal, and external factors. Energy supply is a crucial condition for sustainable development of a country. Ensuring a stable energy balance is one of the main factors of global security. According to experts, the modern political landscape of the world will be determined not by military bloc affiliation but by possession or lack of energy resources. Since the second half of the 1990s, the intense struggle over oil and gas transportation has evolved from economic competition into a geopolitical struggle for the strategic development of the Caspian region. This struggle involved Caspian Basin countries, Western states, and oil companies. The strategy of Caspian region countries was based on attracting foreign investments, strengthening stability in the region, and economic development through the fuel and energy complex. This pushed the Caspian countries to seek alternative routes for transporting natural gas and oil. The presence of rich hydrocarbon reserves in the Caspian basin was one of the factors determining the cooperation between the EU and the Republic of Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan's rich energy resources strengthen its economic potential and play a very important role in regional cooperation. Azerbaijan's inclusion in programs such as the "European Neighborhood Policy" and "Eastern Partnership" was one of the tools for realizing this cooperation.*

Keywords: *Azerbaijan, European Union, energy, hydrocarbons, cooperation, Caspian basin.*

Introduction

At the beginning of the 2000s, as a result of new geopolitical challenges worldwide and the rise in oil prices, large-scale redistribution of natural resources became necessary. According to the International Energy Agency's forecast, by 2030, the global demand for energy raw materials may increase by 53%, with two-thirds of this growth accounted for by developing countries. Experts' predictions

of a sharp decline in oil transportation worldwide by 2020 raised the issue of replacing oil as the primary energy carrier. The main hope was coal and gas, which have large reserves. However, ecological problems related to the use of these energy sources complicated their application. This factor drew the attention of energy-needy countries, especially EU members, to the Caspian region, rich in oil fields. Although there were different opinions on assessing the potential hydro-

carbon reserves of the Caspian, experts predicted that the Caspian would occupy an important place among the world's hydrocarbon sources in the 21st century. Despite its expansion, the EU actively developed strategies to regulate relations with its foreign partners in the energy sector. Such strategies, which played a fundamental role in ensuring EU energy security, gave a special position to oil- and gas-rich Azerbaijan. The Republic of Azerbaijan is one of the countries with rich energy reserves, a developed fuel and energy infrastructure, and an energy system. The foundations of Azerbaijan's energy security policy began with the "Contract of the Century" signed in 1994.

Azerbaijan's Place in Europe's Energy Security

The EU viewed the diversification strategy aimed at expanding sources of energy imports and liberalizing the energy market as fundamental. This strategy was pursued regularly regardless of the volume of oil and gas imports. Such an approach was reflected in the European Council and European Commission (2014) in the "Europe's Secure Energy Supply" Green Papers, which outlined the EU's energy security strategy and diplomacy goals for 2020-2030¹.

According to these documents, the EU sought to expand import routes for energy carriers to enable consumers to benefit from favorable conditions and prices. From this perspective, the EU was more interested in building infra-

structure with new exporters of oil and gas than deepening cooperation with traditional suppliers. Demand for the world's primary energy carriers – coal, oil, natural gas, hydropower, and nuclear energy – continues to grow. According to the International Energy Agency, global energy demand will continue to rise. For example, daily global oil demand was 75.8 million barrels in 2001 and is expected to reach 105 million barrels by 2030, with natural gas demand increasing by 1.8%².

Due to the uneven distribution of global oil and gas reserves, some countries act as exporters while others act as importers. Unlike some Middle Eastern, Latin American, and Caspian region countries and Russia, EU countries lack rich energy resources. The EU, with a population of 505.7 million, accounts for only 2% of global gas reserves and 4% of oil reserves, making it an importer of energy carriers. Political dialogue and cooperation with exporting and transit countries have become key to ensuring energy stability for the EU.

To establish dialogue between producer and consumer countries and transit countries, the EU proposed the signing of the European Energy Charter in February 1991. The goal was to create unified rules for the international energy market. The charter did not impose legal obligations on countries.

According to the document, cooperation among energy partners was based on the following goals and principles:

- Development of open and quality energy markets;
- Creation of conditions attracting private investments and participation of private enterprises;
- Non-discrimination among participants;
- Respect for state sovereignty over natural resources;
- Recognition of the importance of ecologically justified and quality policies.

Based on these principles, on December 17, 1994, the legally binding Energy Charter Treaty was signed in Lisbon. This treaty covered cooperation in investment, trade, transit, and quality in the energy sector. To date, 52 countries from Europe and Asia, including South Caucasus states, have signed and joined the treaty.

Azerbaijan attracted European attention as a potential energy interest area as early as 1883, when the Rothschild family financed the construction of the Baku-Poti³ railway delivering oil to international markets. Oil production in Azerbaijan began in 1813 with the integration of the Baku, Guba, and Derbent khanates into Russia. Since the mid-19th century, oil revenue has played a significant role in the Russian state budget. The first oil well gusher in the Absheron district in 1871 spurred the development of the oil industry and attracted the attention of “Great Powers” in need of energy. Rivaling the Persian Gulf countries that supply Western markets, the Caspian region holds 4% to 9% of the world’s oil reserves. Due to democratization in Gulf countries in

the 1990s, the Caspian region gained exceptional importance for the EU as an energy source with more favorable geopolitical conditions.

At that time, oil and gas fields were the only real resource for Azerbaijan to address existing socio-economic problems. Knowing it lacked sufficient resources to develop energy fields independently, Azerbaijan was compelled to cooperate with EU companies. Georgia sought to deliver transported energy through its territory via Turkey to Western Europe. Zbigniew Brzezinski (former US President Jimmy Carter’s National Security Advisor) noted that *“if Europe and the US do not use diversification to secure energy, Europe will become dependent. Therefore, Western access to Caspian Sea energy resources is vital”*.

When discussing the region’s oil and gas potential, Azerbaijan, with large hydrocarbon reserves in the South Caucasus, should be noted first. Experts estimate Azerbaijan’s oil volume between 1 and 6 billion barrels and gas reserves between 0.5 and 4 trillion cubic meters. According to BP, by the end of 2007, Azerbaijan’s oil reserves were 1 billion barrels and gas reserves 1.28 trillion cubic meters. Russian experts estimate somewhat lower figures: 1.6-1.9 billion tons of oil and 1-1.5 trillion cubic meters of gas⁴.

Azerbaijan’s energy policy with the EU was based on three factors:

- The sharp increase in energy import dependence of most EU member states;

- The EU's eastward expansion with Bulgaria's and Romania's accession, gaining access to the Black Sea;
- The EU's interest in reducing dependence on hydrocarbon imports from Russia by creating energy cooperation with post-Soviet states and importing energy from them.

Since the early 1990s, Brussels developed technical cooperation programs with post-Soviet states, with special emphasis on energy issues. To ensure uninterrupted oil and gas flow to European markets, the EU proposed the "Management of Interstate Oil and Gas Pipelines" project. Its goal was the integration and reorganization of existing pipeline systems in newly independent states. Implemented under the TACIS program, it became the foundation for the EU's INOGATE program, playing a key role in developing South Caucasus energy policy.

On December 2, 1997, Azerbaijan's National Assembly ratified the Energy Charter Treaty and its Protocol. The treaty officially entered into force on April 16, 1998. Azerbaijan's acceptance of the charter's terms demonstrated its leadership's attempt to strengthen energy dialogue with the EU⁵.

Alongside policies aimed at the uninterrupted supply of oil and gas from newly independent states to European consumers, since 2004, the EU has pursued a policy of integrating post-Soviet states' energy markets with its internal energy market. European institutions sought to shape activities reflecting EU interests and

strengthen influence in post-Soviet countries within Russia⁶.

Since the 2000s, the EU began closer energy relations with the South Caucasus, tied to the fact that in 2004 all three South Caucasus states joined the "European Neighborhood Policy," explicitly reflecting the EU's energy interests in the Caspian region.

The importance of these pipelines was emphasized by President I. Aliyev, who stated that "Their completion coincides with a period when European energy security has become a pressing issue"⁷. The BTC and BTE pipelines were constructed based on the Azeri-Chirag-Gunashli (ACG) oil and Shah Deniz gas hydrocarbon projects. The BTC, with a capacity of 50 million tons of oil per year, was designed for 40-60 years of operation. The BTE pipeline, with an annual production capacity of 7.8 billion cubic meters of gas, was also intended for 40-60 years of use⁴. According to BP project operators, the ACG block's oil reserves amounted to 800 million tons. In the Shah Deniz field, operators estimated reserves at 1.0 billion cubic meters of gas and 200 million tons of gas condensate⁸.

This volume of reserves would not even suffice to meet the EU's energy needs for a short period. According to BP-Azerbaijan's plan, the maximum oil production from ACG in 2010 could be 55 million tons⁹. In the same year, according to IEA forecasts, Western Europe's oil demand was 745 million tons⁸. Thus, all the oil produced from ACG would only cover 7.8% of this demand.

After two EU enlargements (2004 and 2007), the oil and gas demand of member states increased by 10-17% (while in 1999, the demand was 72% for oil and 48% for gas, by 2009, it had reached 85.5% for oil and 64.2% for gas)⁹.

Following the “Baku Initiative,” the European Commission proposed a new regional cooperation initiative between the EU and the countries of the Black Sea and Caspian regions⁹. After Bulgaria and Romania joined the EU in 2007, EU leadership had to reconsider its activities in the neighboring Black Sea region, as these countries were important transit zones for transporting Caspian energy resources to Europe. Consequently, in April 2007, a new project called the “Black Sea Synergy” was developed. It included Bulgaria, Greece, Turkey, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia. The EU showed particular interest in the participation of Azerbaijan, Armenia, Moldova, and Greece in this project because these countries were not coastal states of the Black Sea, but their geographical proximity and close relations positioned them as regional players¹⁰.

The “Black Sea Synergy” framework envisaged cooperation in the following areas:

- Democracy, respect for human rights, and good governance, training of employees, and promotion of dialogue with civil society;
- Regional border control and customs cooperation;

- Initiatives to improve migration control and to stop illegal migration;
- “Frozen conflicts” hindering close regional cooperation;
- Energy – energy security dialogue focused on aligning the legal framework of Black Sea countries with EU law concerning production, transport, and transit of energy resources;
- Transport – support for regional transport cooperation;
- Environment – strengthening strategic environmental cooperation in the region and use of multilateral environmental agreements;
- Maritime policy – improving cooperation in maritime border monitoring;
- Fisheries – sustainable and responsible use of fish resources;
- Trade – liberalization of trade in the region;
- Scientific research and education – establishing relations with scientific and educational communities and aligning education and science structures with EU frameworks;
- Science and technology – reflecting mutual interests in EU scientific and technical programs and internal provision of research on specific problems;

Employment and social issues – exchange of advanced practices and information¹¹.

Reviewing the above, we see that numerous fields aimed at developing energy dialogue between the EU and regional countries existed. Neverthe-

less, energy cooperation remained the most important among them.

In May 2008, EU member states, along with Azerbaijan, Georgia, Ukraine, and Lithuania, participated in a summit in Poland to strengthen political and economic ties, including energy relations, between the Black Sea, Baltic, and Caspian regions. A joint communiqué on creating a new European energy corridor was signed¹².

Russia, observing this EU initiative as a mere observer, refused to sign the final decision, stating that “for productive cooperation in the Black Sea, it is more appropriate to have the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization and the European Union”¹³. The presence of various initiatives in the Black Sea and Caspian regions demonstrated the critical importance of energy supply for European countries.

In November 2012, during the third platform meeting of the EU Eastern partners on energy security held in Brussels¹⁴, and at the December 6-7, 2012 meeting of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization in Istanbul¹⁵, discussions were held about creating energy stability and reducing dependency on energy from Russia and the Middle East by finding alternative energy sources. South Caucasus analyst G. Tarkhan Mouravi wrote that “Caspian oil and the region’s transit routes are attractive. The Caucasus creates a Euro-Asian energy corridor between the Black Sea and Caspian Sea”¹⁶.

Azerbaijan, as a rapidly developing energy producer, was advancing not only as a source of Caspian Sea resources but also as a transit country for Europe. Increasing oil production and new gas fields contributed significantly to the country’s GDP growth. Thanks to the major oil reserves in the Azeri-Chirag-Gunashli field, large volumes of oil were transported via the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (Turkey) pipeline. Gas production began from the Shah Deniz field, the strategic Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (Turkey) transit gas pipeline was commissioned, and thus a large volume of gas reached the EU market for the first time through pipelines connecting Turkey and Greece¹⁷. Azerbaijan cooperated in the Trans-Caspian-Black Sea Energy Corridor project prepared by the European Commission. Agreements were reached with Georgia, Poland, Lithuania, and Ukraine to extend the Odessa-Brody oil pipeline to Poland’s Gdansk port, potentially opening possibilities for large-scale supply of Caspian oil resources to the EU. Such developments, especially strategic projects like the “Nabucco” gas pipeline (Turkey to Austria) and the Burgas-Alexandroupolis oil pipeline, were important for EU energy security¹⁸.

After the 2014 events in Ukraine and Crimea, the EU accelerated its search for new energy concepts and ways to free itself from energy dependence¹⁹. The declaration adopted at the EU summit of 28 countries in Brussels on March 21, 2014, caused concern among Europeans. It stated

that “the European Council (EU summit) instructed the European Commission to prepare a plan by June to reduce the EU’s energy dependence based on thorough analyses”²⁰. The rush decision was not aimed at sanctioning Russia but reflected the EU’s attempt to implement an independent energy policy. Speaking at the summit, European Council President H. Van Rompuy stressed the necessity of the “New Strategy,” stating, “In 10 years, 80% of the EU’s energy needs will be met by Russian gas and oil, leading to complete dependence on Moscow in the energy sector”²¹.

European institutions considered replacing Russian fuel imports with oil condensate (liquid sulfur) from the USA. However, this step had drawbacks. The cost of condensate gas increased due to extraction from deposits. A. Razyvaev, director of the analytical department of the Alpari company, noted that “in many European countries, condensate gas is banned due to ecological harm. Even if Europe moves in this direction, the results will only appear after three years”²².

On September 12, 2011, the EU approved a mandate to negotiate a legally binding agreement with Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan for the construction of the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline. On November 17, negotiations were held. If implemented, Turkmenistan’s gas could solve the problem of supplying the large Nabucco project, under preparation since 2002²³.

On April 8, 2013, consultations on the transport of South Caucasus energy resources to Europe were held in Baku. Turkey’s Minister of Energy and Natural Resources, T. Yildiz, said that with Russia’s “South Stream” project realization, Turkey and brotherly Azerbaijan were ready to supply the Trans-Anatolian gas pipeline to Europe either via “Nabucco West” or the Trans-Adriatic pipeline²⁴. The choice between these routes belonged to the Shah Deniz company. Azerbaijan’s State Oil Company planned to sell 29% of its shares to BP, Statoil, and Total, and was preparing to invest \$17 billion in Turkey’s energy sector²⁵. This proposal was of interest not only to Europe but also to Turkey. The then US ambassador to Azerbaijan, R. Morningstar, said that “Washington’s neutral stance on Caspian-European energy projects was to prevent the escalation of geopolitical conflicts in the region”²⁶.

Thus, the EU sought to ensure that the transport of its energy carriers to Europe would be financed partly by Azerbaijan. Consequently, European actors succeeded in making Azerbaijan bear part of the financial costs for extending the oil pipeline to the EU borders and half of the expenses related to works inside Europe.

Azerbaijan’s role in European energy security continues to grow rapidly. The country has broad opportunities not only in traditional energy but also in green energy. This was notably discussed at the 9th meeting of ministers within the Southern Gas Corridor Advisory Council and the 1st

meeting of ministers within the Green Energy Advisory Council, held in Baku on December 3, 2023.

From the above, it is clear that Azerbaijan plays a unique role in solving the EU's energy security problem. This is explained not only by Azerbaijan's rich oil and gas reserves but also by its favorable geographical location, serving as a gateway to the rich resources of the Caspian and Central Asia. It should be noted that Georgia's role as a connecting link between the Caspian Sea and the Black Sea has a role in the EU's energy supply. Thus, Georgia's value for the EU was that Caspian energy carriers were transported to Europe through Georgia.

Conclusion

Azerbaijan's strategic role in the energy security system of the EU and its member states is increasing day by day. The implementation of the Southern Gas Corridor and the future transportation of natural resources of many countries to Europe reflect the country's position as a geostrategic

key country in ensuring Europe's energy security. Two main directions of the successful energy policy of the Republic of Azerbaijan in the energy security of Europe can be highlighted. The first of these is the increase in gas exports based on the Memorandum of Understanding on Strategic Partnership in the field of energy between the European Union and Azerbaijan. The second is that Azerbaijan also occupies an important place in green energy exports to Europe, which is another important component of energy policy. Thus, Azerbaijan plans to become an important supplier of electricity, mainly green energy, to Europe. Azerbaijan's huge renewable energy potential allows our country to play a decisive role in this area.

Thus, the increase in energy cooperation between the European Union and the Republic of Azerbaijan is a necessity arising from Europe's need for fuel for its energy security, and Azerbaijan's need for a market for its huge energy resources.

Notes

- ¹ „Комитет по энергетической политике и энергоэффективности”, *Комиссия Европейских сообществ “Зеленая книга”*, http://www.rspenergy.ru/main/static.asp?art_id=1552.
- ² В.Х. Ишкин, „Энергетическая безопасность – одна из основ безопасности страны”, *Мир связи*, нр.1, 2007, <https://pubsrv.uraic.ru/pressa/katalog/connect.html>; 3.

Бжезинский, „Геостратегия для Евразии. Краткосрочные и долгосрочные цели политики США в этом регионе”, *Независимая газета*, 24.10.1997; В. С. Поликарпов, *Закат Америки (философские размышления)*, отв. ред. Ю.Г.Волков., Изд-во ТРТУ, СПб., Ростов н/Д-Таганрог, 1999, <http://historic.ru/books/item/f00/s00/z0000004/index.shtml>.

- ³ Комитет по энергетической политике и энергоэффективности, *op. cit.*

- 4 В.А. Гусейнов, *Южный Кавказ: тенденции и проблемы развития, 1992-2008 годы*, Красная звезда, Москва, 2008, р. 390.
- 5 Договор к энергетической Хартии. Путеводитель для читателя, р.8, <https://www.energycharter.org/fileadmin/DocumentsMedia/Legal/ECT-ru.pdf>.р.8.
- 6 И. Пашковская, „ЕВРОПЕЙСКИЙ СОЮЗ: ENERGY POLICY against new independent states”, *Analytical reports of НКСММ МГИ-МО (У) МИД РФ*, Issue 1(22), из-во МГИМО, Kuly, Moscow, 2009.
- 7 İ.H. Əliyev, *İnkişaf - məqsədimizdir: çıxışlar, nitqlər, bəyanatlar, müsahibələr, məktublar, məruzələr, müəciətlər*, Sentyabr 2014 - noyabr 2014, 65-ci kitab, Azərnəşr, Bakı, 2018.
- 8 *Ibidem*.
- 9 И. Пашковская, *op.cit*.
- 10 Strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy. Presidency Progress Report, <https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-10874-2007-INIT/en/pdf>.
- 11 *Ibidem*.
- 12 Ministrat Conference on Energy Cooperation between the EU,the Caspian littoral states and their Neighboring countries.Avrupa Komissiyasının saytı, http://esueuropa.eu/dgs/energytransport/international/regional/caucasuscentral_asia/baku/dos/
- 13 Azərbaycan Respublikası Xarici İşlər Nazirliyinin arxivi, *İqtisadi Əməkdaşlıq idarəsinə göndərilən sənədlər*, Fond 47, Qovluq №30, s.s.76, v.250, №4/32-1912, 02/12, 08.11.2012. v156.
- 14 Azərbaycan neft və qazı-2005”, Neft qaz Vertikalı.
- 15 Energy and transport international relations Baku initiative, 13 november 2004. Avropa Komissiyası saytı <http://ec.europa.eu/dos/energytransport/international/regional/caspian/energy>.
- 16 G. Tarkhan-Mouravi, „Frozen conflicts: How the EU can help bring peace to the south Caucasus”, *Europe’s World-Summer issue*, 2007, <http://www.europesworld.org/EWSettings/Article/tabid/78/Default.aspx?Id=42adeee0-1bd1-4bfb-bc43-decb9bdf-10a6>.
- 17 Azərbaycan Respublikası Xarici İşlər Nazirliyinin arxivi, İqtisadi Əməkdaşlıq idarəsinə göndərilən sənədlər, Fond 47, Qovluq, nr.30, s.s.76, v.250, nr. 4/32-1912, 02/12, 08.11.2012. v156.
- 18 *Ibidem*.
- 19 В.Х. Ишкин, *op. cit.*; З. Бжезинский, *op. cit.*; В.С.Поликарпов, *op.cit*.
- 20 В.А. Гусейнов, *op.cit*.
- 21 Aİ və Qara dəniz ölkələrinin Xarici İşlər Nazirlərinin görüşü haqqında məlumat, <http://www.mid.ru/brp4nsfyps.5A9857SCAC>.
- 22 В.А. Гусейнов, *op. cit.*.
- 23 Azərbaycan Transxəzər qaz kəməri üçün ərazi tranzit materialları və infrastruktur təqdim etməyə hazırdır, 17 noyabr 2011, <http://www.milli.az/news/economy/80604.html>.
- 24 T. Yıldız, *Bakı-Tbilisi-Qars və Bakı-Tbilis-Ərzurum regionun əsas layihələridirlər*, 8 aprel 2013. <http://news.day.az/economy/394458.html>.
- 25 BP”, “Satoil” və “Total” Azərbaycan-Türkiyə-Avrupa qaz kəmərinə pay alırlar”, *Nəqliyyat strategiyaları mərkəzi*, 2014, 7 Aprel 25 <http://cfts.org.ua/news/49031>
- 26 Aİ-nin xarici siyasət fəaliyyətinin Avropa xidmətləri saytı,

<http://eeas.europa.eu/blacksea/doc/joint>

[tstatement.blackseaen.pdf](http://www.mid.ru/brp4nsfsps.5A9857SCAC).

Bibliography

Archive

Azərbaycan Respublikası Xarici İşlər Nazirliyinin arxivi, İqtisadi Əməkdaşlıq idarəsinə göndərilən sənədlər, Fond 47, Qovluq, nr. 30, s.s.76, v.250, nr. 32-1912, 02/12, 08.11.2012. v156.

Books

БЖЕЗИНСКИЙ, З., „Геостратегия для Евразии. Краткосрочные и долгосрочные цели политики США в этом регионе”, *Независимая газета*, 24.10.1997.

ГУСЕЙНОВ, В.А., *Южный Кавказ: тенденции и проблемы развития, 1992-2008 годы*, Москва: Красная звезда, 2008.

Articles and studies

ПАШКОВСКАЯ, И., „Европейский СОЮЗ: energy policy against new independent states”, *Analytical reports of НКСМИ МГИ-МО (V) МИД РФ*, Kuly, Issue 1(22), 2009, Moscow, из-во МГИМО.

ТАГИЕВ, Т., „Азербайджан и энергобезопасность Европы”, *Нефтегазовая вертикаль*, nr.6, 2007.

Online resources

ƏLİYEV, İ.H., *İnkişaf - məqsədimizdir: çıxışlar, nitqlər, bəyanatlar, müsahibələr, məktublar, məruzələr, müraziətlər, Sentyabr 2014 - noyabr 2014*, 65-ci kitab, Azərnaşr, Bakı, 2018.

Aİ-nin xarici siyasət fəaliyyətinin Avropa xidmətləri saytı, <http://eeas.europa.eu/blacksea/doc/jointstatement.blackseaen.pdf>.

Aİ və Qara dəniz ölkələrinin Xarici İşlər Nazirlərinin görüşü haqqında məlumat,

<http://www.mid.ru/brp4nsfsps.5A9857SCAC>.

Azərbaycan Transxəzər qaz kəməri üçün ərazi tranzit materialları və infrastruktur təqdim etməyə hazırdır, 17 noyabr 2011.

Azərbaycan neft və qazı, “Neft qaz vertikalı”, 6 aprel 2005.

Azərbaycan Respublikasının xarici siyasətinin əsas istiqamətləri (1991-2016), Azərbaycan Respublikasının Prezidentinin yanında Strateji Araşdırmalar Mərkəzi, Poliart MMC, Bakı, 2017.

BP”, “Satoil” və “Total” Azərbaycan-Türkiyə-Avropa qaz kəmərinə pay alırlar, Nəqliyyat strategiyaları mərkəzi, 7 Aprel 2014, <http://cfts.org.ua/news/49031>.

Договор к энергетической Хартии, Путеводитель для читателя, <https://www.energycharter.org/fileadmin/DocumentsMedia/Legal/ECT-ru.pdf>.

Комитет по энергетической политике и энергоэффективности. Комиссия Европейских сообществ “Зеленая книга”, http://www.rspenergy.ru/main/static.asp?art_id=1552.

Energy and transport international relations Baku initiative. 13 november 2004. Avropa Komissiyası saytı: <http://ee.europa.eu/dos/energytransport/international/regional/caspian/energy>.

Memorandum of understanding on a Strategic partnership. President Barroso and the President of Azerbaijan sign a Memorandum of Understanding on energy partnership, European Commission, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_06_1516.

Ministral Conference on Energy Co-operation between the EU, the Caspian littoral states and their Neighboring coun-

tries.Avropa Komissiyasının saytı,
http://esueuropa.eu/dgs/energytransport/international/regional/caucasuscentral_asia/baku/dos/.

Strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy. Presidency Progress Report,
<https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-10874-2007-INIT/en/pdf>.

Поликарпов, В.С., *Закат Америки (философские размышления)*, отв. ред. Ю.Г.Волков.; СПб.; Ростов н/Д-Таганрог: Изд-во ТРТУ, 1999.
<http://historic.ru/books/item/f00/s00/z000004/index.shtml>.

Ишкин, В.Х., „Энергетическая безопасность – одна из основ безопасности страны”, *Мир связи*, нр.1, 2007,
<https://pubsrv.uraic.ru/prensa/katalog/connect.html>.

Tarkhan-Mouravi, „G. Frozen conflicts: How the EU can help bring peace to the south Caucasus”, *Europe's World-Summer issue*, 2007,
<http://www.europesworld.org/EWSettings/Article/tabid/78/Default.aspx?Id=42adeec0-1bd1-4bff-bc43-decb9bdf10a6>.

Yıldız, T., *Bakı-Tbilisi-Qars və Bakı-Tbilis-Ərzurum regionun əsas layihələridirlər*, 8 aprel 2013,
<http://news.day.az/economy/394458.html/>.

