Words and Weapons: Disinformation and Technology in Russia’s War Against Ukraine

Nataliia NECHAIEVA-YURIICHUK

Abstract: Amid the rapid development of digital technologies and AI, Russia is increasingly combining technological progress with information manipulation in its war against Ukraine. This article attempts to analyse how the Russian Federation is transforming technological development in the military sphere into a means of promoting propaganda narratives. Using the deployment of the Russian “Rassvet” satellite constellation as an example, the author examines how military technology development is becoming a tool for disinformation and propaganda, and how the Russian system for producing and disseminating dis­information operates on a global scale.

Keywords: Russia-Ukraine war, hybrid war, disinformation, propaganda, sat­ellite technologies, AI.

Russia launched a war against Ukraine in 2014 when it occupied the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and parts of Ukraine’s Donetsk and Luhansk regions. It was then, in 2014, that the world gained a new appreciation for the significance of words (in the context of information) and their direct connection to security – from the individual to the nation and the continent. The very begin­ning of Russia’s war against Ukraine was the launch of a series of meas­ures – primarily informational and military-political – aimed at creating a distorted perception among the international community regarding the events in Ukraine.

The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation crossed Ukraine’s state border on February 20, 2014. On that day, military trucks without identifi­cation marks began appearing in the Ukrainian Crimea, and soldiers in Russian uniforms – also without identification marks, known as the “little green men” – were spotted at strategic sites. The very next day, February 21, following the flight of then-President of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovych from Kyiv, Russia launched a military operation to seize the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. Just one week later, on February 27, Russian special forces seized the buildings of the Verkhovna Rada and the Council of Ministers of Crimea. The Russian occupation authorities proclaimed Sergey Aksyonov “head” of Crimea and began preparations for a sham referendum¹. The Russian authorities denied the very fact of a Russian presence in Ukraine’s Crimea, attempting to paint a picture of a civil war in Ukraine and publicly referring to their troops as “self-de­fense forces” allegedly formed by residents. On February 28, after Rus­sian troops seized the Simferopol airport, Russian Ambassador to the European Union Vladimir Chizhov told Euronews: “There are no troops there at all, at least not Russian ones,” echoing Moscow’s official line. When asked by Bloomberg, Russian President Vladimir Putin even suggested: “Go to a store here, and you can buy any uniform there.”². It was only after the so-called referendum in Crimea that Moscow acknowledged its presence and involvement in the armed seizure of Crimea. Symbolically: Moscow established the “For the Return of Crimea” medal long before the so-called referendum on the peninsula. The medal bears the date February 20, 2014 – the date the Russian spe­cial operation began, marking the start of Russian aggression³. A year later, in 2015, Vladinir Putin admit­ted that he himself had given the or­der to launch the operation in Crimea⁴.

Since then, a number of changes have taken place both in the geopo­litical landscape and in the nature of warfare, its tools, and the technolo­gies employed. What has remained constant is the mandatory use of in­formation and hybrid warfare tools to influence the consciousness and worldview of broad segments of the population in various corners of the globe.

This research paper is an attempt to analyse how Russia exerts psy­chological influence on target audi­ences and the general public by com­bining real and fabricated technologi­cal narratives to advance its own agenda – specifically, to weaken support for Ukraine and normalise the international community’s atti­tude toward itself. The analysis is based on publications in open sources, analytical reports, and jour­nalistic investigations, since objective information about the “Rassvet” project and the mechanisms of its narrative exploitation is restricted, and open sources remain the only available way to track these proc­esses and analyse them in real time. Furthermore, with the advent of AI, developments in the field under study are so rapid that they can be tracked through observation and documenta­tion in open-source formats.

According to analysts at the Royal United Services Institute, 2026 was a year of “hybrid escalation by Rus­sia,” in which weaknesses on the front lines were actively offset by sabotage and influence operations⁵. Russia continues to target Ukrainian and Western audiences separately, while simultaneously making exten­sive use of generative models to pro­duce deepfakes, AI-generated “wit­nesses” to events, and networks of mirror sites, overwhelming the fact-checking community with a deluge of fakes and disinformation. In an effort to amplify its destructive influence on public opinion, Russia is actively using AI to spread disinformation. To this end, it employs a technique of “poisoning” Large Language Models (LLMs) by generating fake websites, news portals, and pseudo-analytics, which are systematically “fed” to algorithms through SEO optimisa­tion. The main goal is to reproduce the Kremlin’s disinformation mes­sages about Ukraine – and beyond – in responses to audience queries by bots such as ChatGPT, Gemini, Claude, and others⁶.

Russian disinformation networks began forming as early as 2014, with Olgino; however, until 2022-2023, the networks producing disinforma­tion required human involvement in creating and disseminating content. The emergence and rapid develop­ment of AI changed the situation – now neither actors nor directors are needed to generate fake videos. Moreover, producing fake content is accessible to virtually anyone, not just states with significant resources. Among the most well-known Russian disinformation networks today is “Storm,” which, in various forms, produces a wide range of content to promote Kremlin narratives. For ex­ample, “Storm-1516” specialises in videos presented as coming from “whistleblowers” and pseudo-jour­nalists, while “Storm-1679” produces pseudo-documentaries in the style of American investigative reports⁷.

In response to the technological advancement of Russia’s disinforma­tion machine, the democratic world is developing its own technological defences, among which, in our view, the availability of objective expert information in various languages on open platforms and sites (Common Crawl) to prevent or minimize the “poisoning” of AI by Russian propa­ganda and disinformation, to fill in­formation gaps regarding Ukraine and the Russian-Ukrainian war, and so on is critical.

The war currently being waged for the information space is ex­tremely aggressive. It runs parallel to the combat operations on the front lines of the Russia-Ukraine war and combines the technological and dis­information dimensions of the latter. The combination of conventional and unconventional means of warfare is known in academic discourse as hy­brid warfare, the basic definition of which was formulated by Frank Hoffman:

Hybrid war is the war which “in­corporates a range of different modes of warfare including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts including indiscriminate violence and coercion, and criminal disorder”⁸.

Hoffman’s concept served as a starting point for further research into hybrid wars in their various forms, including Russia’s hybrid war against Ukraine. With the unfolding of Rus­sia’s war against Ukraine, Ukrainian scholars are increasingly focusing their attention on research into hybrid warfare, its forms, and its tools. Among them is Yevhen Magda, di­rector of the Institute of World Pol­icy. In his works, the scholar empha­sises:

“Hybrid warfare is the attempt by one state to impose its political will on another (or others) through a combination of political, economic, and informational measures, without declaring war, in accordance with the norms of international law”⁹.

The experience of the Russian-Ukrainian war demonstrates that the set of measures is constantly being refined and expanded in the context of technological development. What remains constant is the desire of a single state to impose its will on oth­ers using hybrid tools.

The Kremlin’s approach to under­standing the nature of hybrid war differs significantly from those out­lined above. While Western dis­course treats hybrid war primarily as an analytical category for classifying external threats, Russian discourse presents it either as a civilizational conflict of values (the West versus Russia) or as a geopolitical struggle for global dominance. In both cases, Russia is portrayed as the victim, not the aggressor. Moreover, Russian public debates on hybrid warfare and hybrid threats “can be seen as a part of Russia’s strategic communications to the extent that the debate amplifies officially accepted vision of threats towards Russia¹⁰. At the same time, Russia itself is actively using hybrid influence tactics to secure victory in the war.

Manipulation, deception, and the falsification of facts to support Russia’s self-justifying narratives can also be observed in technological applications, particularly in the field of armaments. In modern warfare, satellite internet plays a crucial role not only in ensuring communications but also in data exchange and other military operations. As early as 2017, the Kremlin attempted to launch a satellite communications system (“Efir”). However, a year later, it was removed from the program because no private investors were found willing to fund its launch. In 2018, the creation of the “Sfera” project was announced, which was intended to include the aforementioned “Efir” as well as other satellite systems, including “Megafon 1440.” The latter emerged in 2020 as a project of the mobile operator of the same name. At the end of 2021, “Megafon 1440” began transforming into a separate company tasked with developing and manufacturing satellites, ground in­frastructure, and other key system components. When it became clear in 2022 that the ambitious plans to launch hundreds of satellites into orbit would not be realized, this pro­ject – now known as “Bureau 1440” – became a key player in the field of low-Earth orbit satellite internet¹¹.

In June 2023, the first three ex­perimental satellites of the “Bureau 1440” mission, part of the “Rassvet-1” program, were launched into orbit. A year later, three more – full-scale prototypes of production satellites – were launched as part of the “Rass­vet-2” mission. After losing access to Startlink in February 2026, the Rus­sians accelerated their work in this area¹². In March 2026, the company launched its first group of 16 satel­lites, and by the end of July, it an­nounced that it had placed a second group of satellites into orbit¹³. Look­ing ahead, Moscow plans to signifi­cantly increase the number of satel­lites – specifically, to more than 250 over the next year. If the Kremlin’s ambitious plans are realised, the “Rassvet” satellite constellation could pose a new threat: an increase in “communication windows” – the time during which a Russian satellite is within Ukraine’s coverage area and can provide communication for UAV control. And if scaled up, this time could expand to continuous coverage, creating new challenges for counter­ing Russian drones¹⁴.

However, even with the acceler­ated deployment of the “Rassvet” satellite constellation, it is still too early to speak of a full-fledged com­petitor to Starlink. The key question today is: Can Russia expand its satel­lite constellation quickly enough and support it with ground and launch infrastructure? This requires not only a sufficient number of satellites but also the ability to launch them into orbit on a regular basis: for the 250 satellites planned for 2027, at least 15 rocket launches will be necessary¹⁵. And in the coming years, according to a Roscosmos representative, de­mand for Soyuz rockets will exceed the Progress plant’s production ca­pacity by 50%¹⁶.

Experts currently do not have a unified position on assessing the system’s combat readiness¹⁷. However, the threats posed by this project – not only to Ukraine – are evident to the European Union as well. In July 2026, the 21st sanctions package was approved, which in­cluded the “Rassvet” system as «the manufacture of a system that Russia is developing as an alternative to Starlink». As Senior Fellow at the Bruegel think tank Jacob Funk Kirkegaard said, “Denying Russia the capability… over time, to establish an alternative to Starlink would obvi­ously be a very important priority”. He also underlined, that “As the EU or Europe more broadly prepares for a world in which we have to deter Russia on our own for the long run, denying Russia their military capa­bilities in the next three, four, 10 years from now is very important for our own security”¹⁸.

At the same time, the Russian side is actively promoting the combat capabilities of the “Rassvet” and its technological potential through its own network of media outlets, thereby – in the author’s view – at­tempting to influence public senti­ment and assessments of Russia’s capabilities in the Russian-Ukrainian war.  A telling example in this case is an article “The Landlord Lost the Keys: Russia’s War Gamechanger in Low Orbit” published on SouthFront online resource. In the article, “Rassvet” is positioned as «a crowbar prying open the padlock on low Earth orbit, and the door is already swing­ing wide over Ukraine»¹⁹. It is worth noting that the propaganda in this article operates primarily not at the level of basic facts – which are easy to verify (the launch dates of the sat­ellites, their number, etc.) – but at the level of tone and metaphorical fram­ing. This article is a paean to Russian technology, for which – according to the unnamed authors of the piece – governments, “fearing ‘colour revo­lutions’» are already lining up for it²⁰.  Metaphors, allegories, and emotional appeals – alongside statistics (the planned 250 satellites by mid-2027) – serve an affective function and are intended to instill in the audience a sense of inevitability and powerless­ness in the face of the Kremlin’s “technological superiority.” Thus, in our view, the main goal of Russian propaganda is achieving in such a way – it is spreading fear regarding the Russian Federation’s military and technological capabilities and aimed to reduce support for Ukraine, since in democratic societies, elections are the primary instrument of democracy and determine a country’s domestic and foreign policy course.

Although SouthFront positions it­self as an independent analytical re­source, it is officially subject to sanc­tions imposed by two independent jurisdictions. The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the U.S. Department of the Treasury added SouthFront and NewsFront to its sanctions list in 2021 for activities carried out on behalf of Russian in­telligence agencies²¹. The European Union made a similar decision in 2025, adding the platforms News­Front and SouthFront to its sanctions list; both outlets present distorted interpretations of history and ma­nipulated information in line with Kremlin messaging while also tar­geting European and global audi­ences with distorted and manipulated information²².

Publishing information on this website is dangerous not so much because of the website’s audience as because regional and local media outlets in various countries system­atically translate and republish the content under the guise of independ­ent local journalism. Indeed, a recent study in Romania found that: the single largest source of News Time Romania’s (NTR) TikTok content is SouthFront, a Russian-linked outlet that produces battlefield updates, casualty reports, and geopolitical commentary supportive of the Rus­sian Ministry of Defence. Of the 788 TikTok posts, 270 (or 34.3 percent) consist of „SouthFront„ articles translated into Romanian and accom­panied by direct links to south­front.press or its Telegram account. On Telegram, SouthFront citations exceed 2 766 instances, making it the fourth most cited source overall be­hind three domestic Romanian out­lets („ActiveNews”, „R3media” and „Ortodoxinfo”) which operate within Romania’s borders but are within the Kremlin-aligned media ecosystem²³.

SouthFront is one of the content sources for the Russian propaganda network “Pravda” (Portal Combat), an automated ecosystem of aggrega­tor websites that republish content from other sources, ranging from Russian state media to social media and Telegram channels. According to the study DFRLab, the top five sources mentioned in Pravda articles are the Russian news organizations TASS (136 000), RIA Novosti (99 000), Lenta (89 000), Komsomolskaya Pravda (59 000), and the govern­ment-owned RT (54 000). Other cited news outlets in­cluded the Rus­sian TV channels Ren.tv and Tsargrad. Many of these outlets have been restricted or sanc­tioned in the United States, Canada, and the EU²⁴. Through this network, content pub­lished on overtly propagandistic and sanctioned websites (such as South­Front) loses its direct trace of origin as it passes through an automated translation and republishing system and appears to the reader as a seem­ingly indepen­dent publication in their native language from a familiar source.

In addition, this network is ac­tively used for AI poisoning or LLM grooming. Functioning as an “infor­mation laundry,” this network poses as an authoritative source and poi­sons AI tools and even Wikipedia, primarily on topics related to Rus­sia’s war against Ukraine²⁵. As a di­rect result, when users ask AI-pow­ered chatbots that rely on large lan­guage models (LLMs) trained on sources such as Wikipedia, they re­ceive pro-Kremlin, anti-Ukrainian content in response. According to the author’s observations, users of AI-generated content increasingly note that the AI cites Wikipedia articles as sources.

According to the study’s findings by Anthropic, the UK AI Security Institute, and the Alan Turing Insti­tute, it takes as few as 250 malicious documents to compromise the an­swers of even very large (13B pa­rameters) and highly capable models. Once this harmful content has been baked into a model’s weights, the only fix is a full (and extremely ex­pensive) retrain²⁶. The “Pravda” net­work publishes thousands of articles every day. Thus, in today’s digitised and automated information space, a single piece of disinformation can reach millions of people on different continents – both directly, through reading the content, and indirectly, through interactions with AI chatbots without proper verification of the information and sources.

The analysed “Rassvet” project illustrates how, in the current war against Ukraine, Moscow not only constructs a distorted worldview based on its own propaganda and disinformation narratives but also entrenches it in the minds of digital content consumers using modern technologies. This same logic is ap­plied to other types of weaponry, with claims about their power and invulnerability aimed primarily at intimidating Western and Ukrainian audiences, spreading panic, and re­ducing or eliminating support for Ukraine in the face of “invincible Russia”²⁷.

At the same time, Moscow is cre­ating and spreading blatant disinfor­mation claiming that Ukraine alleg­edly possesses or is developing weapons of mass destruction – pri­marily biological weapons – that are prohibited under international law. Among the most striking examples is a statement made in October 2022 by Vasily Nebenzya, the Russian Federation’s Permanent Representa­tive to the UN, claiming that biologi­cal laboratories are allegedly operat­ing in Ukraine where U.S. biological weapons are being developed and the potential for spreading dangerous infections via migratory birds is be­ing studied. At the same time, claims were made about so-called “combat mosquitoes” that had been trained to attack soldiers of the aggressor state and infect them with various dis­eases²⁸. It is worth noting that Russia began spreading the disinformation narrative about American biolabora­tories as early as 2010, and since then it has been systematically updated and repackaged for various audi­ences.

In summary, it is worth noting that in its war to preserve its empire at Ukraine’s expense, Russia actively utilises modern technological capa­bilities both in weapons development and in information warfare. Its logic is that any fact – whether real (new types of weapons) or entirely fabri­cated (“combat mosquitoes”) – is subordinated to the goal of exerting psychological influence on the target audience in order to advance the Russian agenda. Specifically, this aims to reduce or eliminate support for Ukraine by instilling fear of a stronger Russia or of Kyiv’s “uncon­trollability” – a Kyiv that is “devel­oping” biological weapons and “training mosquitoes” to “attack peo­ple based on their ethnicity or nation­ality”. And despite the sheer absurd­ity of this last claim, the lack of skills in verifying information in a world where artificial intelligence is ac­tively used could lead to the normali­sation of such narratives in the public consciousness – which is exactly what the Kremlin is counting on.

Countering Russia’s hybrid war requires new mechanisms to protect the information space – mechanisms relevant to individual consumers of digital content, on the one hand, and the architecture of AI technologies, on the other. The latter reinforces the need for systematic attention from governments and civil society to de­veloping media literacy and critical thinking skills among the population, as well as intensifying efforts to gen­erate objective information – espe­cially regarding the Russia-Ukraine war – and to use networks containing objective information to train LLD.

Notes

• 20 лютого: початок окупації Криму і війни Росії проти України, 2025, https://crimea-platform.org/news/20-liutoho-pochatok-okupatsii-krymu-i-viyny-rosii-proty-ukrainy/, (accessed 23.08.2026).
• Від «Їх там немає» до «Що приховувати?»: як Росія заперечу­вала, а потім визнала захоплення Криму, 2019, https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/krym-putin-rosijski-vijskovi/297920-92.html, (accessed08.2026).
• Кислиця в ООН: Росія вигравіюва-ла на медалі дату початку агресії проти України, 2021, https://unn.ua/news/kislitsya-v-oonr-osiya-vigraviyuvala-na-medali-datu-pochatku-agresiyi-proti-ukrayini, (accessed 24.08.2026).
• Від «Їх там немає» до «Що прихо-вувати?»: як Росія заперечувала, а потім визнала захоплення Криму, 2019, https://www.radiosvoboda.org/ a/krym-putin-rosijski-vijskovi/2979-2092.html, (accessed08.2026).
• Російська дезінформація у 2026 році: нові кампанії та інструменти, 2026, https://www.united-ukraine.org.ua/post/russian-disinf-o-rmation-in-2026-new-campaignsan-d-tools, (accessed 24.08.2026).
• Російська дезінформація у 2026 році: нові теми та інструменти. Аналітична доповідь, 2026, https://www.united-ukraine.org.ua/ post/russian-disinformation-in-2026-new-topics-and-tools, (accessed08.2026)
• Баловсяк Н. «Шторм-1516» та інші: як Росія створила глобальну екосистему інформаційного впли-ву, 2026, https://tyzhden.ua/shtorm-1516-ta-inshi-iak-rosiia-stvoryla-hlo-balnu-ekosystemu-informatsijnoho-vplyvu/, (accessed08.2026)
• Franc G. Hoffman, Conflict in the 21^st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, 2007, p.29.
• Є. Магда, Гібридна війна: вижити і перемогти, Харків, 2015, p.4.
• Pynnöniemi , Jokela M. Percep-tions of hybrid war in Russia: means, targets and objectives identified in the Russian debate, 2020, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/epdf/10.1080/09557571.2020.1787949?needAccess=true, (accessed 24.08. 2026).
• Пилипів І. Росія втратила Starlink і будує заміну. Що відомо про сис-тему „Рассвєт”, Економічна правда, 2026, https://epravda.com.ua/svit/ rosiya-rozvivaye-vlasniy-suputniko-viy-internet-zagroza-dlya-ukrajini-8-24130/, (accessed08.2026).
• Росія прискорила будівництво власного аналогу Starlink, 2026, https://newformat.info/socium/rosiia-pryskoryla-budivnytstvo-vlasnoho-a-nalohu-starlink/, (accessed08. 2026)
• Пилипів, op. cit.
• І. Моляр, Це вкрай небезпечно для нас: Грабський про угруповання російських супутників „Рассвет”, 2026, https://espreso.tv/viyna-z-rosiyeyu-tse-vkray-nebezpechno-dly-a-nas-grabskiy-pro-ugrupovannya-ro-siyskikh-suputnikiv-rassvet, (accessed 24.08.2026).
• А. Крупка, Росія створює альтерна-тиву Starlink: чи зможе Україна її зупинити, 2026, https://tyzhden.ua/ rosiia-stvoriuie-alternatyvu-starlink-chy-zmozhe-ukraina-ii-zupynyty/, (accessed 24.08.2026).
• Ibidem.
• Struck-Feshchenko, Russia Adds More Rassvet Satellites, Attempting to Build Its Own ‘Starlink’, 2026, https://www.kyivpost.com/post/80765 (accessed 24.08.2026); Д. Шумля-нсь-кий, Супутники «Рассвет» досягли вікна стабільного покриття у кілька годин зв’язку над Україною, 2026, https://militarnyi.com/uk/news/ rassvet-zmozhut-zabezpechyty-rosiy-i-zvyazok/, (accessed 24.08.2026) .
• Skujins, From Garpiya drones to a Starlink rival: Europe strikes at Russia’s military might, 2026, https://www.euronews.com/my-euro-pe/2026/07/27/from-garpiya-drones-to-a-starlink-rival-europe-strikes-at-russias-military-might, (accessed 24.08.2026).
• The Landlord Lost the Keys: Russia’s War Gamechanger in Low Orbit, 2026, https://southfront.press/the-landlord-lost-the-keys-russias-war-gamechanger-in-low-orbit/, (accessed 24.08.2026).
• Lindsay, W. MeyerAshley, CraigElizabeth (Liz), K. Lowe, Ashley T. Luong, Expansive New Sanctions Are Imposed on Russia to Address Concerns over Election Inter-ference, Crimea, and Cyber Attacks, 2021, https://www.venable.com/ insights/publications/2021/04/expansive-new-sanctions-are-imposed-on-r-ussia, (accessed 24.08.2026).
• 16th package of sanctions on Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine: EU lists additional 48 individuals and 35 entities, 2025, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/02/24/16th-package-of-sanctions-on-russia-s-wa-r-of-aggression-against-ukraine-eu-l-ists-additional-48-individuals-and-35-entities/, (accessed 24.08.2026)
• Olari, Romanian channel launders sanctioned Russian content for do-mestic audiences, 2026, https://dfrlab.org/2026/03/20/romanian-channel-launders-sanctioned-russi-an-content-for-domestic-audiences/, (accessed 24.08.2026).
• Châtelet and A. Lesplingart, Russia’s Pravda network in numbers: Introducing the Pravda Dashboard, 2025, https://dfrlab.org/2025/04/18/ introducing-the-pravda-dashboard/, (accessed 24.08.2026).
• Châtelet, Exposing Pravda: How pro-Kremlin forces are poisoning AI models and rewriting Wikipedia, 2025, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/ blog-s/new-atlanticist/exposing-pravda-ho-w-pro-kremlin-forces-are-poisoning-ai-models-and-rewriting-wikipedia/, (accessed 24.08.2026).
• Pravda in the pipeline: Early evidence of state-adjacent propaganda in AI training data, 2026, https://dfrlab.org/ 2026/04/08/pravda-in-the-pipeline/, (accessed 24.08.2026).
• І. Бережанський, У ЦПД пояснили, навіщо Путін знову почав погро-жувати ракетою «Сармат», 2026, https://tsn.ua/ato/u-tspd-poiasnylyna-vishcho-putin-znovu-pochav-pohroz-uvaty-raketoiu-sarmat-3081992.html, (accessed08.2026); A. Кузьмін, «Аналогов нєт». Фейкова зброя Російської Федерації, 2022, https://glavcom.ua/publications/analohov-njet-fejkova-zbroja-rosijskoji-fe-deratsiji-892606.html, (accessed 24.08.2026).
• Клочко, Птахи-вбивці та бойові комарі. Росія в ООН видала нову порцію абсурдних заяв, 2022, https://glavcom.ua/world/world-polit-ics/ptakhi-vbivtsi-ta-bojovi-komari-p-redstavnik-rosiji-v-oon-vidav-novu-p-ortsiju-absurdnikh-zajav-885340 .html, (accessed 24.08.2026).

Bibliography

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HOFFMAN, Franc G. Conflict in the 21^st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, 2007, p. 29.

МАГДА, Є., Гібридна війна: вижити і перемогти, Харків, 2015.

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