The Military-Political Situation in the South Caucasus in the Early 19th Century and the Occupation of the Iravan Khanate by Russia

Ibrahim KAZIMBEYLI

Abstract: This article provides an overview of the general history of the Iravan region, an ancient territory of Azerbaijan. It defines the borders and geographical scope of the Iravan Khanate and focuses on its occupation by the Russian Empire, the subsequent establishment of the Armenian Province in the region, and the process of Armenization. The political situation of the Iravan Khanate in the early 19th century, particularly during the First and Second Russo-Iranian Wars, is examined. The study draws upon primary archival sources, official Russian state documents, and extensive historical literature to analyze Russia’s strategic interest in the region and the military-political measures undertaken for its occupation, ultimately shedding light on the process of the khanate’s downfall.

Keywords: Iravan region, Iravan Khanate, Russo-Iranian wars, Iravan Fortress, fall of Iravan, Armenian Province.

Introduction

Historically, the Iravan region had been an integral part of the various states that existed on the territory of Azerbaijan. The emergence of the city of Iravan as a significant administra­tive center dates back to the periods of the Chokhur-Saad beylerbeylik and the Iravan Khanate. Beginning in the 15th century, the lowland valley area stretching from the confluence of the Arpa and Araz rivers to the territory between Mount Ararat and Mount Alagoz became known as the Saadi Hollow, commonly referred to as Chokhur-Saad.

In the early 16th century, during the reign of the Safavid Empire of Azerbaijan, the Chokhur-Saad Beyler­beylik was established with Iravan as its administrative center. Encompas­sing a significant part of Western Azerbaijani territories, the Chokhur-Saad beylerbeylik can be regarded as the first comprehensive geographical entity of the region¹.

During the Ottoman-Safavid War of 1578-1590, in the year 1585, the Chokhur-Saad beylerbeylik was oc­cupied by Ottoman forces. In com­memoration of this event, a monu­ment named the Revan Köşkü (Revan Pavilion) was erected within the grounds of the Topkapi Palace in Istanbul. According to the Treaty of Istanbul signed in 1590, the territory of the Chokhur-Saad beylerbeylik—along with many other Azerbaijani lands—was ceded to the Ottoman Empire².

During the Ottoman rule over the territory of Chokhur-Saad from 1585 to 1603, the region was referred to as the Province of Revan (Iravan). In relation to this administrative unit, the Ottoman government compiled sever­al comprehensive and summary regis­ters: the Detailed Register of the Prov­ince of Revan (1590), the Summary Register of the Province of Revan (ap­prox. 1595), and the Defteri Sicili Livayi Revan (1603)³.

According to the 1590 Detailed Register, the Province of Iravan con­sisted of two main administrative divi­sions: the Liva of Iravan, which com­prised 10 districts (Iravan, Karbi, Vedi, Aralik, Talin, Ermus, Abnik, Abaran, Sharabkhana), and the Liva of Nakhchivan, which comprised 16 dis­tricts (Aghchagala, Mavazi-Khatun, Mulki-Arslanli, Karabagh, Deresham, Dereshahbuz, Bazachay, Sharur, Zar, Zebil, Alinja, Sisian, Azadjiran, Ordubad-apparently temporary in sta­tus-Shorlut, and Derenurgat) and one qaza (Nakhchivan)⁴.

Socio-political life of the Iravan region (up to the early 19^th cen­tury)

During the Safavid-Ottoman War of 1603-1612, launched by Safavid ruler Shah Abbas I (1587-1629), the Iravan region was liberated from Ottoman control in 1603. According to the peace treaty concluded in 1612, the Ottoman Empire was obliged to return all territories it had gained through the Treaty of Istanbul in 1590, including the Chokhur-Saad region, back to the Safavid state.

In the subsequent period, although the Chokhur-Saad region suffered repeated Ottoman incursions, it re­mained, as before, within the borders of the Safavid Empire until the 1720s.

At the beginning of the 18th centu­ry, the Safavid state experienced a profound economic, political, and mil­itary crisis, which was exploited by the Russian Emperor Peter I to occupy the Caspian littoral regions. In re­sponse, the Ottoman Empire deployed its forces to the region, leading ulti­mately to the signing of the Treaty of Istanbul in 1724 between the two empires. According to the treaty, ex­cept for the Caspian littoral areas, a significant portion of Azerbaijani ter­ritories-including the Iravan region-was ceded to the Ottoman Empire⁵.

Similar to the administrative steps taken in 1590, the Ottoman govern­ment compiled a detailed register (müfessəl defter) of the Iravan prov­ince in 1728. At that time, a separate detailed register was prepared for the Nakhchivan region. Several subdis­tricts-Zar, Zebil, and Sharur-were de­tached from the sanjak of Nakhchivan and incorporated into the Iravan prov­ince. Furthermore, the subdistricts of Maku, Iğdır, and Sürmeli were also added to the province. Within this newly expanded province, additional administrative units were established, including the districts of Goycha, Mezra, Khınzirek, Gyrkhbulag, Derechichek, and Sadarak-the latter being inhabited entirely by Turkic populations-as well as the liva of Shuregel. Subdistricts that had existed at the end of the 16th century, such as Talin, Ermavi, Abnik, and Sharabkhana, were absorbed into these newly created units⁶.

According to the 1728 detailed register of the Province of Iravan, the province consisted of the city of Iravan and the subdistricts of Gyrkhbulag, Karbi, Maku, Khınzirek, Karni, Vedi, Derechichek, Abaran, Goycha, Mezra, Sürmeli, Iğdır, Aralik, Sharur, Sadarak, Zarzamin, as well as the liva of Shuregel⁷.

After restoring the former strength of the Safavid state, Nadir Khan de­feated the Ottoman forces and, in 1735, regained control of the Iravan province for the Safavids. Subse­quently, the province became part of the empire of Nadir Shah (1736–1747), along with other Azerbaijani territories.

Nadir Shah’s administrative-ter­ritorial reorganization is of particu­lar interest. He abolished the Beyler­beyliks of Shirvan, Karabakh, Azerbaijan, and Chokhur-Saad-which had existed during the Safavid era-and established a single unified province of Azerbaijan with Tabriz as its capi­tal. This decision was not arbitrary; by doing so, Nadir Shah reaffirmed that Chokhur-Saad, like the other Beyler­beyliks, was an integral part of Azerbaijani lands⁸.

Following the assassination of Nadir Shah in 1747, the empire he had established disintegrated into numer­ous smaller entities—independent khanates. As a result, around twenty khanates emerged on the territory of Azerbaijan. One of these was the Iravan Khanate. The formation of the Iravan Khanate was partly a con­sequence of the political vacuum that followed Nadir Shah’s death and part­ly the outcome of the historical devel­opment of Western Azerbaijan. As previously noted, the lands of Western Azerbaijan had long been incorpo­rated into various states, yet no inde­pendent local state structure had arisen there until this period. The Iravan Khanate became the first such entity⁹.

The Iravan Khanate emerged on the historical territory of Azerbaijan and encompassed lands on both banks of the Araz River, between Mount Ararat and Mount Alagoz. The Ararat plain and the basin of Lake Goycha constituted the central part of the khanate. It bordered Pambak prov­ince, the Shamshaddil and Gazakh sultanates, and the Ganja Khanate to the north; the Karabakh and Nakhchivan khanates to the east; the Khoy and Maku khanates to the south; and the Ottoman Empire to the southwest and west. Covering an area of 23 800 square kilometers, the khanate was administratively divided into 15 districts (mahals):

1. Gyrkhbulag
2. Zangibasar
3. Garnibasar
4. Vedibasar
5. Sharur
6. Shuran
7. Derekend
8. Saatli
9. Talin
10. Seyidli-Akhsakhli
11. Sardarabad
12. Karpi
13. Abaran
14. Derechichek
15. Goycha¹⁰.

From its establishment in 1747 un­til 1797, the Iravan Khanate func­tioned as an independent political enti­ty. Between 1797 and 1828, it re­mained under the nominal suzerainty of Iran but managed to maintain a significant degree of internal autono­my, as well as a certain level of inde­pendence in its foreign policy. During this period, the Iravan Khanate was ruled by the following khans:

• Mehdi Khan Qasimli (Afshar) (1747-1748)
• Muhammad Hussein Khan Gerayli (1748-1751)
• Khalil Khan Uzbek (1751-1755)
• Hasan Ali Khan Qajar (1755-1759)
• Huseinali Khan Qajar (1759/60-November 1783)
• Ghulam Ali Khan Qajagh (Summer 1783-1784)
• Muhammad Hussein Khan Qajar (1784-June 1805)
• Aliqulu Khan Qajar (June 1797)
• Hasan Khan Makulu (Summer 1797)
• Mehdigulu Khan Qajar (Summer 1805-August 1806)
• Ahmad Khan Maragali (August-October 1806)
• Huseyngulu Khan Qajar (December 1806-October 1827)¹¹.

Like the other khanates that exist­ed in Azerbaijan during the second half of the 18th century, the political history of the Iravan Khanate was characterized by unrelenting feudal strife, bloody palace coups, and con­tinuous resistance against foreign invasions¹². Despite these efforts, the attempts to unite the Azerbaijani khanates under a single political au­thority during the latter half of the 18th century ended in failure. This fragmentation created favorable con­ditions for foreign military interven­tion and occupation towards the end of the century.

By the late 18th century, the impe­rial powers most actively involved in realizing their ambitions in Azerbaijan were primarily Iran and Russia, with the Ottoman Empire playing a sec­ondary role. Iran sought to reoccupy the region and restore the borders of Nadir Shah’s former empire. Mean­while, Russia, having pursued a poli­cy of expansion into the South Caucasus since the reign of Peter the Great, continued its imperial ambi­tions. However, despite military in­cursions into the region during the reigns of Peter I (1682-1725) and Catherine II (1762-1796), Russian forces ultimately withdrew empty-handed from the South Caucasus.

The territory of the South Cauca­sus, the majority of which was com­posed of Azerbaijani khanates, held great political and military-strategic importance for the Russian Empire. Firstly, the conquest of this region could shift the balance of power in the long-standing Russo-Turkish rivalry in Russia’s favor. Secondly, Russia had not yet fully conquered the Cen­tral Caucasus. The occupation of the South Caucasus would create favora­ble conditions to encircle the moun­tainous regions from both the north and the south. Finally, the growing Russo-British rivalry further enhanced the strategic significance of the South Caucasus, including Azerbaijan. Rus­sia’s occupation of these lands would deliver a serious blow to British influ­ence in the East and to the monopoly of the East India Company¹³.

Therefore, following his accession to the Russian imperial throne in 1801, Tsar Alexander I (1801-1825) immediately directed his attention to the occupation of the South Caucasus. At that time, the political fragmenta­tion and complex military situation in the South Caucasus facilitated Russia’s conquest of the region. Tak­ing advan­tage of these circumstances, Tsar Alexander I annexed the Kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti to Russia on Septem­ber 12, 1801¹⁴.

Subsequently, on December 26, 1802, the commander-in-chief of Rus­sian forces in the Caucasus, K. F. Knorring (1801-1802), invited repre­sentatives of the Quba and Talysh khanates, as well as the Shamkhal of Tarki, the Utsmi of Qaraqaytag, the ruler of Tabasaran, and other Dagestani authorities to Georgievsk, where he concluded agreements plac­ing them under Russian “protec­tion”¹⁵.

Following the annexation of East­ern Georgia, territories historically subordinated to the Kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti-such as Gazakh, Shamsaddil, Borchali, and Pambak -also came under Russian control. The Iravan Khanate, which regarded the territory of Pambak as part of its do­main, attempted to reclaim it through military confrontation with Russian forces but ultimately failed¹⁶. Thus, from the autumn of 1801 onward, armed clashes began between the Iravan Khanate and Russian troops.

Russia attached great importance to the occupation of the Iravan Khanate, not only to secure the safety of annexed Eastern Georgia but also because of its strategic location on the Ottoman border, making it crucial in the broader conflict against Iran and the Ottoman Empire. For this reason, in an instruction dated April 24, 1802, Tsar Alexander I directed Knorring to ensure that the Iravan Khanate accept­ed Russian suzerainty “for the sake of Georgia’s security,” and to proceed with the occupation of the Ganja Khanate¹⁷.

Even prior to the issuance of this directive, Knorring had made efforts to bring the Iravan Khanate under control. To this end, he sent a letter on April 2, 1802, to Iravan’s khan, Mohammad Khan, urging him to ac­cept Russian subjecthood¹⁸. Mohammad Khan, however, became involved in the internal power strug­gles among Ottoman pashas and sought to delay his commitments to Russia. Instead, he tried to maintain his independence by maneuvering between the political interests of Russia, Iran, and the Ottoman Empire through strategic diplomatic games.

At the end of the 18th century and the beginning of the 19th century, the French Revolution (1789-1794) had a decisive impact on international rela­tions. The expansion of France’s mili­tary campaigns across Europe and Napoleon Bonaparte’s landing of troops in Egypt on July 2, 1798, prompted the Ottoman Empire to seek rapprochement with Russia. As a re­sult, on December 23, 1798, the two powers concluded a 14-article alliance treaty against the French threat (addi­tionally, 13 secret clauses and one annex were included)¹⁹.

Seeking to take advantage of this alliance in actions against the Khanate of Iravan, General Knorring organized joint military operations between Rus­sian forces and the Pasha of Kars against the Iravan Khanate²⁰. At the same time, he sent letters to Mohammad Khan, urging him to ac­cept Russian suzerainty²¹.

During this period, a struggle for leadership of the Echmiadzin Cathol­icosate unfolded among Armenian clerics. Mohammad Khan of Iravan refused to recognize Daniel, who had been confirmed as Catholicos by de­cree of the Russian Emperor, and in­stead endorsed another Armenian cleric, David, who was loyal to him. This decision angered the Russians, and Knorring sought to exploit the situation as a pretext for military in­tervention in Iravan²².

In 1802, Knorring was replaced by Pavel Dmitrievich Tsitsianov (1802-1806) as commander-in-chief of Rus­sian forces in the Caucasus. This marked a shift from Knorring’s rela­tively moderate policy toward the Azerbaijani khanates to Tsitsianov’s rigid reactionary and openly aggres­sive approach. Tsitsianov launched a direct military campaign against the Azerbaijani khanates. On March 29, 1803, the Jar-Balakan region, and on January 4, 1804, the city of Ganja was occupied by Russian forces.

Following the occupation of Ganja, Tsitsianov turned his full atten­tion to the conquest of the Iravan Khanate. However, six months of cor­respon­dence between Tsitsianov and Mohammad Khan, regarding the lat­ter’s acceptance of Russian suzerainty and the recognition of Daniel as Armenian Catholicos, yielded no re­sults²³.

In a report to Emperor Alexander I, Tsitsianov wrote: “Mohammad Khan refuses to comply with His Im­perial Majesty’s directive recognizing Daniel as the Armenian Patriarch. Leaving him unpunished undermines the authority of His Majesty in the territories we have conquered by arms. Therefore, I must march to Iravan to punish Mohammad Khan and to appoint Daniel as the Armenian Patriarch. Local Armenian merchants have promised to provide us with pro­visions…”²⁴.

In the same report, Tsitsianov also noted that he required an additional four regiments and 100,000 silver ru­bles to successfully complete the Iravan campaign. He further stated that with these forces, he would occu­py Iravan, Nakhchivan, and Karabakh, thereby completing the campaign to conquer all territories along the Kura-Araz River basin²⁵.

In May 1804, Tsitsianov issued the order to launch a military offensive against the Iravan Khanate. On May 29, Russian forces under the com­mand of Major General Tsutskov be­gan advancing toward the Iravan Fortress. Shortly thereafter, the re­maining regiments under Tsitsianov’s command also set out in the same di­rection. The Russian army moving toward Iravan consisted of 4 370 sol­diers and officers²⁶.

The Russo-Qajar struggle over the İravan region of Azerbaijan

In the spring of 1804, Iran was preparing for war against Russia, which was in the process of occupy­ing the South Caucasus. Sisianov had substantial intelligence regarding this matter. Therefore, he sought to act swiftly and seize Yerevan before Ira­nian forces could enter the region. At the same time, the independent actions of Mohammad Khan-who was for­mally subordinate to the Iranian mon­arch Fath-Ali Shah-drew discontent from the central government in Tehran. As a result, Fath-Ali Shah aimed to remove Mohammad Khan from power in Yerevan.

The simultaneous advancement of both Russian and Iranian troops to­ward Yerevan compelled Mohammad Khan to act with utmost caution, en­gage in political maneuvering, and make calculated decisions. Deeply concerned by the fate of Javad Khan, the ruler of Ganja, Mohammad Khan attempted to settle relations with Russia through diplomatic means, but to no avail. He ultimately decided to resist and undertook serious measures to fortify the Yerevan Fortress. The number of defenders was increased to 7 000, and food supplies were stock­piled.

In early June 1804, a detachment consisting of one regiment and two battalions under the command of Tuchkov, accompanied by eight can­nons, invaded the Shörayel district of the Yerevan Khanate²⁷.

On June 10, 1804, diplomatic rela­tions between Iran and Russia were severed, and a few days later, war broke out between the two empires. Iranian troops led by Crown Prince Abbas Mirza advanced toward Yerevan. In view of the gravity of the situation, Mohammad Khan requested assistance from the Iranian High Command. By order of the Shah, the fortresses of Nakhchivan and Yerevan were to be defended at all costs, and the movement of Russian troops had to be halted²⁸.

However, in the initial battles be­tween Iran and Russia at Echmiadzin and Qamarly, Russian forces gained the upper hand. On July 2, Russian troops laid siege to Yerevan. Upon hearing of Abbas Mirza’s failure, Fath-Ali Shah personally arrived in the area. A double encirclement was established around Yerevan: the Rus­sians besieged the city, while the Ira­nians surrounded the Russian forces from the rear, cutting off all supply routes²⁹.

Facing severe food shortages and relentless attacks from Yerevan’s de­fenders, Sisianov’s army found itself in a desperate situation³⁰. Russian forces also suffered heavy losses in clashes with the Iranian army³¹. On July 15, an eight-hour Russian assault on the Yerevan fortress was repelled, resulting in over 300 casualties and forcing the Russians to cease their attack. Although they succeeded in pushing Abbas Mirza’s army to the opposite side of the Aras River, they failed to capture Yerevan. Sisianov’s repeated appeals to Mohammad Khan to surrender the fortress also proved fruitless.

Encouraged by the Iranian cam­paign, a wave of uprisings against Russian occupiers erupted in Shamsaddil, Gazakh, Borchali, Jar, and other regions. Meanwhile, Rus­sian forces faced critical shortages of food, ammunition, and fodder. Taking all of this into account, Sisianov con­vened a military council on August 31, during which it was decided to abandon the siege of Yerevan.

On September 1, Sisianov made a final appeal to Mohammad Khan, urg­ing him to surrender the fortress, but received a firm rejection. Consequent­ly, on September 3, Sisianov ordered the lifting of the siege and the with­drawal of Russian troops from the surroundings of Yerevan³². Thus, the Russian army, having lost more than 2 000 soldiers, was forced to retreat in defeat from the Yerevan cam­paign³³.Although Russian troops lifted the siege of the Yerevan fortress, the occupation of the territory of the stra­tegically important Yerevan Khanate remained a primary objective for the Russian military command. For this reason, the gradual annexation of the Yerevan Khanate’s lands came to the forefront. At the end of March 1805, the Shörayel Sultanate-subordinate to the Yerevan Khanate and strategically as well as economically valuable-was fully occupied by Russian forces³⁴.

Returning from the unsuccessful Yerevan campaign, Sisianov quelled uprisings by local insurgents resisting the Russian occupiers, thereby secur­ing the rear for continued war efforts against Abbas Mirza. Subsequently, he intensified military and political pressure on the Azerbaijani khanates. As a result of these pressures, on May 14, 1805, the Karabakh and Shaki khanates were compelled to sign the Treaty of Kurakchay with Sisianov, accepting Russian suzerainty. Follow­ing this, on December 25, the Shama­khi Khanate also submitted³⁵.

In early 1806, Sisianov decided to launch another offensive toward Yerevan. However, his assassination during the Baku operation on Febru­ary 8, 1806, impeded the execution of this campaign. In June 1806, General Field Marshal I.V. Gudovich was ap­pointed as the supreme commander of the Caucasus, receiving orders to completely conquer the Azerbaijani khanates and incorporate them into the Russian Empire³⁶. That same year, the Quba, Baku, and Derbent khanates were occupied by Russia³⁷.

Aware of Russia’s expansionist in­tentions, Abbas Mirza, in the summer of 1805, removed Mohammad Hussein Khan Qajar- criticized for his inconsistent foreign policy-from pow­er and installed Mehdiqulu Khan Qajar (summer 1805-August 1806) as the ruler of the Yerevan Khanate³⁸.

Although Abbas Mirza led the Ira­nian army in Azerbaijan, he was una­ble to prevent the Russian occupation of the Azerbaijani khanates. Due to Iran’s failure to capitalize on favora­ble strategic conditions in the initial battles of the First Russo-Iranian War (1804-1813), Russian forces gained and maintained strategic superiority until the war’s end. The Ottoman Empire, remaining loyal to its alliance treaties with Russia signed in 1798 and 1805, offered no assistance to resistance movements against the Russian invasion in Azerbaijan. In some instances, such as the 1802 campaign against the Yerevan Khanate, the Pasha of Kars even sup­ported the Russians³⁹.

Consequently, by the end of 1806, the military campaign had effectively concluded with Russia’s occupation of the khanates in Northern Azerbaijan.

In 1806, France, becoming active in Iran and the Ottoman Empire, sup­ported these states in their war against Russia and provided considerable as­sistance in improving their armies. Husseinqulu Khan (1806-1827), the ruler of the Yerevan Khanate, exten­sively utilized French military ex­perts’ help in strengthening the Yerevan fortress according to Europe­an military standards⁴⁰. After the Treaty of Tilsit (1807), England re­placed France in carrying out this mis­sion in Iran.

In November 1806, the Russo-Ottoman War (1806-1812) began. With the outbreak of this war on the Caucasus and Balkan fronts, the Rus­sian government initially sought to conclude peace with Iran to focus its full attention on the Ottoman front. To this end, Captain Stepanov was sent to Tehran for peace negotiations. How­ever, these talks failed due to General Gudovich’s demands that the border between Russia and Iran be drawn along the Kur and Aras Rivers up to Arpaçay, and that the Yerevan and Nakhchivan Khanates be ceded to Russia. The increased diplomatic ac­tivity of the French in Iran during this period also contributed to the failure of negotiations⁴¹.

Following the unsuccessful negoti­ations, Russian troops launched a new offensive against the Yerevan and Nakhchivan Khanates in September 1808. On September 25, General Gudovich set out with 240 officers and 7,506 soldiers toward these direc­tions⁴². At the end of September, Husseinqulu Khan retreated after de­feat in battles with the Russians, and on October 3, the Yerevan fortress was besieged by Gudovich⁴³.

General-Major Nebolsin received orders to capture Nakhchivan and moved with 78 officers and 3,062 sol­diers from Karabakh toward Nakhchivan on October 93⁴⁴. The de­fense of Nakhchivan proved untena­ble, as Kelbali Khan, who held great influence among the local population, had been removed from power in spring 1808 and taken to Iran with his family. His son, Sheikhali Bey, fled to Karabakh with close associates and cooperated with the Russians, playing a crucial role in the fall of Nakhchivan⁴⁵. On October 28, 1808, in the battle near Qarababa close to Nakhchivan, Russian forces defeated Abbas Mirza’s army, and on Novem­ber 1, 1808, Nakhchivan was occu­pied by the Russians⁴⁶.

The defense of the Yerevan for­tress was led by Husseinqulu Khan’s brother, Hasan Khan. Despite repeat­ed urgent demands from Gudovich to surrender the fortress, Hasan Khan firmly refused⁴⁷. In response to Gudovich’s insistence, Hasan Khan famously replied, “You demand that I surrender the Yerevan fortress volun­tarily in exchange for granting me the Yerevan Khanate. If such conduct is acceptable, then you should serve the Shah of Iran and receive control over Yerevan, Tabriz, and other khanates in return”⁴⁸.

The early arrival of winter and the resulting severance of communication with Tiflis caused shortages of food, fodder, and ammunition, placing Rus­sian troops in a difficult position. Consequently, Gudovich concentrated all efforts on taking the Yerevan for­tress by assault.

On November 17, 1808, Russian forces launched another large-scale attack on the fortress but encountered strong resistance and failed. Suffering heavy losses, the Russians had to withdraw on November 30, returning from Yerevan defeated. Russian mili­tary historian N.F. Dubrovin noted that the Russian regiments suffered such severe losses during the attack that a renewed assault on the fortress was not even worth considering⁴⁹. According to Gudovich’s report to the Russian emperor, the battle cost 17 officers and 269 soldiers killed and 64 officers and 829 soldiers wounded⁵⁰.

Seeing that they could not consoli­date their position in the region, the Russian detachment under Nebolsin also failed to establish itself in Nakhchivan and was forced to with­draw⁵¹. Due to pursuing enemies and severe snowfall and cold weather, Russian forces suffered an additional loss of about one thousand men while retreating to Karabakh⁵².

This defeat was the second humili­ating loss of Russian forces in the Yerevan Khanate since the 1804 cam­paign. It is also worth noting that dur­ing both the 1804 and 1808 cam­paigns, Armenians fought alongside the Russians, providing not only mili­tary assistance but also supplying them with food, fodder, and other necessary resources.

After the defeat at Yerevan, General Gudovich was recalled from his position as the commander-in-chief of the Russian troops in the Caucasus, and General Tormasov was appointed in his place⁵³. Tormasov sought to regulate relations with Iran through diplomatic negotiations. At the same time, the Shah of Iran also proposed initiating talks with Russia⁵⁴. In April 1810, during negotiations held in Asgaran, Russia demanded the Nakhchivan and Yerevan Khanates, while Iran insisted on the Talish Khanate. The Russians, employing a method previously used regarding Crimea, proposed that the Talish Khanate become an independent terri­tory, not subject to either Russia or Iran. However, these negotiations ended without success.

Like his predecessor, Tormasov at­tached great importance to the occu­pation of the Yerevan Khanate and believed that its conquest would com­pel Iran to make peace. Nevertheless, the military and diplomatic skills of Husseinqulu Khan prevented Tormasov’s plans from materializing.

During this period, England be­came active in Iran, providing military and financial aid to the Tehran gov­ernment in its war against Russia, while simultaneously encouraging Iran to cooperate with the Ottoman Empire in the Caucasus against Russia⁵⁵. Abbas Mirza, who needed Ottoman support to expel Russia from the South Caucasus, again proposed an alliance to the Istanbul government in 1810, initially obtaining their con­sent. At England’s direct insistence, a Russo-Ottoman alliance treaty was signed between Iran and the Ottoman Empire. According to this treaty, Ira­nian and Ottoman forces were to joint­ly act against Russia following a plan prepared by the British.

In accordance with this plan, in August-September 1810, Ottoman, Iranian, and the forces of Yerevan Khan Husseinqulu Khan attempted a joint strike on Russian troops from the Akhiska and Akhalkalaki directions; however, this effort failed due to a large-scale Russian offensive launc­hed from the directions of Kutaisi, Surami, and Chalke⁵⁶. Fur­thermore, a joint campaign planned by the Iranian and Ottoman commands against Russia in the South Caucasus for the summer of 1811 was never executed⁵⁷. Overall, Russian forces held a complete advantage on both the Russian-Iranian and Russian-Ottoman fronts in the Caucasus.

Anticipating Napoleon’s impend­ing attack on Russia, the Petersburg government signed a peace treaty with the Ottoman Empire on May 16 (28), 1812, in Bucharest, two months be­fore the onset of the French inva­sion⁵⁸. According to the Bucharest peace agreement, although the Otto­man Empire was able to regain some fortresses in the Caucasus occupied by Russian troops, it had to recognize the consequences of Russia’s conquest of the South Caucasus.

Simultaneously, after the signing of the Bucharest treaty, Russia, having the opportunity to redeploy troops from the Russo-Turkish front in the Caucasus to the war against Iran, pres­sured Iran to negotiate peace with cer­tain concessions. However, Russia’s proposal to establish the demarcation line along the Kur, Aras, and Arpaçay rivers was rejected by Abbas Mirza. Nonetheless, the complete failure of Abbas Mirza’s 1812 military cam­paign compelled Iran to resume nego­tiations.

After Russia’s victory in the 1812 Franco-Russian War, Britain realized that by directing Russian forces southward, Russia could completely defeat Iran and threaten British inter­ests in the East. Therefore, the British not only sought to compel Iran to make peace to prevent Russia’s ad­vance deep into Iranian territory but also acted as mediators in the negotia­tions between Russia and Iran. Russia, for its part, needed peace to restore its economy, which had been devastated by Napoleon’s campaign, and in­structed the newly appointed com­mander-in-chief in the Caucasus, General N.F. Rtishchev (1812-1816), to expedite peace with Iran. Negotia­tions mediated by the British culmi­nated in the signing of the Treaty of Gulistan on October 12, 1813. Ac­cording to this treaty, Iran accepted Russia’s conquests in the Caucasus and confirmed that the khanates of Ganja, Karabakh, Shaki, Shirvan, Kuba, Baku, and Talish, as well as Eastern Georgia and Dagestan, were ceded to Russia⁵⁹. The khanates of Erivan and Nakhchivan remained un­der Iranian control. Thus, the first phase of the early 19th-century war between Russia and Iran over Azerbaijani lands concluded.

Despite the signing of the Treaty of Gulistan, Iran-Russia relations re­mained tense. Iran did not reconcile with its defeat, while Russia continued to pursue new territories, particularly aiming to seize the Erivan Khanate. In 1816, Russian Emperor Alexander I wrote to A.P. Yermolov (commander-in-chief of Russian forces in the Caucasus, 1816-1827): “It would be very good if the Shah of Iran ex­changed Erivan and Nakhchivan for the lands south of the Aras under our control (i.e., the Talish Khanate). However, considering the Iranian side’s stubbornness regarding the ces­sion of these lands to Russia, it is un­likely they will agree to this”⁶⁰.

During the interwar period be­tween the two Russo-Iranian wars (1813-1826), diplomatic efforts to resolve disputes between Russia and Iran yielded no results, mainly due to Russia’s strengthening international position and imperial interests.

On July 16, 1826, the Iranian ar­my, commanded by Abbas Mirza, crossed the border and launched an offensive into the territories of North­ern Azerbaijan. The forces of Erivan Khan Husseinqulu Khan also attacked Russian positions in the Lori and Shamshadil directions. Thus began the Second Russo-Iranian War (1826-1828).

The initial phase of the war was unfavorable for Russia. Iranian forces advanced as far as Shamkir and Ganja. By late August, Yermolov managed to reorganize the scattered Russian forces in the South Caucasus. In September 1826, Russian troops delivered a crushing blow to the Irani­an army in the battles of Shamkir and Ganja. After the Battle of Ganja, the Iranian army was unable to recover. By the end of 1826, Iranian forces had withdrawn from all Northern Azerbai­jani territories except for the Talish Khanate⁶¹.

Although the Russian troops had not yet taken the initiative in the war, Emperor Nicholas I (1825-1855) or­dered the Russian forces to seize Erivan. In his decree dated August 1, 1826, sent to General Yermolov, the emperor stated, “Immediately march on the Erivan fortress commander. I expect a prompt response from you: with God’s help, the commander is no more, and the Erivan province is completely occupied-you and your 15,000-strong Russian army are suffi­cient to achieve victory”⁶². However, as Yermolov was focused on sup­pressing anti-Russian uprisings spre­ading across Northern Azerbaijan, the Erivan campaign was temporarily postponed.

In March 1827, General I. F. Paskevich (1827-1831) replaced Gen­eral A.P. Yermolov as commander-in-chief of Russian forces in the Caucasus⁶³. On April 20, 1827, Rus­sian troops who captured the Khudafarin Bridge advanced toward the Erivan Khanate. Simultaneously, forces under General Benkendorf moved from Borchaly toward Erivan, accompanied by the Armenian priest Nerses Ashtaraketsi. On April 13, Benkendorf’s attempt to capture Echmiadzin Monastery and then Sardarabad failed. On April 27, Rus­sian troops laid siege to Erivan for­tress. At the beginning of June, Gen­eral Paskevich also arrived before the fortress. Demands by Benkendorf to surrender the fortress were rejected by Huseinqulu Khan’s brother, Hasan Khan. Seeing the siege was futile, Paskevich was forced to lift the siege on June 23.

On June 26 and July 7, 1827, the Russian army occupied Nakhchivan and Abbasabad, respectively. Abbas Mirza’s resistance proved ineffective. On July 19, 1827, A.S. Griboyedov, together with A. Bakikhanov, visited Abbas Mirza’s camp and proposed initiating negotiations for the cession of Erivan and Nakhchivan khanates in exchange for compensation; however, no agreement was reached.

Paskevich decided to compel the Tehran government to peace by first capturing Tabriz, the arsenal of the Iranian army. Yet, leaving the heavily fortified Erivan fortress behind was a considerable risk. Therefore, Paskevich resolved to first capture Erivan⁶⁴.

After a week-long siege, on Sep­tember 20, 1827, Russian troops seized Sardarabad and laid siege to Erivan fortress four days later. As be­fore, Paskevich’s demands for surren­der were rejected by Hasan Khan. The city was subjected to continuous artil­lery bombardment. Over 40 cannons fired more than a thousand shells at the fortress. Russian historian V. Potto wrote about the destruction caused by the artillery in Erivan city: “It seems to me that what the siege artillery achieved in four days would not have been possible in four centuries”⁶⁵.

On October 1, 1827, the Armeni­ans inside the fortress rebelled and contacted the invaders, demanding that Hasan Khan surrender the for­tress. Despite Khan’s efforts, the Ar­menians opened the northern gates of the fortress to the enemy⁶⁶. According to Armenian historian V. Parsamyan, after Hasan Khan fled, the Armenians opened the fortress gates to the Rus­sian forces⁶⁷. Thus, on October 1, 1827, the fortress and city of Erivan were captured by the Russians. Hasan Khan and the entire garrison were taken prisoner. This marked the fall of the Erivan Khanate.

The capture of Erivan generated great enthusiasm in Russia. Upon hearing the news, Emperor Nicholas I hastily returned to St. Petersburg from Riga. Ceremonial celebrations were organized. On November 8, a prayer ceremony was held at the Winter Palace with the participation of the emperor and his family members to mark the occasion of Erivan’s capture. Special medals were instituted in commemoration. For the conquest of Erivan, General I.F. Paskevich was awarded the title of “Count” and the honorary title “Erivansky,” as well as a monetary prize of one million ru­bles. He was also decorated with the 2nd class Order of St. George and numerous other orders and medals⁶⁸. All these honors demonstrated the exceptional strategic importance of the Erivan Khanate for the Russian Empire.

A few days after the occupation of Erivan, on October 6, 1827, a “Provi­sional Administration” was estab­lished in Erivan by the order of Gen­eral I. Paskevich, commander of Rus­sian troops in the Caucasus. General Krasovsky was appointed head of the administration, General Borodin was named commandant of the Erivan fortress, and Armenian bishop Nerses Ashtaraketsi was included among the administration members. The Provi­sional Administration was tasked pri­marily with consolidating full authori­ty in the Erivan region, implementing governance, establishing law and or­der, and managing the supply and lo­gistics of the Russian forces stationed there⁶⁹.

Simultaneously, the Provisional Administration was charged with en­suring security and organizing guard services in the territory of the Erivan Khanate by forming infantry and cav­alry militias recruited from the Arme­nian population⁷⁰. Despite the Azer­baijani population constituting an ab­solute majority in the Erivan Khanate territory, no Azerbaijani representa­tion was included in the Provisional Administration. The establishment of armed units from the Armenian popu­lation for security and guard duties laid the foundation for the Armeniza­tion of the Erivan region.

Following the capture of Erivan, Russian troops occupied Marand on October 2 and Tabriz on October 13. Peace talks between Russia and Iran began at Dehghargan (November 6, 1827-January 7, 1828) but ended with­out success. Consequently, Rus­sian forces advanced and occupied Urmia on January 28 and Ardabil on February 8. The new Russian offen­sive caused panic among the Iranian ruling circles. Fearing complete defeat of Iran, the British envoy Macdonald acted as a mediator between the war­ring parties. On February 6, peace negotiations resumed between Abbas Mirza and Ivan Paskevich near the village of Turkmenchay, close to Tabriz⁷¹. Iran was forced to accept the terms imposed by Russia. On the night of February 9-10, 1828, the Treaty of Turkmenchay was signed between Russia and Iran⁷². Article 3 of the treaty confirmed the annexation of the Nakhchivan and Erivan khan­ates to Russia.

Shortly after the treaty was signed, on March 21, 1828, by the decree of Emperor Nicholas I, the Provisional Administration was abolished and a temporary administrative unit named the “Armenian Province” was estab­lished in the territories of the Erivan and Nakhchivan khanates⁷³. General-Major Alexander Chavchavadze, commander of the local troops, was appointed governor of the Armenian Province. The creation of the Armeni­an Province in the lands of the Nakhchivan and Erivan khanates rep­resented a significant step towards establishing an Armenian state on Azerbaijani territory.

A draft regulation for governing the Armenian Province was also pre­pared. This draft envisaged certain liberal measures towards the Armeni­an population. While generally serv­ing to strengthen Russian authority in the province, it also laid the ground­work for the Armenization of the re­gion⁷⁴.

Following the Treaties of Turk­menchay and Edirne, the Russian government began facilitating the re­settlement of Armenian populations from Iran and the Ottoman Empire to the South Caucasus. Between Febru­ary 26 and June 11, 1828-a period of three and a half months- at least 8 249 Armenian families, or no fewer than 40 000 people, were relocated from Iran to the territories of the Erivan, Nakhchivan, and Karabakh khanates in Northern Azerbaijan. Shortly there­after, more than 90 000 Armenians were also resettled from Ottoman ter­ritories to the South Caucasus and settled in the same khanates⁷⁵.

Before the resettlement, the popu­lation of the territory later named the “Armenian Province” was 107 224, of which 76.24% were Azerbaijanis and 23.45% were Armenians⁷⁶. In Erivan city, with a population of 9 700, Azer­baijanis constituted 75.6%, while Ar­menians made up 24.4%. This clear demographic predominance of Azer­baijanis in the ethnic composition of the population is an undeniable fact confirming that these lands historical­ly belonged to Azerbaijan.

Following the resettlement, the ethnic composition of the population changed dramatically. In Erivan city alone, the population increased to 11 463 as a result of the migration. Con­sequently, the share of Azerbaijani population dropped to 64%, while that of Armenians rose to 36%⁷⁷.

Thus, in return for the services rendered by the Armenians to the Tsarist army during the occupation of Northern Azerbaijan, Russia granted them a territory called the “Armenian Province” in the conquered Azerbai­jani lands-specifically in the territories of the Erivan and Nakhchivan khan­ates. In doing so, the Armenians, un­der the patronage and support of Tsarist Russia, established a territorial base for themselves in the South Caucasus.

Notes

• Bayramlı, Azərbaycan Səfəvi dövlətinin quruluşu və idarə sistemi, ADPU, Bakı, 2006, p. 104.
• Efendiyev, The Safavid State of Azerbaijan, Azərnəşr, Baku,1993, p. 179.
• ***, Summary Register of the Province of Iravan, Elm, Baku, 1996, pp. 6-7.
• ***, İrəvan əyalətinin icmal dəftəri, Elm, Bakı, 1996, pp. 8-9.
• ***, Azərbaycan tarixi, 7 cilddə, III cild., Elm, Bakı, 1999, p. 363.
• ***, İrəvan əyalətinin icmal dəftəri, cit., p. 9.
• Ibidem.
• Əliyev, U. Həsənov, İrəvan xanlığı, Şərq-Qərb, Bakı, 2007, p. 13.
• Ibidem.
• И.И Шопен, Исторический памятник состояния Армянской области в эпоху ее присоединения к Российской империи, СПб., 1852, pp. 442-446.
• Mahmudov (elmi red.), İrəvan xanlığı. Rusiya işğalı və ermənilərin Şimali Azərbaycan torpaqlarına köçürülməsi, Bakı, Azərbaycan, 2010, pp. 60-61.
• Əliyev, U. Həsənov, op. cit., p. 50
• ***, Azərbaycan tarixi, IV cild., Elm, Bakı, 2000, p. 15.
• ***, Акты собранные Кавказской Археографической комиссией, Т. I, Тифлис, 1866, док. 276, pp. 267-268; Р. Фадеев, Кавказская война, Эксмо Алгоритм, Москва, 2005, p. 36.
• Н. Дубровин, Закавказье от 1803 по 1806 г, СПб., 1866, p. 485.
• АКАК, Т. I, док. 838, pp. 817-818.
• Gürcüstan Respublikası Dövlət Arxivi, f. 2, sən. 39, v. 11.
• Idem, sən. 22, v. 29.
• BOA, HAT, no. 15756 C
• AKAK, T. I, док. 838, p. 709.
• Gürcüstan Respublikası Dövlət Arxivi, cit., f. 2, sən. 22, v. 29.
• Н. Дубровин, История войн и владычества русских на Кавказе, Т. IV, СПб., 1886, p. 268; ***, Утверждение русского влады­чества на Кавказе, Т. I. Тифлис, 1901, p. 129; В.А. Парсамян (под ред. В.А Потто), История армянского народа 1801-1900 гг, Ереван, 1972, p. 20.
• Дубровин, op. cit., pp. 279-285; ***, Акты собранные Кавказской Археографической комиссией, Т. II, Тифлис, 1868, док. 1206, p. 605, док. 1209-1216, pp. 605-610.
• AKAK, T. II, док. 1216, p. 610.
• Əliyev, U. Həsənov, op. cit., pp. 115-116.
• ***, Утверждение русского владычества на Кавказе, Т. I, p. 138.
• ***, Naxçıvan tarixi, Üç cilddə, II cild, Naxçıvan, Əcəmi, 2014, pp. 83-84.
• Əliyarlının (red. ilə.), Azərbaycan tarixi, Çıraq, Bakı, 2009, s. 588.
• Mirzə Adıgözəl bəy, Qarabağnamə, Bakı, 1989, p. 69.
• ***, Присоединение Восточной Армении к России. Т. I. 1801-1813, (Сб. док.), Ред. Ц.П.Агаян, Ереван, Издательство Академии Наук Армянской ССР,1972, pp. 269-270.
• AKAK, T. II, док. 1242, p. 619; F. Əliyev, U. Həsənov, cit., p. 123.
• Ibidem, док. 1682, pp. 815-816.
• ***İrəvan xanlığı. Rusiya işğalı və ermənilərin Şimali Azərbaycan torpaqlarına köçürülməsi, Nəşriyyat, Çaşıoğlu Baki, 2010, p. 303.
• M. Mahmudov, K.K. Şükürov, Azərbaycan: Beynəlxalq münasibətlər və diplomatiya tarixi. 1639-1828. Dövlətlərarası müqavilələr və digər xarici siyasət aktları. Dörd cilddə, I cild., Bakı, 2009, pp. 366-367.
• ***, İrəvan xanlığı. Rusiya işğalı və ermənilərin Şimali Azərbaycan torpaqlarına köçürülməsi, cit., p. 304.
• Azərbaycan tarixi (Uzaq keçmişdən 1870-ci ilə qədər), Red. S.Əliyarlı. pp. 593-594, 598-599.
• ***, İrəvan xanlığı. Rusiya işğalı və ermənilərin Şimali Azərbaycan torpaqlarına köçürülməsi, cit., p. 304.
• AKAK, T. I, док. 838, p. 709.
• ***, Акты собранные Кавказской Археографической комиссией, Т. III, Тифлис, 1869, док. 467, p. 254.
• РГВИА, ф. ВУА, док. 6164, л. 25.
• Н.Ф. Дубровин, История войны и владычества русских на Кавказе, Т. V. СПб., 1887, p. 209.
• РГВИА, ф. ВУА, док. 6265, л. 12-16.
• Н.Ф. Дубровин, cit, p. 215.
• AKAK, T. III, док. 476, pp. 267-268; Х.М. Ибрагимбейли, Россия и Азербайджан в первой трети XIX века (Из военно-политической истории), «Наука», Москва, 1969, p. 93.
• РГВИА, ф. ВУА, док. 4266, л. 1-2; AKAK, T. III, док. 474, p. 267; ***, Naxçıvan tarixi, Üç cilddə. II cild, p. 84.
• Ibidem, л. 1-2.
• ***, Присоединение Восточной Армении к России. Т. I. 1801-1813, p. 473.
• Н.Ф. Дубровин, История войны и владычества русских на Кавказе, p. 224.
• AKAK, T. III, док. 467, pp. 252-264.
• Ibidem, док. 462, pp. 250-251;***, Naxçıvan tarixi, Üç cilddə, II cild, Naxçıvan, Əcəmi, 2014, p.85.
• ***, Утверждение русского владычества на Кавказе, cit., p. 305.
• Дубровин Н.Ф. История войны и владычества русских на Кавказе, Т. V, P. 279.
• ***, Утверждение русского владычества на Кавказе, cit., p.160.
• BOA, C.HR. no. 1342.
• А.В. Фадеев, Россия и Кавказ первой трети ХIХ в., Издательство Академии Наук СССР, Москва,1960, p.154.
• Х.М. Ибрагимбейли, cit., p. 132.
• F, K. Şükürovm, Göst. əsəri, pp. 415-427.
• Mahmudov, K. Şükürov, Göst. əsəri, s. 439; K.K. Şükürov, Türkmənçay – 1828. Tarixi xronika, Çaşıoğlu, Bakı, 2006, pp. 12-14; M. Süleymanov, Gülüstan müqaviləsi. II hissə, Elm və Təhsil, Bakı, 2014, p. 576.
• Шербатов, Генерал-фельдмаршал князь Паскевич. Его жизнь и деятельность,Т. II. СПб., 1890, pp. 12-13; ***, İrəvan xanlığı. Rusiya işğalı və ermənilərin Şimali Azərbaycan torpaqlarına köçürülməsi, op.cit., p. 326.
• Azərbaycan tarixi. Red. S.Əliyarlı, s. 615-616; Х.М Ибрагимбейли, cit., с. 198.
• ***, İrəvan xanlığı. Rusiya işğalı və ermənilərin Şimali Azərbaycan torpaqlarına köçürülməsi, cit., p. 330.
• Шербатов, op. cit.,Т. II, p. 226.
• Əliyev, U. Həsənov, op. cit., p. 137.
• В.А. Потто, Кавказская война в отдельных очерках, эпизодах, легендах и биографиях, Т. III. СПб., 1886, p. 516.
• ***, İrəvan xanlığı. Rusiya işğalı və ermənilərin Şimali Azərbaycan torpaqlarına köçürülməsi, cit., p. 348.
• A. Парсамян, op.cit, p. 43.
• ***, İrəvan xanlığı. Rusiya işğalı və ermənilərin Şimali Azərbaycan torpaqlarına köçürülməsi, cit., pp. 350-351; Потто В.А. Кавказская война в отдельных очерках, эпизодах, легендах и биографиях. Т. III, p. 591.
• ***, Акты собранные Кавказской Археографической комиссией, Т. VII, Тифлис, 1878, док. 432, pp. 480-481.
• AKAK, T. VII, док. 432, p.481.
• ***, Azərbaycan tarixi, IV c., pp. 47-48.
• A. Потто, Кавказская война. Персидская война 1826-1828 гг, vol. 3, Ставрополь, край Кавказ, 1993, pp. 469-470; AKAK, T. VII, док. 551, pp. 594-595.
• ***, Полное собрание законов Российской империи, Собр. Второе. Т. III, 1828. СПб, 1830, pp. 272-273; ***, Собрание актов, относящихся к обозрению истории Армянского народа, Часть I, Москва, 1833, pp. 278-279.
• Süleymanov, Hərbi nəşriyyat, Erməni millətçiliyi və təcavüzkarlığı tarixindən, Bakı, 2008, p. 366.
• AKAK, T. IV, док. 586, c. 619-620, док. 829, c. 845; ***, İrəvan xanlığı. Rusiya işğalı və ermənilərin Şimali Azərbaycan torpaqlarına köçürülməsi, cit., p. 23.
• Əliyev, U. Həsənov, op. cit., p. 15.
• Ibidem, p. 16.