Geopolitical risks and insecurity in the South Caucasus.

The role of geographical constraints in the case of Georgia

 Ciprian IFTIMOAEI
Vicențiu Robert GABOR

Abstract: The South Caucasus region is characterised by a high level of geopolitical instability, determined by the overlapping of frozen conflicts, competition between regional and extra-regional actors, and the structural vulnerabilities of the states in the area. In this context, the article analyses the role of geographical constraints in generating and perpetuating insecurity, taking Georgia as a case study. The premise from which the analysis starts is that geography is not a simple passive framework of international relations, but an essential explanatory variable that shapes the strategic options, foreign policy behaviour and security vulnerability of small states. The research uses a qualitative exploratory approach, based on geopolitical analysis, documentation and cartographic processing. Georgia’s geographical positioning, territorial fragmentation and exposure to external pressures converge in a model of structural insecurity, which limits the state’s ability to diversify its geopolitical options. The article contributes to the regional security literature by highlighting geography as a determinant of geopolitical risk in the South Caucasus and the wider Black Sea region.

Keywords: geopolitics, security, geographical constraints, Georgia, South Caucasus, Black Sea Extended Region.

Introduction

The South Caucasus region is one of the most volatile geopolitical areas in the wider European neighbour­hood, characterised by the existence of ‘frozen conflicts’, competition between global actors (United States of America, European Union, Russian Federation) and persistent structural vulnerabilities of the states in the region (Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan). Located at the cross­roads between Europe and Asia, be­tween the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea, this region is a focus of diver­gent strategic interests, being simul­taneously an energy transit zone, a transport corridor and a geopolitical buffer between competing spheres of influence. The discovery of energy resources in the Caspian Sea has in­tensified competition between state actors in the region, as well as be­tween global strategic actors (USA and the Russian Federation) for the exploitation and transport of hydro­carbons to countries in Europe or Asia¹.

The state of security in the South Caucasus is caused by the interaction of historical, military, geographical and ethno-cultural factors. Among the states of the South Caucasus, Georgia stands out due to its prob­lematic geographical position, caught between constant military pressure from the Russian Federation and the need to cultivate peaceful relations with its other neighbours (Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan). Although Georgia is part of the so-called Black Sea Extended Region, being a coastal state of this sea, it has rather limited access to strategic manoeuvring space. The conflicts in the separatist regions (South Ossetia and Abkhazia) main­tained by the Russian Federation cre­ate multiple vulnerabil­ities in terms of national security. In this context, the geography of Georgia and the entire region becomes a source of geopolitical risks and insecurity.

In general, the South Caucasus is analysed from the perspective of “frozen conflicts” (Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh), compe­tition between Russia, Turkey, EU, NATO and other extra-regional ac­tors, as well as energy security. Ac­cording to O. Milevschi and S. Secrieru, a “frozen conflict” is an administratively disputed territory where military confrontation has ceased but for which no sustainable political solution acceptable to all parties involved has been found, fuel­ling a fragile security environment².

In areas where frozen conflicts exist, violence and armed confronta­tion can erupt at any time. Georgia is already a classic example of a coun­try that „hosts” two frozen conflicts (Abkhazia and South Ossetia), reac­tivated by the outbreak of Russian-Georgian hostilities in 2008. In this landscape dominated by military con­flicts and fierce competition for ener­gy and transport corridors, the role of geography as an explanatory variable in shaping insecurity is often treated superficially.

This study starts from the premise that geography is not just a passive backdrop to geopolitical dynamics, but a structural constraint that shapes the strategic choices, foreign policy behaviour and security vulnerabilities of small states. In other words, the geography of the South Caucasus is a predictor of geopolitical risks and insecurity in this region, which has been disputed at certain times in his­tory.

The main objective of the article is to analyse how geographical con­straints contribute to the generation and perpetuation of geopolitical risks in the South Caucasus, through a case study focused on Georgia. The cen­tral research question concerns the extent to which Georgia’s geograph­ical position and territorial configura­tion limit its ability to ensure its secu­rity and diversify its geopolitical op­tions. In this sense, the article aims to highlight the link between geogra­phy, insecurity and the strategic op­tions of a small state in a tense re­gional space.

Based on the general objective of the paper, the investigative approach is structured around the following research questions:

1. To what extent does Geor­gia’s geographical position contribute to the configuration of a model of structural insecurity in the South Caucasus?
2. What are the main geograph­ical constraints (lack of strategic depth, territorial fragmentation, geo­political neighbourhood) that limit Georgia’s ability to manage its secu­rity risks?
3. How does geography influ­ence Georgia’s foreign and security policy options in a regional context marked by power asymmetries and strategic competition?
4. How does Georgia’s status as a transit state (for energy and transport) transform its geographical position into a simultaneous source of geopolitical opportunity and secu­rity vulnerability?
5. To what extent do geograph­ical constraints reduce Georgia’s stra­tegic autonomy and condition its Eu­ro-Atlantic orientation?

Literature review

The analysis of geopolitical risks and insecurity in the South Caucasus requires a theoretical approach that goes beyond strictly political-institutional or military explanations and integrates geography as a struc­tural factor in power relations. In this sense, the theoretical section com­bines contributions from political geography, classical and critical geo­politics, as well as security studies, to substantiate the role of geographical constraints in producing regional in­security.

Political geography starts from the premise that space is not politically neutral, but influences the distribu­tion of power, the behaviour of states and the architecture of security sys­tems. Geographical positioning, ac­cess to resources, border configura­tion and regional neighbourhoods generate opportunities, but also struc­tural constraints that limit the room for manoeuvre of state actors. In this logic, geography functions as a rela­tively stable variable with long-term effects on security and foreign policy. In regions characterised by chronic instability, such as the South Cauca­sus, these constraints are amplified by the overlapping geopolitical inter­ests of the major powers and the in­stitutional fragility of local states. Thus, geography does not fully ex­plain aspects of insecurity, but it does provide clues about strategic options.

Classical geopolitics attributed a decisive role to geography in explain­ing the behaviour of states, emphasis­ing the importance of strategic posi­tion, territorial size and control of space in the configuration of political power. In the tradition inaugurated by Friedrich Ratzel (1897), the state was conceptualised as an organism de­pendent on vital space, while Halford J. Mackinder (1904) demonstrated that geographical positioning in the “pivot of history” influences the global balance of power. Although these approaches were later criticised for their spatial determinism, critical geopolitics (Agnew, 2003; Ó Tuathail, 1996) recognises the continuing rele­vance of geographical factors, espe­cially in geopolitical border regions such as the South Caucasus, where positional constraints, territorial fragmentation and lack of strategic depth shape states’ foreign and secu­rity policy options³.

Critical geopolitics has nuanced the deterministic perspective of the classical tradition, arguing that geog­raphy does not generate mechanical effects on state behaviour, but is me­diated through representations, dis­courses and political practices. In this vein, Gearóid Ó Tuathail (1996) demonstrated that geopolitical space is discursively produced and repro­duced in the form of narratives on regional and international security issues. Similarly, Simon Dalby (1990) and John Agnew (2003) have empha­sised that mental maps, territo­rial repre­sentations and geopolitical inter­pretations of elites shape the def­inition of interests and threats. From this perspective, geographical con­straints are not immutable, but are interpreted and instrumentalised by political elites according to their stra­tegic projects. In regions marked by geopolitical competition, such as the South Caucasus, geography becomes both a material reality (relief, neigh­bour­hoods, transport routes, energy corri­dors) and a central element of competing narratives on security, defence and foreign policy⁴.

The literature on regional security shows that insecurity is not evenly distributed, but tends to be concen­trated in certain areas where conflict­ual interactions, historical rivalries and power asymmetries are self-perpetuating. In this regard, Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver develop the concept of a “regional security com­plex”, showing that threats are more intense within geographical areas characterised by security interde­pendence⁵.

The concept of the “security di­lemma”, originally formulated by John H. Herz (1950) and later sys­tematised by Robert Jervis (1978), is central to this theoretical framework: a state’s defensive measures are in­terpreted as potential threats by other actors, gen­erating counterbalancing reactions that amplify general insecu­rity.

In the absence of mutual trust and robust institutional mechanisms, the spiral of insecurity becomes difficult to control⁶. In the wider Black Sea region, which includes the riparian countries (Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey, Georgia, Ukraine, Russian Federation), the countries of the South Caucasus (Armenia and Azerbaijan) and the Republic of Moldova, there is a secu­rity dilemma (security versus ener­gy). At present, the Prut River, which forms the eastern border of Romania, European Union and NATO, sepa­rates two geopolitical areas: the Eu­ro-Atlantic space, which includes countries with competitive market economies that provide security in the region, and the post-Soviet space (the former USSR or Commonwealth of Independent States), which in­cludes countries that have energy resources and/or are transit areas for energy pipelines and need security⁷.

In the South Caucasus, insecurity is exacerbated by the proximity of major regional actors (Russian Fed­eration, Turkey, Iran), the existence of frozen conflicts (Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh) and the lack of functional collective security arrangements. In terms of regional security complex theory, the Cauca­sus functions as a subsystem in which negative interdependencies prevail. Geography contributes di­rectly to this configuration: territorial fragmenta­tion, lack of strategic depth, and expo­sure to energy corri­dors and transit routes reduce the ca­pacity of states, especially Georgia, to autonomously neutralise risks and increase vulne­rability to external pressures.

A relevant theoretical contribution to the analysis of structural insecurity is provided by the approach to small states in the international system. David Vital (1967) showed that the vulnerability of small states derives from their reduced capacity to influ­ence the strategic environment and their dependence on the great pow­ers. Subsequently, Robert O. Keohane (1969) emphasised that the status of a “small state” should be understood not only in demographic or territorial terms, but also in relation to the dis­tribution of power and the limited margin of external autonomy⁸.

For small states (e.g. Georgia) in tense regions (South Caucasus), stra­tegic options are often limited to a few dominant alternatives: alignment with a major actor, integration into broader security structures, or ac­ceptance of a state of chronic insecu­rity. The choice of one of these op­tions is not exclusively the result of political preferences, but also of geo­graphical and structural constraints. Based on these theoretical contribu­tions, this article treats geography as a central explanatory variable in the analysis of geopolitical insecurity. Geographical constraints are not un­derstood as absolute determinants of the security, but as structural ele­ments that act through mediating mechanisms: power asymmetries, the security dilemma, and the militarisa­tion of regional space.

Research methodology

The methodological approach is based on a descriptive-exploratory analysis that combines geopolitical analysis, based on cartographic tools, with a comparative analysis of com­posite indices. The article is struc­tured as follows: the first part contex­tualises the architecture of geopoliti­cal risks in the South Caucasus, while the second part analyses the specific geographical constraints of Georgia and their implications for its insecuri­ty and strategic options.

For the comparative analysis of geopolitical risks and the level of insecurity in the South Caucasus, we have selected a series of composite indices used internationally (Table 1): Human Development Index, De­mocracy Index, Global Peace Index, Militarisation Index and State Fragili­ty Index. All these indices allow for a systematic and comparable assess­ment of the position of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan in the secu­rity architecture of the South Caucasus.

Table 1. Composite indices used in the comparative analysis

The Human Development Index (HDI), developed by the United Nations Development Programme, measures the level of development by integrating three fundamental dimen­sions: health (expressed through life expectancy), education (average and expected years of schooling) and standard of living (gross national in­come per capita). This index reflects a state’s capacity to ensure general conditions of well-being and repre­sents an alternative to exclusively economic indicators, such as gross domestic product⁹.

The political dimension is cap­tured by the Democracy Index, de­veloped by the Economist Intelli­gence Unit, which assesses the de­gree of democratisation based on five criteria: the electoral process, gov­ernment functioning, political partic­ipation, political culture and respect for civil liberties. The scores obtained allow political regimes to be classi­fied as consolidated democracies, imperfect democracies, hybrid re­gimes and authoritarian regimes, thus providing a synthetic measure of the stability and legitimacy of political institutions¹⁰.

The level of security and conflict is analysed using the Global Peace Index (GPI), developed by the Insti­tute for Economics and Peace, which includes indicators relating to internal and external conflicts, societal securi­ty and the degree of militarisation. This index reflects the exposure of states to security risks and provides a comparative assessment of the level of regional and international stabil­ity¹¹. Complementary to this, the Global Militarisation Index (GMI), developed by the Bonn International Centre for Conflict Studies, measures the military sector’s share in society using indicators such as military ex­penditure, armed forces and military equipment, thus highlighting the state’s strategic priorities and percep­tion of external threats¹².

The Fragile States Index (FSI), developed by the Fund for Peace, provides a comprehensive assessment of state vulnerabilities based on indi­cators covering demographic pres­sures, political legitimacy, economic performance and external interven­tions. This index is widely used to analyse states’ capacity to maintain internal stability and cope with polit­ical and security risks¹³. Overall, the use of these indices allows for an analysis of the relationship between development, governance and securi­ty, providing a solid empirical frame­work for the comparative as­sessment of geopolitical risks in the South Caucasus.

Geography, geopolitical risks and regional security

The literature on regional security and geopolitics converges on the idea that geography is a structural factor in international relations, influencing both the distribution of power and the typology of geopolitical risks and the level of insecurity of states. In the South Caucasus, this relationship is particularly relevant, given the nature of the region as a geopolitical and civilisational frontier (majority Chris­tianity in the Russian Federation, Georgia and Armenia versus Islam­ism in Turkey and Azerbaijan), marked by competition between ma­jor powers and persistent instability.

Classical geopolitics established the idea that geographical positioning and spatial configuration condition the behaviour of states and their vul­nerability. Halford J. Mackinder showed that certain geographical spaces generate lasting strategic ad­vantages, while others produce vul­nerability and exposure, especially in areas of contact between centres of power¹⁴.

Geography is the most important “stable factor” on which a nation’s power depends, argues Hans J. Morgenthau, along with natural re­sources and raw materials. Added to these are relative factors such as pop­ulation, political leadership, military, and economic capacity¹⁵. Developing this geographical approach, Nicholas J. Spykman emphasised the role of rimlands as areas of intense geopolit­ical competition where insecurity is structural and recurrent¹⁶. Robert D. Kaplan also shares Spykman’s ap­proach, considering that the struggle for space (geography) has never ceased throughout human history. Geographical maps are spatial repre­sentations of human divisions, and geography is the backdrop to history itself, Kaplan argues. A state’s posi­tion on the map is much more im­portant than the philosophy of those who govern it¹⁷.

Applied to the South Caucasus, this perspective suggests that the re­gion’s position between Europe and Asia, between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea, generates objective constraints that limit the strategic autonomy of local states and expose them to external pressures. However, the implicit determinism of classical geopolitics was later nuanced by crit­ical approaches.

From the perspective of critical geopolitics, Gearóid Ó Tuathail ar­gues that geography does not produce mechanical effects, but is mediated by political discourses and securitisa­tion processes, through which space is transformed into an object of stra­tegic competition¹⁸. Simon Dalby takes a similar line, highlighting the fact that insecurity is the result of the interaction between the material re­alities of space and political practices with geopolitical significance¹⁹.

Between geography and insecuri­ty lie geopolitical risks, defined as forms of uncertainty and vulnerabil­ity generated by power competition in a given space. Robert D. Kaplan describes these spaces as „areas of geopolitical friction,” where geogra­phy amplifies political and military tensions, turning risk into a perma­nent feature of the security environ­ment²⁰.

An essential theoretical frame­work for analysing these dynamics is the theory of regional security com­plexes, formulated by Barry Buzan and later developed together with Ole Wæver. According to this perspec­tive, insecurity is structured regional­ly, and security risks are more intense between actors in geographical prox­imity²¹. In the South Caucasus, fro­zen conflicts, historical rivalries and power asymmetries contribute to the consolidation of such a regional secu­rity complex.

Recurring geopolitical risks trans­late, over time, into a state of struc­tural insecurity, conceptualised in security literature through the lens of the security dilemma. John H. Herz has shown that, in the absence of trust and effective collective security mechanisms, one state’s defensive measures are perceived as threats by others, generating a vicious circle of insecurity²². This logic was further developed by Robert Jervis, who demonstrated that insecurity is often unintended but deeply structured by the international environment²³.

In regions characterised by frozen conflicts and the lack of a stable se­curity architecture, insecurity tends to become persistent. David Lake points out that, in the absence of a stabilis­ing regional authority, states remain captive in an environment of self-reproducing insecurity²⁴. This per­spective is consistent with Barry Buzan’s analysis, which defines re­gional insecurity as the result of the interaction between structure, percep­tions and capabilities²⁵.

Regional comparative analysis is an essential tool for understanding how the three Caucasian countries manage their vulnerabilities and build resilience in an environment charac­terised by strategic competition and frozen conflicts. In this regard, the simultaneous assessment of human development indicators, the quality of democratic governance, the level of militarisation, internal stability and security provides an integrated per­spective on the balance between de­velopment and insecurity.

The comparative table below (Ta­ble 2) highlights these differences and convergences, revealing that relatively similar socio-economic performances coexist with different levels of democratic consolidation and exposure to security risks. At the same time, the indicators analysed suggest that insecurity in the South Caucasus is not exclusively the result of territorial conflicts, but reflects a combination of structural, institution­al and geopolitical factors that influ­ence the capacity of states to ensure long-term stability.

Table 2. Comparative analysis of the main indicators

of development in Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia

The analysis of comparative indi­cators highlights a region character­ised by contrasts between the level of socio-economic development and pol­i­tical and security dynamics. In terms of human development, all three states score relatively high, but Georgia and Armenia stand out as being in the ‘very high’ development category, ref­lec­ting more consistent progress in education, health and overall living conditions. Azerbaijan is slightly below this threshold, but still remains in the ‘high’ category, which can be explained by its signifi­cant economic dependence on the energy sector and the uneven distri­bution of the benefits of economic growth.

The differences become more ev­ident at the political level. Azerbaijan’s low score on the De­mocracy Index indicates a highly centralised political system and limited political competi­tion, while Georgia and Armenia are classified as hybrid regimes, where electoral mechanisms function but democratic consolidation processes remain incomplete. Armenia scores slightly above Georgia, suggesting a more favourable evolution of politi­cal reforms in recent years, although institutional vulnerabilities and inter­nal tensions continue to influence the political stability of both states.

Security indicators confirm the sensitive nature of the regional geo­political environment. Moderate lev­els on the Global Peace Index reflect persistent conflicts and geopolitical tensions, particularly in the context of territorial disputes in the region. At the same time, high values on the Militarisation Index for Armenia and Azerbaijan indicate a strong focus on the defence sector, while Georgia shows a more moderate level of mili­tarisation. The State Fragility Index places all three states in the medium fragility zone, suggesting the exist­ence of functional institutions that remain exposed to socio-economic and political pressures.

Georgia’s geographical con­straints and vulnerabilities in the South Caucasus security environment

Georgia is a state located in the South Caucasus, at the crossroads of Eastern Europe and Western Asia, its geographical position giving it a geo­political role as an interface between the Euro-Atlantic space, the Caspian region and the Near East. These geo­graphical characteristics are not just elements of the physical environ­ment, but generate structural con­straints that limit the state’s strategic depth and increase its security vul­nerability ²⁶.

The configuration of the relief di­rectly influences the geopolitical structure of the territory. The Greater Caucasus mountain range, located to the north, forms a strong natural bar­rier against Russia and limits com­munications to a few strategic corri­dors, including the Darial Gorge and the Roki Tunnel, which are of major importance for transport, security and military mobility²⁷. In the south, the Lesser Caucasus Mountains separate Georgia from Armenia and Turkey and contribute to the territorial indi­vidualisation of the state, controlling access to the transregional corridors of Anatolia and the Armenian Plateau²⁸.

Between the two mountain ranges lie the main internal transport routes and areas of demographic and eco­nomic concentration, namely the Kura (Mtkvari) river basin in the east and the Colchis Plain in the west, regions that constitute the functional core of the state²⁹. The opening to the Black Sea provides access to interna­tional maritime routes and strength­ens Georgia’s role as a transit state for the energy and transport corridors connecting the Caspian region to Eu­ropean markets³⁰.

Figure 1. Physical and geographical framework of Georgia and main landforms

From a geopolitical point of view, Georgia borders the Russian Federa­tion to the north, Azerbaijan to the east, Armenia and Turkey to the south, and has access to the Black Sea to the west³¹. This location at the crossroads of areas of major strategic interest amplifies the country’s im­portance as a regional transport hub and, at the same time, generates geo­political vulnerabilities, especially in the mountainous border areas, where control of access corridors and transport infrastructure has a direct relevance for state security and the functioning of regional corridors³².

During the existence of the Soviet Union, Georgia functioned as a stra­tegic outpost on the southern border of the socialist bloc, directly exposed to Western influence due to its prox­imity to Turkey, which led to a policy of Russification and, paradoxically, fuelled the consolidation of Georgian nationalism. After gaining independ­ence in 1991, the victory of national­ist forces generated profound internal instability, manifested in the conflict between the ultra-nationalist and re­formist currents, as well as in the outbreak of separatist movements in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. These were indirectly supported by Russia, which used the secessions as a tool of geopolitical pressure and as a means of maintaining strategic control over key points, such as the Black Sea coast and the Caucasian communica­tion corridors. In exchange for rela­tive stabilisation and reduced support for the separatists, Georgia agreed to join the Commonwealth of Inde­pendent States and accept the pres­ence of Russian military bases, which limited its strategic autonomy³³.

Samuel P. Huntington takes a similar view, highlighting Georgia’s historical oscillation between inde­pendence and subordination to Rus­sia. Although Georgia had periods of autonomy, such as the period prior to the annexation of 1801 and the brief independence after the Russian Revolution, it was forcibly reinte­grated into the Russian sphere of con­trol. After the collapse of the Soviet Union (1991), Georgia’s newly re­gained independence was weakened by internal conflicts and external pressures. During Eduard Shevardnadze’s pres­idency, Georgia faced separatist movements in Abkhazia, supported by Russia, which led to major con­cessions. According to S.P. Huntington, Russia’s intervention had a dual function: initially to desta­bilise Georgian authority and subse­quently to keep Georgia within its sphere of influence, thereby limiting the state’s real autonomy and con­firming the geopolitical constraints that define Georgia’s position in the post-Soviet space³⁴.

Post-Soviet Georgia has evolved towards instability, marked by ethno-territorial conflicts and competition between various foreign policy op­tions³⁵. Georgia’s declared orienta­tion towards Euro-Atlantic integra­tion has been confronted with the specific security realities of the Caucasus, where the reorganisation of borders after the collapse of the USSR was accompanied by identity tensions, territorial claims and frozen conflicts³⁶.

In the South Caucasus, the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh had a first phase of war (1988-1994), followed by re­newed hostilities and major changes to the status quo, including Azerbaijan regaining control in 2023 and the resumption of peace negotia­tions in 2024-2025. In the north, Georgia indirectly borders several federal en­tities of the Russian Federation in the North Caucasus. These are mainly organised as national republics, each corresponding to dominant ethnic groups, with autonomous status with­in the Russian Federation and distinct demographic, economic and political characteristics.

The North Caucasus region has historically been marked by political instability and armed conflict. The Republic of Chechnya was the epi­centre of the most violent post-Soviet clashes, and the Republic of Dagestan and the Republic of Ingushetia have also experienced recurrent episodes of insecurity. In contrast, the Republic of North Ossetia-Alania, the Republic of Kabardino-Balkaria and the Republic of Karachay-Cherkessia are considered relatively stable, although they too were affected by ethnic tensions and insurgent incidents in the 1990s and early 2000s³⁷.

The border between Georgia and the Russian Federation is, from a ge­opolitical point of view, the most sensitive border of the Georgian state, even if we ignore the North Caucasian republics. The situation is mainly determined by the conse­quences of the 2008 Russian-Georgian conflict and the existence of de facto separation lines within the internationally recognised territory of Georgia. Currently, a significant part of the border sector is associated with the separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, where the Russian Federation maintains a military pres­ence and effectively controls the de­marcation lines. These lines are not internationally recognised as state borders, but function as militarily controlled boundaries, with severe restrictions on movement and period­ic incidents related to the detention of persons, patrols or changes to the route of security fences. This situa­tion reduces Georgia’s ability to ex­ercise full control over its northern borders and represents one of the state’s main strategic vulnerabilities.

In the sector under the direct con­trol of the Georgian authorities, the mountain border is relatively stable and sparsely populated, characterised by a small number of crossing points, the most important of which is in the Kazbegi-Verkhny Lars area, the main road link between the two states. Due to the difficult terrain and mountain climate, accessibility is limited, and the strategic importance of these crossing points is high both from an economic point of view and in terms of military mobility.

Currently, the Russian-Georgian border is not the scene of open armed conflict, but it remains a heavily mili­tarised and politicised border, where the lack of a definitive solution for the separatist regions maintains a high level of latent geopolitical ten­sion and constantly influences Geor­gia’s security environment.

Georgia’s most stable border is with Turkey, which functions primar­ily as an area of economic coopera­tion and regional transit, crossed by major transport and energy infra­structure corridors. Among the most important examples are the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, which transports oil from the Caspian re­gion to Turkish ports on the Mediter­ranean Sea, and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline, part of the southern energy corridor linking Azerbaijan to European markets. Similarly, the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway line reinforces the role of the Georgian-Turkish border as a major Eurasian transport axis, facilitating trade flows between Central Asia, the Caucasus and Europe³⁸.

The proximity to Armenia and Azerbaijan was a potential risk factor during the conflict between the two states, when episodes of military con­frontation raised fears of spreading instability and possible refugee flows into Georgian territory. Following military developments in 2020-2023 and the resumption of bilateral nego­tiations, the risk of the conflict spreading has been significantly re­duced, although the regional situation continues to be closely monitored.

Georgia’s access to the Black Sea is one of the country’s most im­portant geopolitical advantages, as it reduces the isolation caused by its location in a mountainous and strate­gically complex region and provides a direct connection to European mar­kets. Through its seaports and associ­ated transport infrastructure, Georgia maintains direct commercial and lo­gistical links with Europe, without being exclusively dependent on re­gional land routes, which are often affected by geopolitical tensions.

Table 3. Georgia’s relations with its neighbours

Domestically, ethno-territorial conflicts were one of the main obsta­cles to the consolidation of the Geor­gian state after the collapse of the Soviet Union, affecting territorial control, political stability and the in­stitutional capacity of the state. In the early stages of independence, the weakening of central authority, the fragmentation of political elites and identity-based rivalries fostered the emergence of separatist movements in several peripheral regions.

Abkhazia became one of the most important conflict zones in the early 1990s, with tensions between Geor­gian authorities and local political elites escalating into armed clashes in 1992-1993. The conflict ended with Georgia losing effective control over the region and a significant part of the Georgian population being dis­placed, profoundly altering the local demographic structure. In the follow­ing years, Abkhazia functioned as a de facto separate entity, supported politically, economically and militari­ly by the Russian Federation. After the 2008 Russian-Georgian conflict, Russia officially recognised the re­gion’s independence, thus consolidat­ing its de facto separation from the Georgian state.

South Ossetia followed a similar path, with ethno-political tensions turning into armed clashes as early as 1991-1992. After a period of calm (“frozen conflict”), the region again became the scene of military clashes in 2008, in the context of escalating Russian-Georgian relations. The Russian Federation’s military inter­vention led to the consolidation of Russia’s military presence in the re­gion and the maintenance of de facto separation from the Georgian au­thorities.

Adjara was a distinct case, as it did not evolve into formal secession, but was characterised in the 1990s and early 2000s by a high degree of de facto autonomy under the leader­ship of local leader Aslan Abashidze. He consolidated a personalised re­gional political system, supported by his own security structures and con­trol over local economic resources, limiting the influence of the central authorities in Tbilisi. The 2004 polit­ical crisis in which unfolded against the backdrop of internal transfor­mations generated by the Rose Revo­lution and the consolidation of Georgian state authority, led to Abashidze’s re­moval from power and the region’s full reintegration into the state ad­ministrative system without major armed confrontation.

Figure 2. Georgia’s neighbours, borders and separatist regions

In the territories under the effec­tive control of the Georgian state, the ethnic structure is relatively stable, but includes several regional minori­ties concentrated in specific areas, with political and socio-economic relevance. Georgians represent the majority of the population, approxi­mately 85-87%, dominating the polit­ical, administrative and institutional structure of the state, while ethnic minorities are concentrated mainly in certain border regions.

The largest minority is the Azer­baijani minority, concentrated mainly in the Kvemo Kartli region in the south-east of the country, near the border with Azerbaijan. The commu­nity is predominantly rural, and the main difficulties have been associat­ed with linguistic integration and po­litical participation, but overall the region is stable and shows no sepa­ratist or h al tendencies. The Armeni­an community is concentrated in the Samtskhe-Javakheti region in the south, on the border with Armenia. Although there were fears of possible autonomist claims in the 1990s, these did not materialise. The current situa­tion is considered stable, even if dif­ferences in economic development and challenges related to linguistic and infrastructural integration persist.

Other ethnic groups, such as Rus­sians, Greeks, Kists (Georgian Che­chens) and other smaller communi­ties, are scattered across the territory and have not caused any major geo­political problems in the post-Soviet period. In this context, Georgia’s main ethno-territorial tensions are not associated with minorities under state control, but with the separatist re­gions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which are not under the effective administration of the Georgian au­thorities³⁹.

In the regions controlled by Tbilisi, inter-ethnic relations are gen­erally stable, and the existing chal­lenges are mainly socio-economic and administrative in nature, not sep­aratist. Essentially, Georgia remains a state defined by its geographical po­sition in the Black Sea Extended Re­gion. The mountains offer it protec­tion, but also isolate it. The sea gives it access to the world, but does not completely remove it from the strate­gic competition of the great powers. And its location between Russia, Turkey and the Caspian region indi­cates that, regardless of its size, Georgia will continue to play an im­portant role in the geopolitics of the Caucasus.

Figure 3. Ethnic configuration of the Caucasus region.

(Source: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, 2004)

Its position at the intersection of the Euro-Atlantic space, the Caspian region and the Near East gives Georgia a strategic hub role, but at the same time exposes it to competi­tion between powers. The Greater and Lesser Caucasus mountain rang­es offer natural protection, but limit strategic depth and concentrate mo­bility in a few critical corridors, mak­ing transport infrastructure a target with direct security relevance.

The proximity to the Russian Federation and the existence of the separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia maintain a state of la­tent geopolitical tension. The north­ern border remains militarised and politicised, and the lack of a defini­tive solution to the frozen conflicts reduces the state’s ability to exercise full control over its territory. This reality places Georgia in a situation of permanent structural vulnerability, even in the absence of direct armed confrontation. In contrast, the south­ern and western borders – particular­ly the relationship with Turkey and access to the Black Sea – function as strategic balancing factors. Energy and transport corridors (BTC, BTE, Baku–Tbilisi-Kars) strengthen Geor­gia’s geopolitical relevance and offer it alternatives for external connectivi­ty, reducing the risk of isolation.

A recent European Commis­sion report (2024) shows that Georgia is going through a period of internal political and strategic insecu­rity, characterised by deep political polari­sation, democratic regression and a deterioration in its relationship with the European Union. These de­velopments generate an indirect geo­political risk by weakening the state’s Euro-Atlantic anchoring. The adop­tion of legislation on “transparency of foreign influence”, regression in the rule of law and the limitation of civic space are assessed as backslid­ing and have effectively blocked the path to EU accession⁴⁰.

From a national security perspec­tive, the European Commission em­phasises that the low level of align­ment with the Common Foreign and Security Policy (49%), partial adher­ence to European sanctions against the Russian Federation, which invad­ed Ukraine (2022), and the intensifi­cation of air connections with Russia amplify Georgia’s geopolitical vul­nerability. Domestically, deficiencies in the electoral process, intimidation of political and civic actors, and weak democratic oversight of the security services, as noted by the OSCE, contribute to a profile of insti­tutional insecurity, with a direct im­pact on the state’s ability to manage external and hybrid risks⁴¹.

Cooperation between NATO and Georgia takes place at both the politi­cal and military levels. Georgia has consistently participated in NATO-led operations, including the Kosovo Force (1999-2008). Georgia has dis­tinguished itself as one of the most important non-NAT s to the Interna­tional Security Assistance Force and the Resolute Support Mission. At the same time, Georgia supports NATO maritime operations in the Mediter­ranean (Active Endeavour and, since 2016, Sea Guardian), strengthening cooperation in the field of maritime security⁴².

Beyond the military dimension, the partnership with NATO includes Trust Fund projects for the destruc­tion of ammunition and the reduction of security risks, as well as the devel­opment of crisis management capa­bilities through cooperation with the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre. Georgia’s on­going involvement in NATO’s Sci­ence for Peace and Security Pro­gramme extends cooperation to areas such as cyber security, CBRN, ener­gy and the Women, Peace and Secu­rity agenda. Overall, these contribu­tions support Georgia’s status as an active security provider and confirm the substantial nature of its rap­prochement with NATO in a regional context marked by structural insecu­rity⁴³. Table 4 summarises the most important milestones in the partner­ship between NATO and Georgia

Table 4. Milestones in NATO-Georgia cooperation

Analyses published by the Carne­gie Endowment for International Peace and the International Crisis Group converge on the idea that Georgia plays a pivotal role in the South Caucasus, being both a border state of the Euro-Atlantic area and a buffer zone between Russia and the Caspian region. From the perspective of the Carnegie Endowment for In­ternational Peace, Tbilisi is the main pro-Western partner in the region, with a strategic function in the energy and transport corridor linking the Caspian Sea to the Black Sea and the European market, reducing the EU’s dependence on routes controlled by Moscow⁴⁴.

However, reports provided by the International Crisis Group highlight the structural vulnerability of the Georgian state, marked by frozen conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which limit its regional pro­jection capacity and strengthen Rus­sia’s influence⁴⁵. The analyses of these think tanks show that Georgia is a regional actor with systemic rele­vance but limited strategic autonomy. In conclusion, internally, the main risks to Georgian security do not come from minorities under the con­trol of the authorities in Tbilisi, where inter-ethnic relations are rela­tively stable, but from territories out­side the effective control of the state. Georgian insecurity should be under­stood as a product of geographical constraints and regional dynamics, not just as an effect of episodic polit­ical crises.

Conclusions

Our study confirms the hypothesis that started the investigation: geogra­phy is not simply a backdrop to in­ternational relations, but a structural explanatory variable in the configura­tion of geopolitical risks and regional insecurity. In the South Caucasus, the positioning of countries at the inter­section of Europe and Asia, between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea, generates a framework of persistent geopolitical competition, in which small states operate with a limited margin of strategic autonomy.

From a theoretical point of view, the article integrates contributions from political geography, classical and critical geopolitics, and the theo­ry of regional security complexes, demonstrating that structural insecu­rity results from the interaction be­tween geographical constraints, pow­er asymmetries, and securitisation processes. Geography acts through mediated mechanisms – border mili­tarisation, control of energy corri­dors, territorial fragmentation – ra­ther than through mechanical deter­minism. Thus, space becomes both a material reality and a strategic con­struct.

At the regional level, the South Caucasus functions as a regional complex of insecurity, characterised by „frozen conflicts”, negative inter­dependencies and the absence of a stable collective security architecture. Competition between the Russian Federation, Turkey, the European Union and other extra-regional actors amplifies the structural vulnerabili­ties of the states in the area. Geopolit­ical risks are not circumstantial but recurrent, and geographical proximi­ty intensifies the security dilemma.

Applied to the case of Georgia, the analysis highlights a pattern of geographically determined structural insecurity. Its position between Russia and the Euro-Atlantic space, territorial fragmentation and lack of strategic depth limit the country’s ability to manage security risks au­tonomously. The existence of the separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the militarisation of the northern border and dependence on a few strategic transit corridors make geography a permanent factor of vulnerability.

Its status as an energy transit and transport country gives Georgia a geopolitical relevance that is dispro­portionate to its size. Energy corri­dors and access to the Black Sea rep­resent both strategic opportunities and vulnerabilities. Thus, its geo­graphical position creates a strategic paradox: it increases the country’s external importance but reduces its decision-making autonomy. Internal­ly, the conclusions show that Geor­gian insecurity is not fuelled primari­ly by active inter-ethnic dynamics in the territories controlled by Tbilisi, but by the loss of control over exter­nally supported separatist regions. Therefore, the main vulnerability is geopolitical-territorial in nature, not internal ethno-social.

Notes

• Paul Dobrescu, Geopolitică, Editura Comunicare.ro, București, 2003, sec­țiunea „Butoiul de pulbere al Caucazului”, p. 301.
• Octavian Milevschi și Stanislav Secrieru, „Conflictele înghețate în spațiul postsovietic” în Daniel Biró (coord.), Relațiile internaționale con­tem­porane. Teme centrale în politica mondială, Editura Polirom, Iași, 2013, pp. 162-184.
• See the works: John Agnew, Geopolitics: Re-visioning World Politics, 2nd ed., Routledge, London, 2003; Halford J. Mackinder, “The Geographical Pivot of History”, The Geographical Journal 23, no. 4 (1904): 421-437; Gearóid Ó Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics: The Politics of Writing Global Space, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1996; Friedrich Ratzel, Politische Geographie, Oldenbourg, Munich, 1897.
• Klaus Dodds, Geopolitics: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford University Press, 2007.
• Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security, University Press, Cambridge, 2003.
• John H. Herz, “Idealist Internati­onalism and the Security Dilemma”, World Politics, 2, no. 2 (1950): 157-180; Robert Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma”, World Politics, Vol. 30, no. 2 (1978): pp. 167-214.
• Ciprian Iftimoaei, Despre securitate, consolidare democratică și bună gu­vernare. România în context regional, Editura Lumen, Iași, 2015, pp. 11-41.
• Robert O. Keohane, “Lilliputians’ Dilemmas: Small States in International Politics,” International Organisation 23, no. 2 (1969), pp. 291-310; David Vital, The Inequality of States: A Study of the Small Power in International Relations, Oxford University Press, 1967.
• United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 2023/ 2024. Breaking the Gridlock: Reima­gining Cooperation in a Polarised World, New York: UNDP, 2024, pp. 288-291.
• Economist Intelligence Unit, Democracy Index 2023: Age of Conflict, London: EIU, 2024, pp. 55-60.
• Institute for Economics and Peace, Global Peace Index 2024: Measuring Peace in a Complex World, Sydney: IEP, 2024, pp. 2-5.
• Bonn International Centre for Conflict Studies, Global Militarisation Index 2023, BICC, Bonn, 2023, pp. 6-9.
• Fund for Peace, Fragile States Index Annual Report 2024, DC: Fund for Peace, Washington, 2024, pp. 10-15.
• Halford J. Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality, Constable, London, 1919, pp. 25-47.
• Hans J. Morgenthau, Politica între națiuni, Lupta pentru putere și lupta pentru pace, Editura Polirom, Iași, 2007, Cap. 9 – Elementele puterii na­ționale. Geografia, pp. 150-153.
• Nicholas J. Spykman, America’s Strategy in World Politics, New York, Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1942, pp. 41-65.
• Robert D. Kaplan, Răzbunarea geografiei. Ce ne spune harta despre conflictele viitoare și lupta împotriva destinului, Editura Litera, București, 2012, pp. 65-66.
• Gearóid Ó Tuathail, cit., pp. 1-22.
• Simon Dalby, Creating the Second Cold War, Pinter Publishers, London, 1990, pp. 3–19.
• Robert D. Kaplan, cit., pp. 3-28.
• Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security, cit, pp. 40-73.
• John H. Herz, cit., pp. 157-180.
• Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, Princeton University Press, 1976, pp. 58-113.
• David A. Lake, “Regional Security Complexes: A Systems Approach”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 45, no. 6, 2001, pp. 689-706.
• Barry Buzan, Popoarele, statele și frica. O agendă pentru studii de securitate internațională în epoca de după Războiul Rece, Editura Cartier, Chișinău, 2014, pp. 192-231.
• Charles King, The Ghost of Freedom: A History of the Caucasus, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008; Svante E. Cornell, The International Politics of the Caucasus, Routledge, London, 2015.
• Thomas de Waal, The Caucasus: An Introduction, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010.
• Charles King, cit.
• Svante E. Cornell, cit.
• Vladimir Socor, The Southern Gas Corridor and Europe’s Energy Security, Jamestown Foundation, Washington DC, 2017.
• Svante E. Cornell, Small Nations and Great Powers: A Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict in the Caucasus, Curzon, Richmond, 2001.
• Thomas de Waal, cit.
• Aymeric Chauprade, Francois Thual, Dicționar de geopolitică, Grupul editorial Corint, București, 2003, pp. 129-132.
• Samuel P. Huntington, Ciocinirea civilizațiilor și refacerea ordinii mondiale, Editura Antet, București, 1998, p. 242.
• Christoph Zürcher, The Post-Soviet Wars: Rebellion, Ethnic Conflict, and Nationhood in the Caucasus, New York University Press, New York, 2007; Svante E. Cornell, Small Nations and Great Powers: A Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict in the Caucasus, Curzon, Richmond, 2001.
• Gerard Toal, Near Abroad: Putin, the West and the Contest over Ukraine and the Caucasus, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2017.
• Christoph Zürcher, cit.
• Vladimir Socor, cit.
• Charles King, cit.
• European Commission (2024). Georgia Report 2024, General publications, https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/7b6ed47c-ecde-41a2-99ea-41683dc2d1bd_en?filename=G-eorgia%20Report%202024.pdf, last accessed February 2026.
• NATO (2024). Relations with Georgia, https://www.nato.int/en/what-we-do/p-artnerships-and-cooperation/relations-with-georgia, last accessed February 2026.
• Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. (2023–2025). Georgia. Russia and Eurasia Program – Country Analysis, https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/regions/georgia, last accessed February 2026.
• International Crisis Group. (2022). Georgia’s Abkhazia and South Ossetia: Time to Talk Trade. Europe Report No. 268, https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-c-entral-asia/caucasus/georgia/268-abk-hazia-and-south-ossetia-time-talk-tra-de, last accessed February 2026.

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