Slipping and Sliding Between Formalities and Informalities: Lobbying, Interest Groups and Democratic Governance in Georgia

Nino MACHURISHVILI

Irakli SAMADALASHVILI

Abstract: This article examines the complex interplay between formal regulatory frameworks and informal political practices through the lens of lobbying in Georgia. As a pioneer among post-Soviet states with its 1998 Law on Lobbying Ac­tivities, Georgia presents an instructive case study for analyzing the challenges of institutionalizing transparent interest representation in transitional democracies. Through a synthesis of neo-institutional theory, elite analysis, and comparative po­licy examination, this study explores the relationship between imported formal in­stitutions and established informal norms. The analysis moves beyond empirical case data to engage in a theoretical and desk-research based investigation of how formal lobbying mechanisms, designed to ensure transparency and accountability, can remain underutilized or bypassed in political cultures where influence is tradi­tionally mediated through personal networks and informal channels. By situating Georgia’s experience within broader scholarly debates on post-Soviet democrati­zation, institutional development, and hybrid governance, the paper examines the systemic conditions that can lead to differences between legal design and political practice. It concludes with a discussion of the implications for democratic consoli­dation and offers a framework for considering how formal and informal systems of influence might be aligned to strengthen governance.

Keywords: Political Lobbying, Democratization, Georgia, Post-Soviet Politics, Interest Groups.

Introduction: The Difference Between Institutional Design and Political Practice

The process of democratic conso­lidation in transitional societies is frequently characterized by observa­ble differences between newly esta­blished formal institutions and resili­ent informal practices that shape the actual exercise of power. This dynamic is demonstrated in the do­main of political lobbying and inte­rest representation, where laws de­signed to ensure transparency and equitable access often coexist with, and are sometimes bypassed by, networks of influence that operate less visibly¹. This article investigates this phenomenon through a theoreti­cal and comparative analysis of lob­bying in Georgia, a country that esta­blished a comprehensive legal fra­mework for lobbying activities in 1998, yet whose political system con­tinues to be analyzed through the prism of informal governance.

The central inquiry of this study is theoretical and systemic in nature: What does the development and im­plementation (or limited implementa­tion) of formal lobbying regulation reveal about the nature of instituti­onal change, power distribution, and state-society relations in a post-Soviet transitional democracy? Rat­her than focusing on the specific out­comes of a single law, the analysis seeks to understand the broader con­ditions under which formal democra­tic institutions develop or face chal­lenges in taking root, and how infor­mal practices persist or adapt. This approach allows for an examination of systemic features, historical lega­cies, and structural factors.

The investigation is guided by three interconnected analytical ques­tions derived from theoretical litera­ture:

1. How can neo-institutional the­ories, particularly historical and soci­ological institutionalism, explain the persistence and adaptation of infor­mal influence channels alongside new formal regulatory structures?
2. What are the common structu­ral and procedural features that can affect lobbying legislation effective­ness, as observed in various transitio­nal contexts, and how might these be identified in institutional design?
3. What are the broader implica­tions of differences between formal transparency mechanisms and infor­mal political practice for key demo­cratic principles such as accountabili­ty, pluralism, and public trust?

The conceptual framework for this analysis is drawn from two com­plementary theoretical traditions. Neo-institutional theory provides tools for understanding why informal norms and practices demonstrate such remarkable resilience, continu­ing alongside new formal rules thro­ugh processes like decoupling, laye­ring, and symbolic adoption. Elite theory offers insights into the incen­tives and strategies of powerful ac­tors who may find advantages in ma­intaining less visible channels of in­fluence, thereby continuing arrange­ments that ensure their continued access and influence. Methodologi­cally, this research employs a desk-based approach, synthesizing existing academic literature, comparative po­licy analysis of regulatory models (notably the Georgian and European Union frameworks), and theoretical development to construct a nuanced understanding of the issue.

Georgia’s early adoption of lob­bying legislation, followed by scholarly observations of its limited practical uptake, serves as a relevant case for examining these theoretical questions and puzzles. The country’s post-independence trajectory-marked by aspirations for Euro-Atlantic inte­gration, repeated reform efforts, and a complex Soviet legacy-creates a rich context for analyzing how for­mal democratic designs interact with informal political realities. This study contributes to the literature on post-Soviet democratization and hybrid regimes by providing a focused, the­oretical exploration of one arena where the rules on paper may diverge from the rules in use. It examines this divergence not merely as a technical matter of regulatory compliance but as central to how political power is constituted, contested, and legitimi­zed in transitional settings.

Theoretical Framework: Formal Rules, Informal Power, and Institutional Change

Neo-Institutional Theory: The Continuity of Informal Norms

Neo-institutional theory posits that institutions-defined broadly as the formal rules, informal norms, and established procedures that structure political, social, and economic life-are powerful and significant determi­nants of behavior and outcomes². This perspective is particularly illu­minating in transitional societies where new, often externally inspired, democratic institutions are su­perimposed upon deeply embedded informal practices. The result is fre­quently notable differences between formal prescriptions and actual beha­vior, differences that can themselves become established over time.

Historical institutionalism em­phasizes the substantial influence of legacy and path dependence. It de­monstrates that profound institutional change is rarely an abrupt break but occurs through extended processes of layering (adding new rules alongside existing ones), drift (changing impact of existing rules due to shifting cir­cumstances), and conversion (redi­recting existing institutions to new purposes)³. In the post-Soviet con­text, this theoretical framework means that networks of personal lo­yalty, reciprocal exchange (blat), and clan-based politics that characterized the late Soviet bureaucracy did not simply disappear with independence and new legislation. Instead, they evolved and embedded themselves within the new state apparatus, often providing the operational framework for formal institutions. Political and economic elites who successfully navigated the Soviet system through personal connections are unlikely to abandon strategic approaches that continue to yield results, simply be­cause a formal lobbying registry now exists in legislation.

Sociological institutionalism con­tributes the important concept of isomorphism or institutional conver­gence-the observable tendency for organizations and states to adopt si­milar formal structures to gain legi­timacy in their environment, rather than because those structures repre­sent functionally optimal solutions⁴. This logic of appropriateness helps explain why a state like Georgia might adopt a Western-style lobbying law that remains underutilized: the legislation serves important symbolic and legitimizing functions, both do­mestically and internationally, signa­ling commitment to democratic norms and European integration even if it does not substantially alter un­derlying behavioral patterns. The potential decoupling of formal struc­ture from actual practice is thus a predictable outcome when instituti­ons are adopted for legitimacy rather than functional efficiency.

Elite Theory: Power, Access, and the Characteristics of Limited Transparency

If neo-institutional theory expla­ins how formal rules can be bypas­sed, elite theory helps identify who might find advantages in such pat­terns and what their strategic incenti­ves are. Classical elite theorists, from Pareto to Mosca, argued that regar­dless of a political system’s formal design, power inevitably tends to concentrate within a small, organized minority⁵. Modern scholarship refi­nes this analytical view, examining how elites in democracies and transi­tional systems adapt their strategies to maintain influence within chan­ging institutional landscapes⁶.

In transitional settings like Geor­gia, established political and econo­mic elites-whether stemming from the Soviet nomenklatura, post-independence privatization processes, or newer oligarchic groups-often ma­intain influence through dense, inter­locking networks. When formal channels like a public lobbying regis­try are perceived as less effective, cumbersome, or-significantly-as im­posing unwanted transparency, these elites may rationally choose to rely on familiar, trusted mechanisms: per­sonal relationships, discreet consulta­tions, and less visible arrangements that have historically served them well. This dynamic can foster networks whose influence spans poli­tical, economic, and media spheres, potentially making formal democratic institutions less central to where sub­stantive decisions are actually made⁷.

From this analytical perspective, the underuse of a formal lobbying system is not necessarily a failure but can be a rational outcome for those already possessing privileged access. Formalization raises transaction costs, creates public records, and co­uld em­power additional groups by leveling the informational playing field. There­fore, limited engagement with a transparency mechanism can occur when influential actors see greater advantages in existing arran­gements, regardless of the technical merits of the formal system.

Lobbying and Interest Represen­tation in Comparative Perspective

The scholarly literature on interest group politics in transitional and post-authoritarian states provides essential context, suggesting that Georgia’s hypothesized experience reflects recognizable regional and theoretical patterns. Research across Central and Eastern Europe has con­sistently highlighted the prevalence of less transparent or shadow lob­bying in contexts characterized by developing state capacity, instituti­onal change, and varying levels of public trust⁸. This often involves a complex mix of legitimate advocacy, various forms of influence, and me­dia campaigns, creating situations where lines between different forms of influence become less distinct⁹.

Studies reveal observable patterns of captured liberalization or elite cap­ture, whereby democratic reforms and new institutions are influenced by incumbent powerful interests and transformed into tools for rent-seeking or legitimization, rather than genuine democratization¹⁰. The re­markable resilience of informal insti­tutions based on kinship, regional affiliation, and patron-client relati­onships is particularly pronounced in the Caucasus and Central Asia regi­ons. Ethnographic and political sci­ence work demonstrates that these informal systems often operate alongside or interact uneasily with formal democratic procedures, crea­ting distinct hybrid political orders¹¹.

This comparative body of scholar­ly work strongly suggests that chal­lenges in implementing a transparent lobbying system are not unique but are a specific manifestation of a broader, systemic post-Soviet chal­lenge: the difficulty of building im­personal, rule-based institutions in a social and political context long cha­racterized by personalism, informal reciprocity, and variable levels of trust in state institutions.

Analytical Methodology: A Desk-Based Synthesis

This research is grounded in a qu­alitative, desk-based methodology specifically designed to facilitate the­oretical exploration and comparative policy analysis without reliance on original empirical data collection. The methodological approach is structured around three interconnec­ted analytical components:

Theoretical Analysis and Literature Synthesis

The foundation of the study is a comprehensive review and applicati­on of relevant theoretical frame­works. This involves a systematic engagement with neo-institutional theory (encompassing historical, rati­onal choice, and sociological strands) and elite theory to construct a robust conceptual lens. Furthermore, a wide-ranging review of academic literature on lobbying, interest gro­ups, and civil society in transitional democracies-with a particular focus on post-Soviet and Eastern European contexts-serves to situate the Georgi­an case within broader scholarly de­bates. This synt­hesis identifies key concepts, theore­tical areas for further exploration, and analogous cases, informing the analysis of how formal and informal lobbying dynamics inte­ract.

Comparative Legal-Institutional Policy Analysis

A core component is the detailed, systematic examination and compari­son of legal and institutional frame­works specifically designed to regu­late lobbying activities. This analysis focuses on two primary models:

The Georgian Framework: A de­tailed analysis of the Law of Georgia on Lobbying Activities (1998) is conducted based on its legislative text and existing legal commentary. This examination focuses on its sta­ted objectives, key provisions (defini­tions, registration procedures, ethical standards, transparency measures, and designated venues for lobbying), and its embedded incentives and di­sincentives. Particular analytical at­tention is paid to identifying potential structural features, regulatory ele­ments, and the adequacy or ina­dequacy of envisioned enforcement mechanisms as presented in the law itself.

The European Union Model: As a benchmark representing an evolving, complex supranational system, the EU’s approach embodied in the EU Transparency Register and associated codes of conduct is examined. This analysis focuses on its governing principles, registration mechanics (including its conditionally mandato­ry nature), disclosure requirements, and enforcement protocols. The comparison with the Georgian fra­mework is not meant to suggest a direct template for adoption, but to highlight differing philosophical and practical approaches to managing transparency, access, and accountabi­lity in pluralistic systems.

Contextual and Systemic Analysis

Moving beyond the letter of the law, this analytical component invol­ves analyzing the broader political, historical, and social context in which lobbying regulations are meant to function. This includes considering:

Historical Legacies: The substan­tial impact of Soviet-era practices of informal networking and the absence of a tradition of independent, transpa­rent interest group pluralism.

Political Culture: Prevailing attitudes towards the state, public trust in insti­tutions, and norms governing relati­onships between business and poli­tics.

State Capacity and Institutional Stability: The ability of state institu­tions to consistently implement and enforce complex regulations over extended time periods.

Civil Society Landscape: The strength, independence, and resource base of non-governmental organiza­tions and business associations that would be potential natural users of a lobbying system.

This multi-pronged, desk-based met­hodology allows for a holistic and theoretically informed analysis of why formal lobbying institutions might face challenges in becoming operational, focusing on systemic and design factors rather than specific political events or individual actors.

Comparative Institutional Analysis: The Georgian Framework in Theoretical Perspective

This section provides a detailed analytical overview of the Georgian legal framework for lobbying and situates it within a comparative dis­cussion, drawing primarily on the EU model for instructive contrast. The purpose is not to conduct a forensic audit of implementation but to struc­turally analyze the design of the fra­mework itself and the systemic envi­ronment it exists within.

Georgia’s Legal Framework: An Early Innovation

Georgia’s Law on Lobbying Ac­tivities, adopted in 1998, was a pio­neering piece of legislation in the post-Soviet space. Its enactment so soon after independence signaled an ambitious intent to move away from less transparent Soviet governance traditions and to establish transpa­rent, rules-based interactions between society and the state. On paper, the law established a comprehensive sys­tem. It provided a broad definition of lobbying, established formal registra­tion procedures for advocates, set qualification criteria, and outlined ethical expectations. It required con­tracts for lobbying assignments, de­signated permissible venues for lob­bying activities (Parliament, go­vernment bodies, municipal coun­cils), and significantly, enshrined the principle of public access to lobbying reports¹².

A theoretical analysis of the law’s design, however, reveals potential considerations from a neo-insti­tutional perspective. Firstly, the law can be seen as a classic candidate for isomorphic mimicry-adopting the form of a modern transparency insti­tution to gain external legitimacy, potentially without the concomitant internal drivers or enforcement capa­city to make it operational¹³. Secon­dly, the literature on policy imple­mentation suggests that laws which impose costs (registration, disclosure) without providing clear, commensu­rate benefits to users are likely to experience lower levels of complian­ce. If the formal channel is not perce­ived as an effective pathway to influ­ence, or if informal channels remain more efficient, rational actors will utilize alternative systems.

Furthermore, the effectiveness of any transparency mechanism is hea­vily dependent on the enforcement capacity-the monitoring and enfor­cement capability of the state, and the existence of meaningful sanctions for non-compliance. A law that lacks robust, independent oversight and clear consequences for operating out­side its provisions may create a for­mal shell that is more easily bypas­sed. The resilience of informal networks, as highlighted by elite the­ory, means that without a concerted effort to shift the cost-benefit calcula­tion for actors with influence, the existing patterns of operating are likely to persist.

The European Union’s Evolving Ecosystem: Integration, Incentives, and Enforcement

The European Union’s approach to regulating interest representation offers a contrasting model that has evolved substantially through practi­ce and experience. The EU Transpa­rency Register, a joint initiative of the Parliament, Commission, and Coun­cil, represents a system built on inte­gra­tion, pragmatic incentives, and gra­duated enforcement mecha­nisms¹⁴.

A key distinguishing difference lies in the linkage between registrati­on and access. While formally volun­tary, registration in the EU system functions as a de facto requirement for meaningful engagement with in­stitutions. It is tied to practical bene­fits like obtaining access badges to parliamentary buildings or securing meetings with high-level officials. This creates a powerful functional incentive for compliance that goes beyond mere legal obligation. The system also demands detailed disclo­sure about an organization’s objecti­ves, funding, and legislative interests, fostering a culture of transparency and accountability.

Perhaps most importantly, the EU framework is supported by a detailed Code of Conduct and an enforcement mechanism. Violations can lead to the suspension of access privileges or removal from the register-conseq­uences that carry real profes­sional and reputational significance. This structure reflects an understan­ding that transparency systems requi­re not just rules, but also a credible threat of consequence for those who would undermine them.

Analysis of Divergent Approaches

The comparison reveals more than merely technical differences; it highlights divergent approaches to institutional design. The EU system attempts to create an ecosystem whe­re transparency and rule-following provide tangible benefits, facilitating access and lending credibility. It is integrated into the daily workings of the institutions. The Georgian law, as analyzed in theory and context, ap­pears more as a standalone construct-a formal structure that may not be well-integrated into the operational realities and incentive structures of the political system it seeks to regula­te.

From an institutionalist viewpoint, the EU model has undergone a pro­cess of gradual layering and adaptati­on based on accumulated experience. The Georgian law, introduced early in the state-building process, may not have had the time or the supportive ecosystem to undergo a similar pro­cess of organic development and in­tegration. The result, as suggested by scholarly commentary on such con­texts, can be an institution-present in legal code but less present in political practice, its potential underutilized because the informal rules of the ga­me remain more determinative.

Systemic Implications: When Formal Channels Are Underutilized

The hypothetical or observed sce­nario where formal lobbying chan­nels remain underutilized, while in­formal networks continue to thrive, has profound systemic implications for democratic governance. This sec­tion explores these implications the­oretically, drawing on the literature concerning institutional effective­ness, political equality, and democra­tic legitimacy.

The Challenge to Transparency and Accountability

The primary purpose of lobbying regulation is to provide visibility into the process of influence, allowing citizens to see who is seeking to sha­pe policy and on behalf of which in­terests. When this process operates primarily in the informal sphere, transparency is fundamentally affec­ted. Decisions may appear to emerge from technocratic or political delibe­ration, while their true origins in less visible consultations or private nego­tiations remain unclear. This limited visibility makes it exceptionally dif­ficult to hold power accountable. Conflicts of interest can be concea­led, and the public cannot fully assess the arguments of different interests because only the outcomes, not the deliberative process, are visible.

The Continuation of Elite Advantage and Differentiated Access

Informal networks are, by their very nature, selective and exclusive. Access is granted based on personal connections, kinship, shared experi­ence, or patronage-not necessarily on the merit of an argument or the repre­sentativeness of a constituency. This creates different tiers of political en­gagement. Well-established elites, business figures with close ties to power, and insiders with the appro­priate connections enjoy more direct pathways to influence. In contrast, newer societal actors, grassroots mo­vements, smaller businesses, and groups advocating for diffuse public interests (like consumers or environ­mental protection) may find themsel­ves with fewer opportunities and marginalized. They may lack the so­cial capital to access informal circles and the formal channel is perceived as less effective. This dynamic can perpetuate and can even exacerbate existing patterns of access, which may not align with the democratic principle of pluralism where diverse voices should have the opportunity to be heard¹⁵.

The Effect on Institutional Legitima­cy and Public Trust

When citizens perceive that for­mal, democratic institutions are not tal political proces­ses, seeing participation as less mea­ningful or even futile, or they may seek alternative, sometimes destabili­zing, avenues to express concerns or discontent. The health of a democra­cy relies fundamentally on belief in its procedures; when those procedu­res are seen as disconnected from the actual exercise of power, that belief can weaken substantially.he primary arenas where real decisi­ons are made, the legitimacy of those institutions can be significantly cor­roded. If laws exist but are bypassed by influential actors, it can breed widespread cynicism and a sense that the system does not function as de­signed. This decoupling can erode public trust, which is the bedrock of a stable democracy. Citizens may di­sengage from form

The Instability of Policy Outcomes

Policies secured through informal arrangements and personal patronage can be inherently less stable. They are tied to specific individuals, relati­onships, and political moments. When a patron loses power, when a coalition shifts, or when a personal relationship changes, the policy out­comes can be swiftly reversed. This contrasts sharply with change achie­ved through more formal, transparent processes, where public debate, re­corded arguments, and institutional buy-in can provide greater stability and continuity over time. An over-reliance on informalism thus contri­butes to policy volatility and short-termism, as arrangements are made for immediate advantage rather than long-term public benefit.

The Challenge to Democratic Consolidation

For a transitional democracy like Georgia, the persistence of a robust informal sphere that operates along­side, and sometimes instead of, formal institutions represent a signi­ficant consideration for consolidati­on. Democratic consolidation requi­res that the rules of the game become internalized by major politi­cal actors-that they habitually turn to demo­cratic procedures to resolve conflicts and advance interests. If influential actors consistently bypass these procedures because they find them less efficient or advantageous, the democratic system may remain less developed. It risks becoming a hybrid regime, maintaining the exter­nal forms of democracy while opera­ting on patterns of personalism and less visible power that are more cha­racteristic of different systems. This can affect the development of a genu­inely pluralistic and accountable poli­tical culture.

Conclusion and Pathways for Scholarly and Policy Reflection

This theoretical and comparative analysis has explored the complex interplay between formal lobbying institutions and informal political practices in transitional democracies, using Georgia’s early regulatory fra­mework as a focal point for discussi­on. The investigation underscores that the creation of formal legal struc­tures-while a necessary first step-is insufficient to guarantee transparent and equitable interest representation. The vitality of such institutions de­pends profoundly on the broader ecosystem in which they are embed­ded: the incentives for compliance, the capacity for enforcement, the re­silience of competing informal norms, and the genuine commitment of political and economic elites to a rules-based system.

The Georgian case, as analyzed through the lens of theory and com­parative practice, illustrates a broader challenge in post-Soviet and transiti­onal contexts: the difficulty of intro­ducing formal democratic institutions into a social and political context still deeply influenced by legacies of in­formality, personalism, and variable levels of trust¹⁶. Neo-institutional theory helps explain the persistence of these informal practices, while elite theory illuminates the rational incentives that actors may have to maintain less visible channels of in­fluence. The observed or potential differences between law and practice is thus not an anomaly but a predic­table outcome of specific historical, structural, and strategic conditions.

Implications for Democratic Theory and Practice

This analysis holds several impor­tant implications for both scholarly understanding and practical efforts at democratic development. Firstly, it reinforces that institutional design should be context-sensitive and tailo­red. Laws and regulations cannot be mere technical blueprints imported from other democracies; they should be crafted with deep understanding of the local political culture, power structures, and state capacity. Design should consider not only the rules themselves but also the incentive structures needed to encourage their use and the enforcement mechanisms required to deter bypassing.

Secondly, it highlights that buil­ding effective formal institutions is a long-term process of integration and acculturation, not a one-time legisla­tive event. It requires persistent, sus­tained effort to align the formal rules on paper with the rules in use. This may involve complementary reforms in areas like judicial independence, civil service professionalism, media freedom, and anti-corruption efforts-all of which contribute to an envi­ronment where transparency is valu­ed and limited transparency carries meaningful risks.

Thirdly, the analysis suggests that external actors supporting democratic development should look beyond the mere adoption of legislation as a measure of success. Support might be more effectively directed toward bu­ilding the infrastructure of transpa­rency-such as independent monito­ring bodies, investigative journalism, and a vibrant civil society capable of using disclosure tools-and toward fostering a cultural shift where open, rules-based engagement is seen as a source of legitimacy and effective­ness for both advocates and decision-makers.

Avenues for Future Research

This desk-based study opens se­veral productive avenues for future empirical and comparative research:

Comparative Studies: Systematic comparison of lobbying regulation outcomes across multiple post-Soviet states (e.g., Ukraine, Moldova, Ar­menia, Baltic states) could identify the specific factors-political competi­tion, civil society strength, EU inte­gration pressure-that correlate with more effective institutionalization of transparent lobbying.

Ethnographic and Network Analysis: Qualitative research into the actual practice of influence in Georgia and similar contexts, map­ping the informal networks and stra­tegies used by different types of ac­tors (business, NGOs, diaspora gro­ups), would provide a richer, ground-level understanding of how the for­mal-informal interplay works in daily practice.

Longitudinal Analysis: Tracking the evolution of interest representati­on over time in Georgia could reveal whether and under what conditions formal channels begin to gain utiliza­tion. Are there tipping points related to political alternation, generational change, or deepening integration with international systems?

Experimental and Survey Research: Investigating the attitudes and prefe­rences of potential users of a lob­bying system (business associations, NGOs, professional groups) through surveys or experimental designs co­uld reveal the specific conditions un­der which they would be willing to utilize formal channels, informing more effective policy design.

Concluding Reflections

The journey from informal, per­sonalized politics to formal, instituti­onalized pluralism is a central narra­tive of democratization. The regulati­on of lobbying sits at the very heart of this transition, as it directly go­verns how societal interests interact with state power. Georgia’s experi­ence, as examined here, offers a va­luable window into the dynamics inherent in this process. It demonstra­tes that the passage of a law is a de­claration of intent, but its realization depends on a confluence of factors: design craftsmanship, enforcement will, elite commitment, and cultural change.

Ultimately, the goal is not the elimi­nation of informal networks, which exist in all political systems, but the establishment of a dominant formal institutional framework that is perce­ived as the primary, legitimate, and effective arena for political contesta­tion and interest aggregation. Achie­ving this in transitional democracies remains a formidable but essential task for building governments that are truly transparent, accountable, and responsive to their citizens. The scholarly and policy challenge is to better understand the pathways that can lead from democratic form to democratic function.

Notes

• Guillermo O’Donnell, „Illusions about Consolidation”, Journal of Democracy, 7, no. 2 (1996), pp. 34-51.
• C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990.
• Streeck & K. Thelen (Eds.), Beyond Continuity: Institutional Change in Advanced Political Economies, Oxford University Press, 2005.
• J. DiMaggio & W. W. Powell, „The iron cage revisited: Institutional iso­morphism and collective rationality in organizational fields”, American Sociological Review, 48(2), 1983, pp. 147-160.
• John Higley and Michael G. Burton, Elite Foundations of Liberal Democracy (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006).
• Higley, & M. G. Burton, Elite Foundations of Liberal Democracy, Rowman & Littlefield, 2006.
• W. Mills, The Power Elite, Oxford University Press, 1956.
• Beyers, R. Eising & W. Maloney, „Researching interest group politics in Europe and elsewhere: Much we study, little we know?”, West European Politics, 31(6), 2008, pp. 1103-1128.
• Frank Goldberg, “Corruption and Lobbying: Conceptual Differentiation and Gray Areas”, Crime, Law and Social Change 70, no. 5 (2018), pp. 539-556.
• S. Hellman, „Winners take all: The politics of partial reform in postcommunist transitions”, World Politics, 50(2), 1998, pp. 203-234.
• V. Ledeneva, „Can Russia Modernise? Sistema, Power Networks and Informal Governance”, Cambridge University Press, 2013. G. Helmke & S. Levitsky, „Informal institutions and comparative politics: A research agenda”, Perspectives on Politics, 2(4), 2004, pp. 725-740.
• Law of Georgia on Political Lobbying, No. 1656-IIs, 1998.
• Andrews, The Limits of Institutional Reform in Development: Changing Rules for Realistic Solutions, Cambridge University Press, 2013.
• EU Transparency Register, “Transpa­rency Register”, https://transparency-register.europa.eu.
• Robert A. Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1989.
• Alena V. Ledeneva, Can Russia Modernise? Sistema, Power Networks and Informal Governance, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013.

Bibliography

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Law of Georgia on Political Lobbying, No. 1656-IIs, 1998.

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ANDREWS, M., The Limits of Institutional Reform in Development: Changing Rules for Realistic Solutions, Cambridge University Press, 2013.

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Articles and studies

BEYERS, J., Eising, R., & MALONEY, W., „Researching interest group politics in Europe and elsewhere: Much we study, little we know?”, West European Politics, 31(6), 2008, pp. 1103-1128.

DIMAGGIO, P. J., & POWELL, W. W., „The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields”, American Sociological Review, 48(2), 1983, pp. 147-160.

GOLDBERG, F., “Corruption and Lobbying: Conceptual Differentiation and Gray Areas,” Crime, Law and Social Change 70, no. 5 (2018), pp. 539-556.

HELLMAN, J. S., „Winners take all: The politics of partial reform in postcommunist transitions”, World Politics, 50(2), 1998, pp. 203-234.

HELMKE, G., & Levitsky, S., „Informal institutions and comparative politics: A research agenda”, Perspectives on Politics, 2(4), 2004, pp. 725-740.

O’DONNELL, G., “Illusions about Consolidation,” Journal of Democracy 7, no. 2 (1996), pp. 34-51.

Web page

EU Transparency Register, “Transparency Register,” https://transparency-regist-er.europa.eu.