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Slide background

Journal of The Faculty of
Political and Administrative Sciences

Coordonatori: Sabin Drăgulin, Sorin Bocancea și Angelo Chielli

Volum XIV, Nr. 2 (52), Serie nouă, martie-mai 2026

Descarca articol PDF

Romanian migration to Germany and Italy from COVID-19 to nowadays: A perspective on human rights and social innovation
 Chiara CAUSIO

 Abstract: The article examines Romanian migration to Germany and Italy in the COVID-19 to today context, highlighting the gap between formal EU citizenship rights and migrants lived experiences. Through comparative analysis, it explores how different national government frameworks influence the effectiveness of social innovation in promoting social inclusion. Based on a capacity-based approach, the study highlights how institutional capacity and policy coherence determine wheth­er social innovation can act as a transformative mechanism for the realisation of rights. While Germany demonstrates a coordinated and institutionalized approach, Italy highlights the limits of fragmented and bottom-up initiatives. The study sup­ports creating a rights based system of migration at the level of Europe; social in­novation should become integrated into rationalized and effective governance mechanisms to create substantive equality and inclusion among all participants within such systems.

 Keywords: Migration, Social innovation, Romania, EU, Human rights.
 
 
Introduction

Although the COVID-19 pandem­ic has caused structural weaknesses in migration governance systems across Europe, it has also made ap­parent the fault lines existing be­tween the formally enshrined guaran­tees of EU citizenship and the lived experiences of mobile individuals. Data provided by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and De­velopment (OECD) indicate that ap­proximately 169,000 permanent mi­grants were welcomed into Italy in 2024, with intra-EU mobility being a large proportion of this number; no­tably, many of those migrating to Italy are Romanians. The 2019 out­break of the pandemic did not merely result in a global health emergency, but also exacerbated inequality in em­ployment, welfare provision, health­care infrastructure and access to social participation. Due to job insecurity, marginalization at the sys­tem level and lack of institutional recognition, although they possess free movement rights as EU citizens, Romanian migrants, numbering over 5.7 million people globally and rep­resenting one of the largest diaspora communities internationally, have been disproportionately affected. Systematic comparative analysis of migration trajectories in two key EU destination countries, Germany and Italy, examines how divergence be­tween national institutional frame­works shapes the capacity for social innovation to translate formal citizen­ship rights into substantive social integration. Therefore, social innova­tion must be considered as mecha­nism developing new practices, poli­cy tools, collaborative frameworks addressing unmet needs and reducing structural barriers1. Of great im­portance, the conceptualization of migration beyond technocratic sys­tems as a dynamic process that re­configures the relationships between state institutions, civil society organi­zations and migrant communities themselves is essential. COVID-19 has caused an exacerbation of exist­ing disparities in working conditions, social assistance rights, access to healthcare and opportunities for so­cial participation creates a fundamen­tal empirical context to analyse whether and how social innovation can perform as a transformative mechanism for inclusion rather than a simple response to governance fail­ures.

The analytical framework used is based on capacity-based approaches, specifically the fundamental research of Amartya Sen, which shifts the fo­cus from narrow concerns about mi­gration management towards the broader improvement of migrants’ real freedoms, agency and substantial opportunities2. Instead of viewing social innovation as a way to attain hard-to-reach legal rights, this theo­retical model views social innovation as an end unto itself. To understand the effects of inclusive policies on marginalized groups, one must go beyond the management of programs and the effectiveness of program de­livery. One must evaluate inclusion policies based on their ability to re­duce structural vulnerabilities at the level of individual or group; promote legitimate social acknowledgment and acceptance and create opportuni­ties for all people to exercise univer­sal human dignity and freedom. Us­ing a multi-faceted approach to ana­lyse post-COVID governance regard­ing migrant mobility within the Eu­ropean Union, the study demonstrates that whether internal EU mobility will lead to „true” social citizenship will depend on the institutional ca­pacity; policy coherence/integration; and strategic use of social innovation.

Given the disparate nature of the governance structures used by Germany and Italy to manage inter­national migration and socially inte­grate migrants into these respective countries, the comparative methodo­logical approach used was also nec­essary. The two country-specific ap­proaches to managing international migration and integrating migrants into each society provide a natural experimental setting within which the role of institutional structures can be examined as they relate to social in­novation initiatives, and actual inclu­sion outcomes. Germany has an es­tablished system of social welfare institutions, coupled with a robust system of multi-level government coordination. Conversely, Italy lacks a comprehensive and cohesive na­tional integration system. As a con­sequence, many civil society organi­zations in Italy functionally serve as „gap-fillers” when there are no inte­grated systems of national integration available to address the needs of mi­grant populations3. The attention on Romanian migrants, as EU citizens with the right to free movement and equal treatment, sharpens the analyti­cal focus on the gap between de jure rights and de facto access, highlight­ing how national implementation of EU Framework can facilitate or hin­der the realisation of fundamental freedoms and social rights.

The German model

Germany’s approach to Romanian migration governance shows how social innovation can be strategically embedded within coordinated institu­tional frameworks to have substantial inclusion outcomes that go beyond formal citizenship status. The Ger­man model stands out for the system­atic integration of innovative practic­es into established governance struc­tures, creating synergies between federal agencies, municipal authori­ties, welfare organizations, trade un­ions and migrant associations. This multi-level coordination represents a deviation from ad hoc and reactive policy responses, highlighting social innovation as a central pillar of glob­al integration strategies. Post-COVID policy developments have particular­ly emphasized collaborative govern­ance mechanisms that bring together different stakeholders to address vul­nerabilities exposed by the pandemic, including employment instability, barriers to access to healthcare, and social isolation among EU mobile workers4.

Concrete manifestations of Germany’s institutionalised approach to social innovation include targeted skills recognition programmes de­signed to translate foreign qualifica­tions into nationally recognised cre­dentials, facilitating labour market integration and reducing de-skilling among Romanian migrants. Digital access to healthcare initiatives have been expanded to ensure mobile workers can navigate complex insur­ance systems and access preventive and acute medical services, filling critical gaps that became acutely vis­ible during pandemic-related health crises5.

Comprehensive counselling ser­vices, designed for mobile workers in the EU, provide guidance on how to navigate social security rights, under­stand labour rights and access family reunification pathways. These initia­tives are systematically integrated components of the broader architec­ture of German inclusion, supported by dedicated funding streams, cross-sectoral coordination mechanisms and accountability frameworks that ensure sustained implementation ra­ther than episodic intervention.

In Germany, A number of posi­tive outcomes also resulted from the multi-faceted approach used to in­clude Romanians in many areas of German society. Many migrants were able to migrate from informal or pre­carious employment status to formal employment status with associated protection and benefit provisions, via skill recognition programs. Coordi­nated efforts regarding job placement and processes for documenting pre­vious work experience have facilitat­ed the ability of migrants to increase their labor mobility while decreasing exploitation and increasing wages. In addition to enhancing access to So­cial Security, the information cam­paigns and streamlined processes for accessing the same have made it eas­ier for migrant workers to obtain their entitlements to Unemployment Bene­fits, Health Insurance, Pension Con­tributions, etc. This is perhaps the most important aspect of how the social innovations create stable and secure conditions for Romanian im­migrants to make long term plans for themselves and their families instead of being „temporary”6. The German method provides an important insight into both how social innovation func­tions as a bridge between formal le­gal rights and actual accessibility to substantive engagement. It recogniz­es that the implementation of rights is contingent upon institutional support for implementing rights, coordinating services, adapting to changing needs or obstacles, etc., rather than treating citizenship rights as autonomous as­surances regarding their own effec­tiveness. The German model strengthens policies designed for in­creasing inclusion by creating institu­tional memory and policy continuity through the integration of social in­novation into established governance structures; therefore, providing grow­able models based on different mu­nicipalities and sectors which are less fragile than bottom-up or project-based initiatives.

The German approach also demonstrates how social innovation can change power dynamics in mi­gration governance by legitimizing migrant associations and civil society organizations as actors in designing and implementing policies. The par­ticipatory dimension reinforces re­sponsiveness to real-world needs and experiences of migrants while strengthening organizational capacity within migrant communities. The pandemic period has highlighted both the resilience of this coordinated sys­tem and areas where further strength­ening is needed including digital ac­cess to healthcare settings, language access to healthcare settings, and pro­tection from job discrimination dur­ing the pandemic.

The Italian context

The Italian Migration Governance System is decentralized therefore most of the social innovation has been undertaken through civil society organizations and religious commu­nity solidary networks. As opposed to a formalized national integration process as there is in Germany and France, Italy has no national level coordination strategy or systemic method for integrating local govern­ment into its migration governance. The Italian Model of migrating demonstrates substantial organiza­tional challenges within its public administration. Regional variation in the implementation of immigration policy, low administrative capacity in the welfare state and large amounts of ambiguity within immigration pol­icy making at the national level all contribute to problems in developing nationally coordinated immigration policy to meet the needs of immi­grant population. Therefore, Romani­an migrant workers (as well as nu­merous mobile EU citizen and non-EU migrants) have had high levels of vulnerability during the COVID-19 pandemic. Vulnerability among mi­grant workers is due to their em­ployment status. Many Romanian migrant workers are employed in informal labor. This results in them being exposed to poor living condi­tions and limited access to healthcare services. Also, there are barriers such as bureaucracy when trying to use their entitled social assistance pro­grams to mitigate crisis.

Despite of the structural con­straints mentioned above, Italian bot­tom-up social innovation has shown an exceptional ability to be creative and adaptable to overcome some of those constraints. Some examples include non-profit organizations and faith-based organizations establishing mobile health clinics that provide primary care, preventative services, COVID-19 testing and vaccinations, maternal health services, and refer­rals to migrant agricultural workers working in remote areas of Italy that do not have access to adequate healthcare7. Informal labour media­tion services have emerged to con­nect Romanian workers and other migrant workers with employers, while providing basic information on labour rights, although these services often lack the regulatory authority to effectively combat exploitation or enforce labour standards. Communi­ty-based care networks and mutual aid systems have provided emergen­cy assistance, food security, housing support, and childcare during pan­demic lockdowns and economic dis­ruptions, drawing on the principles of solidarity and reciprocity rather than formal social assistance rights.

The initiative of Bottom-up has been an important component for protecting elementary rights and meeting basic subsistence needs in areas where there are institutional gaps, bureaucratic complexities and large-scale job informality. They show the rapid capability of civil so­ciety to respond to emerging needs and involve marginalized populations that other forms of institutions are unable to include. However, the lack of a coherent and stable national framework for inclusion constrains the potential for scalability, sustaina­bility, and system-wide effectivity of these innovations. Many Romanian immigrants in Italy have obtained employment, yet they continue to be unable to gain steady access to public welfare services that differ greatly from one area to another. Also, most Romanian immigrants are restricted to the informal economy, and since they do not enjoy protections for workers under labor law; wages may be stolen from them; their working conditions will likely be precarious; and their employers will probably not contribute to their unemployment insurance.

In Italy, opportunities for political and social participation for Romanian migrants are limited by structural barriers such as language access dif­ficulties, reduced information on civ­ic engagement pathways, and socio-economic marginalization that limits time and resources to engage the community. Electoral data reveal an important involvement of the diaspo­ra in Romanian national elections, with important electoral blocs in both Italy and Germany8, but this transna­tional political participation does not automatically turn into a significant voice within Italian local government structures. The limits of bottom-up social innovation, without institution­al support, are particularly evident in issues of financial sustainability and organizational capacity. Various civil society initiatives have sprung from precarious project-based funding, voluntary work and charitable giving, creating cycles of expansion and con­traction that harm the continuity of services and the erosion of organisa­tional skills. In addition, the weight of bearing the burden of providing essential services is placed upon civil society organizations that are lacking in the capacity to regulate; financially and politically to contest the structur­al inequality and ensure accountabil­ity from public institutions for failure to protect rights9.

The European Union has recently proposed policies designed to reduce disparities among member states by developing frameworks that include the renewed approach to returns within the context of the Pact on Mi­gration and Asylum. This renewed approach emphasizes compliance with human rights and proportionali­ty. Furthermore, multinational con­sultations have been undertaken to accelerate migration management amongst all member states whilst ensuring compliance with the Euro­pean Convention on Human Rights10, and multinational consultations aimed at accelerating coordinated migration management while respect­ing the European Convention on Human Rights11. The implementation of the new frameworks in each mem­ber state may be different with high probability that they focus on the is­sues of borders and returns of mobile European Union Citizens instead of their integration and inclusion. In this regard, the Italian case represents how small-scale social innovation has great potential but also demon­strates its limits. Basic social innova­tion can serve as a source of critical support and protection to individuals while the public sector does not offer sufficient services. However, if there is no basic structure (institutional), enough money or an understanding that migration is a common societal obligation rather than a merely tech­nical operation, then nothing will be changed.

Towards a rights-based European migration model

In Romania, Social Innovation will never create the necessary sus­tainable transformation of Migration Policy. However, if institutional ca­pacity exists to implement consistent policies at all levels of government and if there is a clear expectation that migration is a societal issue that re­quires shared responsibility among stakeholders, then Social Innovation can assist in creating rights for mi­grants and increasing their inclusion.

Without such institutional infra­structure supporting Social Innova­tion, Social Innovations will always result in hierarchical access to ser­vices and resources based on loca­tion/organization. When Social Inno­vations are implemented within gov­ernance systems that include multi-level collaboration, resource alloca­tion and citizen participation; Social Innovations become mechanisms for establishing migrant rights, reducing structural vulnerabilities and promot­ing meaningful social cohesion. Com­pa­ring Romania’s Migration Governance with other countries be­sides Germany and Italy could be useful12.

The German Method illustrated that an institutionally based social innovation model could help to close this gap by developing enabling con­ditions such as the acknowledgment of individual skills, specific support services, streamlined processes, and coordinated provision of services. Addi­tionally, through innovative practices of government, the German Model illustrates how a system of government may create enhanced social citizenship opportunities that extend beyond economic engage­ment. The Italian Case demonstrated the ability of non-profit organizations to engage in creative forms of social citizenship responses at time when there was crisis and inequality. How­ever, it also exemplifies the limita­tions imposed upon these types of „bottom-up” innovations by inade­quate institutional supports and struc­tural weaknesses to achieve adequate replacements for sustainable national policies, regulatory authorities, and political accountability about ad­dressing deep-seated inequalities and holding governments and other insti­tutions accountable for violations of rights and failures to deliver public services13.

From this theorical aspect, this analysis emphasizes the importance of thinking about social innovation as a way to enforce people’s rights and extend their capabilities as opposed to viewing social innovation solely as a technical solution to improve ser­vice delivery efficiency. Inspired by capacity-based approaches developed by Amartya Sen and deepened by critical scholars of social policy, the research shifts the analytical focus from migration management schemes to a comprehensive improvement of migrants’ real freedoms, agency, and substantial opportunities to pursue lives they have reason to value. Such an approach necessarily foregrounds human rights as core normative commitments rather than as optional policy additions, positioning non-discrimination, equal access, and par­ticipatory governance as essential rather than aspirational elements of migration policy frameworks.

At the European level, the post-pandemic has intensified debates on the integration of human rights prin­ciples into innovative and inclusive migration policies, reflected in frameworks such as the European Pillar of Social Rights and the Action Plan on Integration and Inclusion (2021-2027), which highlight the same access to essential services, fair working conditions and meaningful social participation for all residents, encompassing mobile EU citizens14. However, the implementation of these frameworks continues to show important variations between Mem­ber States, perpetuating diversity in migrants’ lived experiences in terms of citizenship and inclusion. There is a need to strengthen monitoring and enforcement mechanisms at EU lev­el, the development of binding mini­mum standards for social protection and labour rights applicable to all mobile workers, and the creation of financial instruments that incentivise Member States to invest in compre­hensive inclusion infrastructures ra­ther than minimum compliance.

In the future, Member States should institutionalise social innova­tion within multi-level coordinated governance frameworks, rather than relying on ad hoc civil society initia­tives. This institutionalisation re­quires dedicated funding flows, cross-sectoral coordination mecha­nisms, participatory policy design processes that meaningfully involve migrant communities, and accounta­bility systems that ensure continuity and quality of implementation. The German model shows a guideline regarding the organizational infra­structure and political commitment necessary for such institutionaliza­tion, although it must be adapted to different national contexts and politi­cal economies.

European and national frame­works need to overcome narrow la­bour market integration schemes and include comprehensive approaches to social inclusion that address health, education, housing, political partici­pation, cultural recognition and fami­ly life. The pandemic has starkly re­vealed how labour market-centred approaches, which treat migrants primarily as economic inputs, do not protect fundamental rights or ensure resilience during crises. A capacity-based model will be better suited to create policies that enhance freedom and substantive opportunity. The fo­cus should shift from current measures, toward multiple indicators that measure well-being, social par­ticipation and the actual enjoyment of rights. Informal labor practices and exploitation of workers need to take centre stage, especially in areas where migrant labor is predominant. The need for enhanced inspection capabilities clear avenues for report­ing violations without the risk of immigration ramifications, severe penalties against employers violating labor laws and an effort to proactive­ly educate all workers about their rights in accessible language and format, are all essential. Germany’s relatively successful integration of trade unions into migration govern­ance provides a model of collective organisation and representation, alt­hough adaptation is necessary in con­texts such as Italy, where labour market informality is more en­trenched and union density has de­clined. Tech­nological innovations such as mobile applications to report violations, access to multilingual le­gal information, and connection with support services could complement traditional regulatory approaches, although digital tools need to be de­signed to address, rather than re­pli­cate, existing inequalities in terms of access and digital literacy. Particular attention should be paid to domestic and care workers, whose private workplaces present unique applica­tion challenges15.

In addition, access to healthcare has to be ensured as an elementary right for all people instead of being made dependent on their employment status or bureaucratic regulation pro­cesses. As seen during pandemics, individuals excluded from the health system pose risks to overall public health. Such models include; regional health cards available to residents with varying immigration statuses (regardless of where they reside), mobile health unit services providing care to residents who are geograph­ically isolated, multilingual health information systems, and culturally sensitive delivery of healthcare. Ex­amples of these models need to be expanded upon within European con­texts. Documentation by the World Health Organization regarding the inequities in health experienced by populations due to the COVID-19 pan­demic provide significant exam­ples of why equitable access to health­care is beneficial to both indi­vidual rights, and overall population welfare16.

It is necessary to develop mean­ingful pathways of political and so­cial participation to allow migrants to exercise their voice and autonomy in shaping the policies that affect their lives. This includes extending the right to vote locally to long-term res­idents regardless of citizenship status, creating formal consultation mecha­nisms within policy development processes, supporting organisational capacity building among migrant associations, ensuring language ac­cess in civic institutions, and combat­ing discrimination in civic and politi­cal life. The significant electoral par­ticipation of the communities of the Romanian diaspora in the national elec­tions demonstrate a political com­mitment that should be chan­nelled into local government struc­tures in the destination countries17. Participatory budgeting processes, advisory coun­cils on migrants, and designated repre­sen­tation in munici­pal planning could transform mi­grants from political objects to active actors shaping institutional responses to migration.

Beginning with the current situa­tion, many recent innovations are still being utilized solely by their originat­ing regions. Therefore, these present numerous missed opportunities to increase the number of people im­pacted by such innovation. Establish­ing platforms across Europe for shar­ing successful approaches to migra­tion, comparative analysis of perfor­mance (and thus effectiveness) of each approach, and peer-to-peer net­working would undoubtedly facilitate the quicker diffusion of effective models as well as reduce the likeli­hood of policymakers adopting inap­propriate policies due to a lack of consideration of the unique character­istics/conditions associated with dif­ferent geographic locations18.

It is crucial to formulate short-term migration inclusion policies to ensure the rights and dignities of to­day’s migrant population but there is also a need for longer-term strategic frameworks to account for why so many countries, as Romania, contin­ue to systematically emigrate at such a high rate. In this respect, the European Union must invest jointly in economic growth, reform and/ or create new education systems, en­hance the capacities of all regional institutions impacted historically by migration, and implement migration policies that avoid exacerbating exist­ing regional inequities by preventing additional “brain drain”.

Migration, development and so­cial integration must evolve from being individual country obligations (i.e., obligations/bilateral relation­ships between countries of origin and destination), to becoming a collective responsibility for the EU. As post-pandemic regulatory measures illus­trate with regard to both German and Italian policy-making toward Roma­nian migrants, while it is true that migration policy can no longer solely focus on technical adjustments to the labor market or solely on economic recovery; that regulatory, structural reforms based on human rights prin­ciples and social innovation as a fa­cilitator; and inclusive public policies that acknowledge that migration is fundamentally connected to people’s aspirations, dignity, and lives; rather than merely an issue of an economic flow or an administrative problem19. The EU will require an innovative migration model which meets the requirements of a very interconnect­ed yet fundamentally inequitable post-COVID Europe. To achieve this, it will be necessary for the EU to implement policies with peoples’ best interests at hand versus national self-interests. The need to invest in physi­cally, economically, and socially in­clusive community-based infrastruc­ture and services also remains. It will also be important to provide opportu­nities for migrants to influence deci­sion-making processes on policy af­fecting them. And finally, creating a common sense of identity (solidarity) among citizens will promote social cohesion, rather than divide citizens into separate groups based on their level of citizenship.

This reality demonstrates the ne­cessity for the establishment of pub­licly funded entities, using social in­novation methods to address the gap that exists between what has formally been provided to individuals through their designation as an EU citizen and how they live their daily life. Many Romanians are formally designated as EU citizens and therefore have full access to all rights available due to that designation. However, the same elected officials who designated them as such continue to marginalize them.


Notes

  • European Commission (2021), Action Plan for Integration and Inclusion 2021-2027, Bruxelles.
  • Sen, A. (1999), Development as Freedom, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 3-4, pp. 285-288.
  • European Union Agency for Funda­mental Rights, FRA 2024, Reports on Migration and Fundamental Rights, Vienna, FRA.
  • European Commission 2021, Action Plan for Integration and Inclusion 2021-2027, Bruxelles, European Commission, OECD, International Migration Outlook 2025 – Country Note (Italy), 2025
  • World Health Organization – WHO Europe, Health and Migration in Europe, Copenhagen, WHO Regional Office for Europe, 2024.
  • International Labour Organization – ILO (2023), Migrant Workers and COVID-19, Ginevra, ILO; Commission (2021), Action Plan for Integration and Inclusion 2021–2027, Bruxelles, European Commission.
  • World Health Organization – WHO Europe, 2024, Health and Migration in Europe, Copenhagen, WHO Regional Office for Europe.
  • Osservatorio Balcani Caucaso Transeuropa, 2025, “Il voto della diaspora: speranze e timori dei giovani romeni in Italia”.
  • European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights – FRA (2024), Reports on Migration and Fundamental Rights, Vienna, FRA.
  • European Commission (2025), “EU proposes a new approach to returns”.
  • ANSAmed (2025), “Sei paesi UE chiedono misure contro l’immigra­zione irregolare”.
  • European Commission (2021), Action Plan for Integration and Inclusion 2021-2027, Bruxelles
  • European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights – FRA (2024), Reports on Migration and Fundamental Rights, Vienna, FRA.
  • European Commission, 2021, Action Plan for Integration and Inclusion 2021-2027, Bruxelles, European Commission.
  • Anderson, B. (2007), “A very private business: exploring the demand for mi­grant domestic workers”, in European Journal of Women’s Studies, vol. 14, n. 3, pp. 257-264.
  • World Health Organization – WHO Europe (2024), Health and Migration in Europe, Copenhagen, WHO Regional Office for Europe.
  • Osservatorio Balcani Caucaso Transeuropa (2025), “Il voto della diaspora: speranze e timori dei giovani romeni in Italia”.
  • OECD (2025), International Migration Outlook 2025.
  • European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights – FRA (2024), Reports on Migration and Fundamental Rights, Vienna, FRA, “EU proposes a new approach to returns”.

 

Bibliography

 

Books

LUTZ, H., The New Maids: Transnational Women and the Care Economy, 2011, Londra, Zed Books.

SEN, A., Development as Freedom, 1999, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

 

 

Articles and studies

ANDERSON, B., “A very private business: exploring the demand for migrant domestic workers”, in European Journal of Women’s Studies,2007, vol. 14, n. 3, pp. 247-264.

Online resources

ANSA (2025), 13 Paesi UE riuniti sui migranti: accelerare sui rimpatri. https://www.ansa.it/nuova_europa/it/notizie/nazioni/germania/2025/10/23/riunione-13-paesi-ue-sui-migranti-accelera-re-su-rimpatri_b3ab628f-b34b-4094-9-13a-c82326a679aa.html

ANSA (2025), 169.000 migranti permanenti in Italia nel 2024. https://www.ansa.it/ sito/notizie/cronaca/2025/11/03/in-ital ia-169.000-migranti-permanenti-nel-2024_8303347f-4541-4cf3-bf49-8a80 7d793679.html

ANSAmed (2025), Sei paesi UE chiedono misure contro l’immigrazione irregolare. https://www.ansa.it/ansamed/it/notizie/rubriche/nazioni/2025/07/21/sei-paesi-ue-chiedono-misure-contro-limmigra-zione-irregolare_414a79cb-27ab-47b0-925d-5214e938ab13.html

Dossier Statistico Immigrazione (2025), Movimenti migratori con l’estero dei cittadini stranieri e di origine straniera. https://www.dossierimmigrazione.it/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/20.-Movime-nti-migratori-con-lestero-dei-cittadini-stranieri-e-di-origine-straniera.pdf.

Euronews (2025), “Come l’immigrazione incide sul calo demografico dei paesi europei”. https://it.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/02/27/unione-europea-co-me-incide-l-immigrazione-sul-calo-de-mografico-dei-paesi-europei

Euronews (2025), “Demografia: come la migrazione cambia la popolazione dell’UE”. https://it.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/02/19/demografia-come-la-migrazione-cambia-la-popolazione-dellue

European Commission (2021), Action Plan for Integration and Inclusion 2021-2027. https://commission.europa.eu

European Commission (2025), “EU pro-poses a new approach to returns”. https://commission.europa.eu/news/migration-commission-proposes-new-euro-pean-approach-returns-2025-03-11_it

European Commission (2025), European Pillar of Social Rights. https://commission.europa.eu/social-pillar

European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights – FRA (2024), Reports on Migration and Fundamental Rights. https://fra.europa.eu

International Labour Organization – ILO (2023), Migrant Workers and COVID-19. https://www.ilo.org

OECD (2025), International Migration Outlook 2025 – Country Note (Italy). https://italiarapparigi.esteri.it/wp-con-tent/uploads/2025/11/IMO2025_Country-note-Italy.pdf (consultato nel 2025).

OECD (2025), Reports on Social Innovation and Migration Policies,

https://www.oecd.org

Osservatorio Balcani Caucaso Transeuropa (2025), “Il voto della diaspora: speranze e timori dei giovani romeni in Italia”. https://www.balcanicaucaso.org/aree/Romania/Il-voto-della-diaspora-speranze-e-timori-dei-giovani-romeni-in-Italia-237835

Radio Romania International (2025), “Diaspora: una radiografia della migra­zione romena”. https://www.rri.ro/it/ guida-programmi/il-futuro-inizia-og-gi/diaspora-una-radiografia-della-mig-razione-romena-id953561.html

World Health Organization – WHO Europe (2024), Health and Migration in Europe. https://www.who.int/europe

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