The Emergence, Development, and Subsequent Fate of the Nabucco Project

Namig KARIMOV

Abstract: Economic development in Europe has inherently led to a growing demand for energy. In the early 2000s, alternative energy sources (such as wind, solar, and others) had not yet gained sufficient relevance, and as a result, the demand for natu­ral gas remained significantly high. Russia held a monopolistic position in supplying natural gas to meet the energy needs of the European Union (EU), maintaining a substantial share in the EU’s gas imports. In response to Russia’s use of energy as a political pressure tool, the EU began supporting various projects aimed at diversify­ing energy sources and transportation routes. One such project was the Nabucco pipeline. This article explores Azerbaijan’s position and policy toward the Nabucco project, in which the country was viewed as one of the principal suppliers. The study also examines the underlying necessity for the project’s initiation, its supply sources, the challenges it faced, and the attitudes of leading states toward its implementation. Azerbaijan has a strategic interest in diversifying its oil and gas export routes. The EU, on the other hand, views the transportation of natural gas from the Middle East and Caspian Basin-bypassing Russia-as a critical component of its energy security strategy. The examination of such projects, especially against the backdrop of Azer­baijan’s increasingly active role in Europe’s energy security, and the historical-political analysis of the reasons behind the failure of some of these initiatives, en­hances the relevance and significance of this research.

The study is based primarily on historical-analytical and comparative methods. A wide range of sources were used in the research, including academic articles, monographs, and official documents in various languages.

Keywords: Azerbaijan, Nabucco Project, gas reserves, gas pipeline, energy demand, supply.

Introduction

As the number of member states within the European Union (EU) in­creased, the Union’s dependence on external energy sources also grew sig­nificantly. This development, particu­larly in the pre-Ukraine war period, rendered the EU more vulnerable to energy monopolization by Russia, which held a dominant position in the supply of oil and natural gas. Among the newly admitted Eastern European member states, dependency on Rus­sian energy was particularly acute, not only in terms of oil and gas supplies but also with respect to political pres­sure exerted by official Moscow.

In the 1990s, the EU launched the TACIS (Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States) program, aimed at supporting the development of the South Caucasus and other former Soviet republics. Subsequently, the EU intro­duced the TRACECA (Transport Cor­ridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia) and INOGATE (Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe) programs, de­signed to facilitate the development of energy transportation routes from the South Caucasus, coordinate invest­ment projects related to pipeline infra­structure, and address other relevant objectives.

In this context, the EU supported three main routes for the transporta­tion of hydrocarbon resources from the South Caucasus-primarily from Azerbaijan: the Baku–Supsa pipeline, the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline, and the South Caucasus Pipeline. However, the EU’s support during this period remained largely technical in nature. In the 1990s, the EU’s policy toward the South Caucasus had not yet fully crystallized, and the region was still predominantly regarded as part of Russia’s “near abroad.” Any significant expansion of EU influence in the region would have risked direct confrontation with Moscow-an unde­sirable scenario for the EU, especially given its reliance on Russian energy resources.

By the early 2000s, however, the situation began to change. First, the EU’s consumption of oil and gas con­tinued to rise, and its dependency on Russian energy supplies increased accordingly. At the same time, Rus­sia’s strategic use of energy as a geo­political tool underscored the urgent need to diversify energy sources. The desire to reduce dependence on Rus­sia’s monopolistic energy position prompted the EU to adopt the “Ener­gy Security and Solidarity Action Plan” in 2007.

This Action Plan outlined key pri­orities, including the liberalization of the internal energy market, diversifi­cation of supply sources, and the pro­motion of a competitive energy policy aimed at improving overall efficiency. Among its objectives, the plan also envisaged the implementation of es­sential measures to promote the Southern Gas Corridor. This strategic corridor encompassed several key pipeline projects, including the Inter­connector Turkey–Greece–Italy (ITGI), the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), and the Nabucco Gas Pipeline Project.

The Emergence of the Nabucco Project: It was within such a geopo­litical and energy-dependent context that the European Union (EU) began to seek alternative energy sources and reliable oil and gas pipeline routes that would bypass Russia and ensure the uninterrupted and secure delivery of liquid and natural gas to Europe.

From both geo-economic and geo­political perspectives, the EU had a particular interest in the transportation of oil and gas resources from the Caspian Sea region and Central Asia to the European continent via routes that circumvented Russian territory. Within the framework of the “Shah Deniz II” project, several pipeline proposals were put forward to facili­tate the export of natural gas to Europe, including the “Nabucco” (of­ten referred to as “Nabucco West” or “Greater Nabucco”), the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), the Intercon­nector Turkey–Greece–Italy (ITGI), and the South East Europe Pipeline (SEEP). Among these, the “Greater Nabucco” project received the strong­est backing from both the United States and the European Union.

It is worth noting that the origins of the Nabucco project date back to 2002. However, negotiations regard­ing the creation of the project had al­ready been underway prior to this date, and preliminary agreements had even been reached. As early as 2001, discussions had begun on the necessi­ty of securing alternative pipeline routes and energy sources to meet Europe’s growing demand for natural gas. In February 2002, the Nabucco project was formally proposed¹.

The name of the project was de­rived from the opera Nabucco (short for Nabucodonosor), composed by the renowned Italian composer Giuseppe Verdi, with a libretto by Temistocle Solera. The naming of the project is symbolically linked to the opera’s narrative: in the second part of the final act, the Babylonian king Nabucco allows the marriage of Fenena-a young girl from the north who over­comes various obstacles for the sake of love-and Ismaele, a distin­guished ambassador of the Kingdom of Judah in Babylon, representing the south². The project’s name was thus inter­preted as a metaphor for over­coming barriers and fostering the un­ion of East and West through cultural con­ver­gence and cooperation. In this symbolic framework, the Nabucco project was conceived not only as an energy corridor but also as a bridge of partnership between the Eastern world and Europe.

The decision to name the project “Nabucco” is particularly intriguing from a historical and symbolic stand­point, as it reflects an effort to create a meaningful connection between past and present. The attempt to link the territories once ruled by the Babyloni­an king Nebuchadnezzar with modern Europe through a transcontinental gas pipeline can be interpreted as a con­scious effort to invoke a sense of his­torical continuity and identity. In this context, the project envisioned the transportation of natural gas extracted from the northeastern Caspian region and the Middle East to European mar­kets via Turkey.

In 2002, discussions were held be­tween Austria’s energy company OMV and Turkey’s BOTAŞ regard­ing the construction of a pipeline that would carry natural gas from the Cas­pian region through Turkey, Romania, and Hungary to Austria, and from there to Western European countries. On October 10 of the same year, dur­ing negotiations in Vienna concerning the technical and economic feasibility of the project, representatives of “BulgarGaz” (Bulgaria), “BOTAŞ” (Turkey), “Transgaz” (Romania), “OMV” (Austria), and “MOL” (Hungary) reportedly attended a per­formance of Giuseppe Verdi’s Nabucco opera and collectively agreed to name the pipeline project after the work³.

On that very day (October 10, 2002), the aforementioned companies signed an agreement to initiate a joint technical and economic feasibility study for the project. According to 2005 estimates, the planned 3 300-kilometer pipeline would require a financial investment of approximately €4.6 billion. The pipeline was ex­pected to transport around 31 billion cubic meters of natural gas annually⁴. Due to rising costs in subsequent years, the project’s total estimated cost increased to €8 billion⁵. The European Investment Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the Nabucco International Com­pany expressed their willingness to fi­nance the project through credit lines.

For the first time within the framework of this initiative, the na­tional gas networks of Turkey, the European Union, and Southeast European countries were to be inter­connected. The pipeline was designed to pass through the territories of Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary, ulti­mately reaching the Central European Gas Hub near Vienna, Austria⁶. Importantly, the pipeline was intended to include off-take points in each transit country, allowing gas access at various stages along the route.

One of the most significant indica­tors of the EU’s commitment to the Nabucco project was its inclusion in the Trans-European Networks for Energy (TEN-E) program in 2003, where it was classified as a priority project⁷. Following the 2006 gas crisis between Russia and Ukraine, the Nabucco pipeline was identified as a critical component of the EU’s “Energy Policy for Europe” framework intro­duced in 2007 and regarded as one of the Union’s most strategically impor­tant gas corridors⁸.

In 2004, the Nabucco Gas Pipeline Company was established to manage the construction, operation, and ad­ministration of the proposed pipeline. The consortium initially comprised six companies:

• RWE (Germany)
• BulgarGaz (Bulgaria)
• BOTAŞ (Turkey)
• Transgaz (Romania)
• OMV (Austria)
• MOL (Hungary)⁹.

Regarding project financing, it was agreed that 30% of the total construc­tion cost would be provided by the six participating companies, with the re­maining 70% to be funded through external loans. Subsequently, on June 24, 2004, the project participants signed a “Partnership Agreement” establishing the legal entity Nabucco Company Study Pipeline GmbH. This marked an important step in expand­ing the project’s technical and finan­cial capacities.

On June 28, 2005, with the aim of securing financial resources and at­tracting investments, Nabucco Com­pany Study Pipeline GmbH was trans­formed into the Nabucco Gas Pipeline International Company. For the prep­aration of engineering and technical documentation, an agreement was concluded with the London-based consultancy firm Penspen¹⁰.

In total, European financial institu­tions expressed their willingness to invest €4 billion in the Nabucco pipe­line project. Of this amount, €2 bil­lion—half of the total-was expected to be provided directly by the European Investment Bank. An additional €1.2 billion was to be allocated by the Eu­ropean Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), while the re­maining €800 million was to be cov­ered by the International Finance Cor­poration (IFC). The outstanding por­tion of the project’s financing was to be secured by the consortium mem­bers and private investors¹¹.

Конец формы

The Nabucco Gas Pipeline Project

The signing of the Intergovern­mental Agreement on the Nabucco project on July 13, 2009, in Ankara by Turkey, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Austria was not only considered a major milestone in the realization of the project but also played a crucial role in establishing its legal founda­tion¹². The agreement was subse­quently ratified by the parliaments of the signatory states by March 2010. This document holds particular signif­icance as it represents the first energy agreement concluded between Turkey and European Union member states¹³.

Despite the steps taken toward the realization of the Nabucco project—such as the signing of a memorandum of understanding among the partici­pating states and the selection of the UK-based engineering firm Penspen to conduct the technical and economic feasibility studies-the project encoun­tered several substantial challenges during its implementation phase.

Another key development oc­curred in June 2011 in the city of Kayseri, Turkey, where a Project Support Agreement (PSA) was signed. In addition to representatives of the Nabucco Gas Pipeline Interna­tional GmbH consortium, the event was attended by Günther Oettinger, the European Commissioner for Energy, Richard Morningstar, the U.S. Special Envoy for Eurasian Energy, as well as officials from the European Investment Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development¹⁴. The PSA ad­dressed several critical aspects of the project, including the establishment of a favorable transit regime and legal protections against potential discrimi­natory changes in national legislation that could affect the pipeline’s opera­tion.

The PSA was also instrumental in attracting international financial insti­tutions to support the project, as such agreements are typically regarded as vital for ensuring stable transit tariffs and shielding the project from future regulatory or legal uncertainties. For this reason, investors placed particular emphasis on the existence of such a framework.

Construction of the Nabucco pipe­line was initially scheduled to begin in 2013, with the delivery of natural gas from the Caspian and the Near and Middle East to the Central European Gas Hub in Austria projected for 2017¹⁵.

http://www/botaş. gov. tr/index.asp

Supply Sources: During the project preparation phase, supplier countries were envisaged to be states from the Middle East and the Caspian basin. Among the countries expected to sup­ply natural gas to the Nabucco pipe­line, Iraq held significant importance. The Prime Minister of Iraq, Nouri al-Maliki, declared their readiness to supply the mentioned pipeline with 15 billion cubic meters of natural gas annually¹⁶. Under such circumstances, approximately 50% of the planned annual transmission capacity of 31 billion cubic meters of the Nabucco pipeline was allocated to Iraq.

Iraq possesses natural gas reserves estimated at 3.2 trillion cubic meters, ranking it as the tenth-largest holder of blue fuel reserves worldwide. Despite its abundant reserves, only about 0.04% of the existing capacity is cur­rently extracted annually due to the underdeveloped infrastructure. Present gas production primarily comes from fields located in the southeastern part of the country, including Nahr bin Umar, Majnun, Nasiriyah, Rumaila, West Qurna, and Zubair, where gas is extracted alongside oil. Additionally, there are relatively smaller gas fields in Kirkuk, such as Bai Hassan, Ajil, Jambur, Chemchemal, Kormor, and Al Mansouriyah. The principal chal­lenges in production and export of existing gas reserves are the weak infra­structure, lack of storage facili­ties, and, naturally, political instabil­ity.

Before the First Gulf War, official Baghdad utilized a 169-kilometer pipeline leading to Kuwait’s Ahmadi Gas Production Station with a daily transmission capacity of 11.33 million cubic meters for gas exports; however, this capacity was insufficient to meet demand. The Iraqi central government regards Europe as the optimal market for its natural gas reserves. To access the European market, two major pro­jects were proposed. The first involves exporting Iraqi natural gas via the Ar­ab Gas Pipeline through Syria and Lebanon to Europe. The second pro­ject envisages bypassing Syria and Lebanon, delivering gas directly to Turkey, where it would connect to the Nabucco project. Informally, it was planned to transport natural gas via pipeline from the aforementioned area to the village of Bismil near Diyarbakir, and from there integrate it into Nabucco¹⁷.

Egypt, officially the Arab Republic of Egypt, could also partially serve as a supplier, facilitated by the newly completed Trans-Arabian pipeline. This Trans-Arabian pipeline system links the energy networks of Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Turkey¹⁸. Since the Nabucco project overall aimed to transport natural gas from the Caspian basin and the Middle East to Europe­an markets, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan were also considered as supplier states; however, the practical reality painted a different picture.

Azerbaijan emerged as the main sup­plier country for Nabucco. The con­firmed blue fuel reserves of Azerbaijan amount to approximately 2.6 trillion cubic meters, with the pri­mary resources concentrated in the Shah Deniz (currently operational), Absheron, and Umid fields. Addition­ally, natural gas is also extracted alongside crude oil from fields known primarily for oil production, such as Azeri, Chirag, and Gunashli. Azerbai­jan’s estimated natural gas reserves are valued at about 6 trillion cubic meters. The largest gas field, Shah Deniz, is located approximately 70 kilometers south-southeast of Baku. The first phase of its development was com­pleted by 2006. In this phase, in 2001, Azerbaijan signed an agreement for the transportation of its gas to Turkey via the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum pipe­line¹⁹.

Turkmenistan, possessing vast gas fields, was also considered one of the supplier states. With 144 identified oil and gas fields within its territory, Turkmenistan’s proven natural gas reserves reportedly exceed 25 trillion cubic meters. Turkmenistan produces over 75 billion cubic meters of gas annually, of which 60 billion cubic meters are exported. The country aims to increase gas production to 230 bil­lion cubic meters by 2030. At first glance, Turkmenistan appeared to be a prime candidate as a main supplier; however, several obstacles existed that will be analyzed below.

Among the Caspian littoral states, Kazakhstan, holding the largest share, has confirmed natural gas re­serves estimated at approximately 3 trillion cubic meters. The most prom­ising field in terms of reserves, Kara­chaganak, is located in northwestern Kazakhstan near the Russian border. Experts estimate its reserves at around 1.3 trillion cubic meters.

After sanctions are lifted in the fu­ture, Iran is also expected to play a significant role among the supplier countries. Iran possesses 34 trillion cubic meters of gas reserves, enabling it to share first and second place glob­ally with Russia. Approximately 18.2% of the world’s natural gas re­serves are attributed to Iran. Its pro­ductive gas fields are concentrated in the Persian Gulf and southern border regions, while gas reserves in the Caspian Sea region are relatively lim­ited. The Sardar-Jangal field, discov­ered in the Caspian in 2012, is consid­ered comparatively promising²⁰.

Challenges in the realization of the Nabucco project

Foremost among these was the prevailing political instability in the Middle Eastern countries designated as suppliers for the planned pipeline, specifically the lack of definitive as­sessments regarding the annual vol­ume of natural gas these countries could reliably supply. Additional ob­stacles included financing difficulties and Russia’s perception of the project as a competitor, all of which constitut­ed significant challenges as outlined above.

Although Iraq’s Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki expressed readiness to supply half of the required natural gas, the reality was different. At that time, U.S. forces maintained a presence in Iraq. Despite statements by President Barack Obama regarding the with­drawal of U.S. military contingents from Iraqi territory, this had not yet materialized, and instability continued in Iraq.

Another critical issue concerns the administration of gas fields such as Chemchemal and Kormor, which are located in the region governed by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) of northern Iraq. From an in­ternational legal perspective, these territories belong to the Iraqi state. Given Turkey’s stringent operations against Kurdish terrorist groups in all domains, any form of agreement or cooperation with this administration would create serious complications. However, it is notable that Austria’s OMV, a member of the Nabucco con­sortium, acquired a 20% stake in Pearl Petroleum, a company operating in the region. Furthermore, OMV and Dana Gas, a company based in the UAE, signed agreements for natural gas production in KRG-controlled areas, formalizing the arrangements by contract. Similarly, Germany’s RWE, another Nabucco partner, es­tablished a joint venture with the KRG and signed a contract for the purchase of 20 billion cubic meters of gas. These agreements were declared ille­gal by the official Baghdad govern­ment and deemed contrary to interna­tional law²¹. The unresolved political and economic disputes between Baghdad and the KRG, including the status of Kirkuk and revenue-sharing disagreements, prevented Iraq from acting as a primary supplier country.

The Trans-Caspian pipeline pro­ject, aimed at transporting gas from Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan—both identified as supplier countries—was initially intended for realization in the early 1990s. However, the project gradually acquired a predominantly political rather than economic charac­ter. Under Western sanctions and un­willing to cede its dominant position in European gas markets, Russia em­phasized that the Caspian Sea’s final legal status remained undetermined and raised ecological concerns. Moscow argued that any pipeline con­struction along the Caspian seabed required the unanimous consent of all five littoral states.

The signing of an agreement for Russia to purchase 500 million cubic meters of gas annually from Azerbaijan further strengthened Moscow’s posi­tion. Despite signifi­cant supply chal­lenges faced by Nabucco, Russia’s symbolic acquisition of this volume from Azerbaijan increased the psy­chological pressure on the project.

One of the most critical issues fac­ing the Nabucco pipeline project was the absence of any signed agreements with supplier countries to provide nat­ural gas. Approaching the problem logically, a supplier state had to be identified first, followed by solutions to transportation challenges. However, the failure to secure a supplier country emerged as the primary and most sig­nificant obstacle to the project.

Another notable challenge was se­curing a foothold in the European gas market. At the time the project was under discussion, the global economy was experiencing a financial crisis, with Europe particularly affected. The economic downturn led to a noticea­ble decline in gas consumption, which consequently reduced interest in the project to some extent. Furthermore, the transit countries along the pipeline route had not reached full consensus on transit tariffs.

Among the factors negatively im­pacting the project’s realization, the rising costs and significant financial difficulties should be emphasized. Independent experts estimated that the total completion costs could escalate to as much as 15 billion US dollars. Attempts to resolve the funding prob­lem by attracting private investors were also hindered by obstacles, such as the absence of a clear and compre­hensive legal framework to guarantee investment protections.

Another adverse trend was related to changes in the European gas market dynamics. Previously underestimated, shale gas rapidly began to penetrate European markets and was considered commercially attractive. This devel­opment undoubtedly diminished pri­vate investors’ interest in the Nabucco project²².

Due to the aforementioned chal­lenges, doubts about the realization of the Nabucco project increased daily. In this context, positive progress in negotiations between Azerbaijan and Turkey regarding the transportation of gas produced under the Shah Deniz-2 field in the Azerbaijani sector of the Caspian Sea via the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP) prompted the Nabucco consortium to propose a new initiative. Recognizing that the original “Greater Nabucco” was not feasible in reality, they in­stead proposed.

“Nabucco West” project

The Azerbaijani government no longer wished to act as the sole energy supplier. The oil and gas projects it had implemented had granted official Baku significant advantages both in terms of experience and financial ca­pacity. Moreover, the Azerbaijani government was determined not only to retain ownership of its natural gas resources but also to control their transportation as a principal stake­holder—a position that was non-ne­gotiable during the talks. Conse­quently, Azerbaijan, with a firm stance, did not want to be excluded from this major project and proposed that the gas extracted in the Shah Den­iz-2 phase be transported to Europe via Turkey through the construction of an approximately 1,300-kilometer pipeline associated with the “Nabucco West” project.

Briefly, the “Nabucco West” pipe­line project, approximately 1,300 kil­ometers in length, was planned to start at the Turkey-Bulgaria border and traverse Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary before reaching Austria. The pipeline was intended to be construct­ed in two phases: the first phase with a transmission capacity of 10 billion cubic meters (bcm) per year, and the second phase increasing the capacity to 23 bcm per year. The financial costs of the project were estimated at around 8 billion euros. The Azerbaija­ni government responded positively to this proposal.

Through this pipeline, natural gas reserves from Iraq, Iran, and Middle Eastern countries were expected to be transported via Turkey, Bulgaria, and Romania to Austria, from where it would be distributed to other Europe­an countries through a network of dis­tributors. Essentially, there is a pro­portional relationship between Azer­baijan’s balanced foreign policy, the “TANAP” project it proposed, and its acceptance of the “Nabucco West” project.

While Russia possesses vast gas reserves, it also maintains an insist­ence on preserving its monopolistic position by controlling its territory as the principal transit route for Central Asian and Caspian gas resources to Europe. The original “Greater Nabucco” project conflicted with Russia’s inte­rests and consequently faced Moscow’s opposition from the outset.

Russia’s signing of agreements to purchase part of Azerbaijan’s gas, as well as renewing contracts with Cen­tral Asian countries for gas trade, in our view, aimed to deprive the Nabucco pipeline of potential gas supplies. Azerbaijan’s refusal to sup­port the “Greater Nabucco” project simultaneously served to “calm” Moscow and reduce its opposition to the “TANAP” project, which is largely re­cog­nized as a joint Azerbaijani-Turkish initiative. Since “Nabucco West” cons­ti­tutes only a segment of the “Greater Nabucco” project, Russia’s stance towards it was less confronta­tional.

Furthermore, the realization of TANAP occurred in the context of ongoing negotiations between Russia and Turkey regarding the “South Stream” pipeline project, which was later re­placed by the “TurkStream” project.

The Position of Major Powers Regarding the Nabucco Project

Although officials claimed that Nabucco was not a rival to the South Stream pipeline, an analysis of Rus­sia’s energy policy—particularly re­garding natural gas—makes it clear that Russia seeks to maintain its mo­nopolistic position in exporting blue fuel to the European market. By con­trolling both the sources and transit routes, Russia gained additional lever­age amid political tensions with Europe. Since Nabucco was designed to transport natural gas from Central Asia, the Middle East, and the South Caucasus to European markets by­passing Russia²³, it naturally conflict­ed with Russian interests. Thus, de­spite assertions that Nabucco did not compete with South Stream, it was evident that this was not the case²⁴. Russia perceived Nabucco as a threat to its monopoly in European gas mar­kets.

To realize the South Stream pipe­line, official Moscow signed agree­ments with Bulgaria, Serbia, and Hungary. This move was not only intended to obstruct Nabucco but also aimed at preventing the establishment of a unified energy policy within the European Union²⁵.

Contracts signed with Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan for natural gas deli­very, which involved Russia purchas­ing a significant por­tion of the gas required by the Nabucco pipeline, further complicated the realization of the project, which already faced sub­stantial supply chal­lenges. Notably, according to the agreements, Turkmenistan committed to selling Russia 6 billion cubic me­ters of gas in 2004, increasing to 10 billion cubic meters by 2006, and reaching 70 bil­lion cubic meters an­nually after 2009. To facilitate gas transport stipulated in these contracts, the parties also agreed on the con­struction of a new pipeline passing through Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan to Russia. Naturally, all these developments depleted the po­tential gas sources for Nabucco and diminished hopes for its implementa­tion²⁶.

On May 12, 2007, Russia signed a contract with Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan under which both states undertook to transport a portion of their produced gas via the Central Asia–Center Gas Pipeline, thereby reducing their likelihood of serving as gas suppliers for Nabucco, as previ­ously noted. Analysis shows that as the probability of Turkmen and Kazakh gas serving as sources for Nabucco decreased, Iran—due to imposed sanctions—was also unable to assume the status of a reliable su­pplier. Although Azerbaijan indicated it could supply up to 8 billion cubic meters annually at best, the identities of the providers for the remaining large share of 23 billion cubic meters remained uncertain.

During the relevant period, Turkmenistan was engaged in inten­sive negotiations with China for natu­ral gas exports and favored this option over the Nabucco project²⁷. Turkmen­istan’s simultaneous supply commit­ments to Russia, China, and Iran sig­nificantly weakened its position as a primary gas supplier for Nabucco²⁸.

Among the two major European Union states, Germany (alongside France) did not view the Nabucco project favorably, which at least hin­dered its progression to an operational phase. Firstly, Germany, the EU’s strongest economy, deepened its co­operation with Russia in the natural gas sector by initiating the Nord Stream 1 and subsequently Nord Stream 2 projects. This development contributed to European financial in­stitutions’ reluctance to allocate suffi­cient credit to Nabucco. Additionally, Russia’s “new Red Army,” Gazprom, counted Germany as its largest part­ner, and former Chancellor Gerhard Schröder’s role within Gazprom’s leadership further underscored this alignment. The global economic crisis also negatively impacted the prospects for Nabucco’s realization and cannot be overlooked.

Moreover, the support for Nabucco from other major European powers such as the United Kingdom and France was not fully apparent in the context of reducing Europe’s de­pendence on Russian gas. The trans­portation of hydrocarbon resources from Central Asia and the Middle East via Turkish territory would strengthen Ankara’s economic and political position²⁹. Consequently, the foreign policies of these states toward the Middle East, closely tied to the region through history, culture, reli­gion, and other spiritual values, faced strong opposition from Turkey, as evidenced by recent events in Syria, Iraq, and Libya.

The interest of Austria’s OMV in Nabucco also waned, especially after selling 50% of its gas storage capacity in Europe to the Russian giant Gazprom. Additionally, Wintershall-a subsidiary of Germany’s BASF and a participant in the Nabucco project-cooperates with Gazprom on both the Nord Stream 2 and South Stream pro­jects, while France’s energy giant EDF also appeared inclined towards similar directions. This dynamic can be interpreted as a decline in the EU’s overall enthusiasm for Nabucco. It must be acknowledged that uncertain­ties surrounding Nabucco allowed Turkey to reach agreements with Russia on more concrete energy pro­jects such as South Stream and Blue Stream, which undoubtedly negatively affected Nabucco’s realization³⁰.

On June 23, 2007, Russia signed agreements with Italy’s ENI and sub­sequently with Hungary, Bulgaria, and Austria concerning the South Stream project³¹. This can be seen as a strategic move to diminish these coun­tries’ interest in Nabucco.

Within Turkish academic circles, discussions on the Nabucco pipeline highlighted that if gas from Central Asia and Azerbaijan were to be trans­ported through Turkey utilizing the South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP), sig­nificant problems would arise in se­curing reliable gas supplies. If Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan were also to be used as source suppliers, the SCP would need to be expanded through the construction of a parallel line.

As noted above, Turkmenistan was frequently mentioned among the po­tential source countries for supplying the Nabucco pipeline. Although Turkmenistan declared its ability to export 10 billion cubic meters of gas annually³², the lack of an adequate pipeline infrastructure posed a signifi­cant challenge. The Trans-Caspian project, which envisaged laying a pipeline beneath the Caspian Sea and had been under discussion since the early 1990s, did not seem likely to materialize in the near term. Primarily, during the period from 2010 to 2013, the final legal status of the Caspian Sea remained unresolved, and there were disagreements between Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan, par­ticularly concerning ownership of the Kapaz (Serdar) gas field. Although following the determination of the Caspian Sea’s legal status, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan signed an agree­ment on joint development of the Kapaz field, serious obstacles to con­structing the Trans-Caspian pipeline persisted. The final convention signed in Aktau on August 13, 2018, allowed the laying of pipelines on the seabed subject to unanimous consent of the littoral states, citing environmental concerns. Undoubtedly, Russia and Iran are likely to exploit these envi­ronmental concerns as a pretext to obstruct the pipeline’s construction by all means possible.

During discussions of the Nabucco project, the position of Turkey-a brotherly country aiming to become a hub in energy trade-was also signifi­cant. From a broad perspective, Turkey’s key geographic position as a transit country for natural gas from the energy-rich Middle East, Caspian Basin, and Russia to Europe, which is the primary consumer of blue fuel, provided an opportunity to maximize its advantage. Official Ankara aimed not only to serve as a transit state but also to become an energy hub. Turkey’s aspiration to purchase natu­ral gas itself and resell it to Europe, reflecting the strategic visions of Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, led to a swift resolu­tion of related challenges.

Conclusion

Against the backdrop of increasing energy demand in the European Union and the desire to overcome Russia’s monopolistic position, the Nabucco project entered the political agenda in the early 2000s. Although the Nabucco pipeline was included among the EU’s priority energy pro­jects, it ultimately failed to be real­ized. Based on the conducted re­search, the primary reason for the pro­ject’s failure was the inability to se­cure reliable supplier countries. The resource potential of each prospective supplier was analyzed in detail, and after a comprehensive examination of the challenges each faced, it was concluded that the problem of secu­ring natural gas supplies for Nabucco remained unresolved. Furthermore, the project’s significant financial scale and the inability to attract adequate investors-exacerbated by legislative ga­ps-negatively impacted its feasibility.

The stances and approaches of ma­jor powers toward the project were also analyzed. Russia was the strong­est opponent of Nabucco, vehemently rejecting any loss of Gazprom’s mo­nopolistic position in the European market. Germany and France likewise failed to provide sufficient support. At that time, Germany had already im­plemented Nord Stream 1 and was negotiating the construction of a paral­lel second pipeline. The EU’s chilly relations with Turkey also had a nega­tive impact. Additionally, the global economic crisis and the emergence of commercially attractive shale gas in Europe diminished investors’ interest in Nabucco.

Against this backdrop, Azerbaijan, considered the primary supplier coun­try, chose to cooperate with Turkey on the TANAP and TAP projects for transporting its gas to European mar­kets.

Notes

• Ə. Mehdiyev, „Enerji resurslarının nəqlində Azərbaycan Türkiyə əməkdaşlığı: “Nabukko”dan “Cənub Qaz Dəhlizi”nə”, Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi, 2018, 34 (1), p. 97; Nabucco Gas Pipeline International GmbH (NIC), “Proje”, (Çevrimiçi), http://www.nabuccopipeline.com/portal/page/portal/tr/Home/the_project, 01 Ağustos 2011, p. 244.
• Nabucco Gas Pipeline International GmbH (NIC), cit.,p.1.; Ç. İleri, „Dünden bugüne Nabucco projesi. İKV Degerlendirme notu”, Aralık, 2011/44, İktisadi Kalkınma Vakfı, www. ikv. org. Tr, p. 1.
• Üstün, M. Pazarbaşı, “Verdi Yerine Bende Can”, Milliyet Gazetesi, 14 Temmuz, 2009, p.7 ; A. Yalçınkaya, NABUCCO’dan TANAP’a Türkiye ve boru hatları, Marmara Üniversitesi, Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi. Elektron resurs file:///C:/Users/User/Downloa-ds/Alaeddin%20Yalcinkaya,%20Nabucco’dan%20TANAP’a%20Balkanlarda%20sosyal%20bilimler%20kongresi.pdf
• “The Nabucco Gas Pipeline: A Chance for the EU to push for change in Turkmenistan”, cit., pp. 6-7.
• Uluatam, “Nabucco Doğalgaz Boru Hattı Projesi Sürecinin Neresindeyiz?”, Ekonomik Forum Dergisi, Ankara, Temmuz, 2010 sayı:247, p. 67.
• Reinhard Mitschek, „Nabucco: A pioneering pipeline project”, 20th World Petroleum Congress, https://firstforum.org/wp-content/uplo-ads/2021/05/Publication_00584.pdf., pp. 72-73; Nabucco Gas Pipeline Interna­tional GmbH (NIC), “Proje”, (Çevrimiçi) http://www.nabuccopipeline.com/portal/page/portal/tr/Home/the_project, 01 Ağustos 2011, p. 72.
• Agata Łoskot-Strachota, „Nabucco vs. South Stream-Rivalry over Balkan Gas Pipelines. CES. Commentary”, Centre for eastern studies, Issue 3, 19.03. 2008, p. 6, https://www.files.ethz.ch/ isn/55482/commentary_03.pdf.; D. Langton, D. A. Roberts, “To FEED or Not to FEED?”, Petrofac Engineering-Construction & Roberts Contracts and Claims Consultants Ltd., 8 April 2009, (Çevrimiçi) http://www. Construction contractsandclaims.com/petrofac-rccc-l-presentation.pdf, 01 Eylül 2011, p. 6.
• Ibidem.
• К. П. Евгеньевич, Современное стратегическое сотрудничество Российской Федерации с Турцией в сфере энергетики, Ддиссертация на соискание ученой степени канд-идата исторических наук. Иркутс-кий Государственный Университет, Иркутск, 2014, p. 70.
• Langton, D.A. Roberts, “To FEED or Not to FEED, op. cit.; J. Kusznir, „The Nabucco Gas Pipeline Project and its Impact on EU Energy Policy in the South Caucasus”, Caucasus Analytical Digest, nr. 33, 12 December 2011, pp. 9-12.
• С. А. Кондаков, „Ттрубо-проводная дипломатия России”, Международные отношения, nr. 1, 2012, https://nbpublish. com/libra-ry_get_pdf.php?id=21312, pp. 10-11.
• M Ağayev, Nabukko qaz kəməri layihəsi. “Kültür Evreni”, Universe of Culture – Вселенная Культуры. Uluslararası Hakemli Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi. Ankara, 2010, sayı 5, pp. 162-163; İoannis N. Qriqoriadis, The Nabucco Project: Implications for the EU Strategic Energy Review, Part II-Energy and climate change challenges, Research Fellow, ELIAMEP, p. 62.
• Reinhard Mitschek, cit.; Nabucco Gas Pipeline International GmbH (NIC), op. cit., p. 72.
• Özkan, “Enerji Arz Güvenliği ve Yeni Büyük Oyun Bağlamında Nabucco Projesi”, Akademik Araştırmalar Dergisi, 2010, 12 (45), s.31-46; Nabuccoda destek imzaları atıldı.Akşam gazetesi 8. 06. 2011. W e b . 1 2 . 1 0 . 2 0 1 1 . < h t t p : / / w w w . a k s a m . c o m . t r / n a b u c c o d a - d e s t e k - i m z a l a r i - a t i l d i - - 4 6 4 0 1 h . h t m l >, p. 73.
• Reinhard Mitschek, cit.; Nabucco Gas Pipeline International GmbH (NIC), “Proje”, (Çevrimiçi), op. cit., p. 73.
• İoannis N. Qriqoriadis, cit.; Ç. İleri, op.cit., pp. 63-64.
• Doğan, „Nabucco’ nun arka üzü. Ekovitrin”, Agustos 2009, pp. 74-81, https://www.doganaydal.com/CmsFiles/FaaliyetGalerisi/92/10 Uluslararası EKOVITRIN_AGUSTOS_2009_NABUCCONUN_ARKA_YUZU.pdf.; Agata Łoskot-Strachota, op. cit.,p. 78.
• İoannis N. Qriqoriadis, cit.; Ç. İleri, op. cit., pp. 63-64.
• [1]Ə. Kərimov, Xəzər dənizinin hüquqi statusu və sahilyanı dövlətlərin maraqları, “Mütərcüm”, Bakı, 2023, p. 90; C. İşık, O.İşık, AB-Türkiye ilişkilerinde yeni adım: Nabucco, 2012, https://www.researchgate.net/ publication/268743968_AB_Turkiye_Iliskisinde_Yeni_Adim_NABUCCO S.7., p. 21.
• Ə. Kərimov, op. cit., pp. 84-85.
• Doğan, op. cit.
• Kusznir, op. cit.; C.A. Кондаков, op. cit., p. 3.
• Koçaslan, Avrupa Birliği’nin Doğalgaz Politikasi ve bu eksende Türkiye’nin önemi, vol. 61, 2011, pp. 248–249; N.Ə. Kərimov, Xəzər dənizinin hüquqi statusu və sahilyanı dövlətlərin maraqları, “Mütərcüm”, Bakı, 2023, p. 320.
• К. П. Евгеньевич, cit.; Enerji A. Doğan„ Nabucco gerçekten yüzyılın projesi mi?, Ekovitrin Ekim, 2010. https://www.doganaydal.com/CmsFiles/FaaliyetGalerisi/92/16Uluslararasi_EKOVITRIN_EKIM_2010_Nukleer_Nabucco_Ruzgar.pdf, p. 71.
• Agata Łoskot-Strachota, cit.; D. Langton, D.A. Roberts, op.cit, p. 6.
• İşık, O. İşık, op. cit.; İoannis N. Qriqoriadis, op. cit., p. 7.
• Г. Выгон , В. Ермаков , М. Белова , Е. Колбикова, «Турецкий поток»: сценарии обхода Украины и барье-ров Европейской Комиссии, VYGON Consulting, Москва, 2015, p. 17.
• С. А. Кондаков, cit.; G. Koçaslan, op. cit., p. 133.
• Özkan, op. cit.; Reinhard Mitschek, op. cit., pp. 37-38.
• Sandıkli, Doğalgaz boru hatları projelerinde Büyük Oyun: Nabucco, Güney Akım, SEEP ve TANAP, BİLGESAM, İstanbul, 20 Haziran, 2012, https://www.tuicakademi.org/ dogalgaz-boru-hatlari-projelerinde-bu-yuk-oyun-nabucco-guney-akim-seep-ve-tanap/.
• T Gökhan, V. Tatar, Türk Dış Politikasında Enerjinin Konumu: Nabucco Doğal Gaz Boru Hattı Projesi Çerçevesinde Bir Değerlen-dirme, İstanbul Üniversitesi, Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü, http://acikerisim.kirklareli.edu.tr:8080/xmlui/bitstream/handle/20.500.11857/184/20115smpz.html.pdf?sequence =1&isAllowed=y, pp. 89-107; К. П. Евгеньевич, op. cit., pp. 99.
• Doğan, op.cit., p. 74.

Bibliography

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ВЫГОН, Г., ЕРМАКОВ, В., БЕЛОВА, М., КОЛБИКОВА, Е., «Турецкий поток»: сценарии обхода Украины и барьеров Европейской Комиссии, VYGON Consulting, Москва, 2015.

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ÜSTÜN, G., Pazarbaşı, M., “Verdi Yerine Bende Can”, Milliyet Gazetesi, 14 Temmuz, 2009.

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DOĞAN, A., „Nabucco’ nun arka üzü. Ekovitrin”, Agustos 2009, pp.74-81, https://www.doganaydal.com/CmsFiles/FaaliyetGalerisi/92/10 Uluslararası EKOVITRIN_AGUSTOS_2009_NABUCCONUN_ARKA_YUZU.pdf.

IDEM, „Enerji Nabucco gerçekten yüzyılın projesi mi?”, Ekovitrin Ekim, 2010, https://www.doganaydal.com/CmsFiles/FaaliyetGalerisi/92/16Uluslararasi_EKOVITRIN_EKIM_2010_Nukleer_Nabucco_Ruzgar.pdf.

GÖKHAN, N.T, Tatar V., Türk Dış Politikasında Enerjinin Konumu: Nabucco Doğal Gaz Boru Hattı Projesi Çerçevesinde Bir Değerlendirme, İstanbul Üniversitesi, Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü, http://acikerisim.kirklareli.edu.tr:8080/xmlui/bitstream/handle/20.500.11857/184/20115smpz.html.pdf?sequence=1&i-sAllowed=y

İŞIK, C, İŞIK, O., AB-Türkiye ilişkilerin-de yeni adım: Nabucco, 2012, https://www.researchgate.net/publica-tion/268743968_AB_Turkiye_Iliskisinde_Yeni_Adim_NABUCCO.

КОНДАКОВ С. А., „Ттрубопроводная дипломатия России. Междуна-родные отношения. №1, 2012 cс.128-138. Elektron resurs: https://nbpublish. com/library_get_pdf.php?id=21312.

LANGTON, D, ROBERTS D. A., “To FEED or Not to FEED?”, Petrofac Engineering-Construction & Roberts Contracts and Claims Consultants Ltd., 8 April 2009, (Çevrimiçi) http://www. Construction contractsandclaims.com/petrofac-rcccl-presentation.pdf, 01 Eylül 2011.

Nabucco Gas Pipeline International GmbH (NIC), “Proje”, (Çevrimiçi) http://www.nabuccopipeline.com/portal/page/portal/tr/Home/the_project, 01 Ağustos 2011.

Nabuccoda destek imzaları atıldı.Akşam gazetesi 8. 06. 2011. W e b. 1 2. 1 0. 2 0 1 1. < h t t p : / / w w w . a k s a m . c o m . t r / n a b u c c o d a - d e s t e k - i m z a l a r i - a t i l d i - - 4 6 4 0 1 h. h t m l >.

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YALÇINKAYA, A., NABUCCO’dan TANAP’a Türkiye ve boru hatları, Marmara Üniversitesi, Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, file:///C:/Users/User/Downloads/Alaeddin%20Yalcinkaya,%20Nabucco’dan%20TANAP’a%20Balkanlarda%20sosyal%20bilimler%20kongresi.pdf